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Abstract
Our view of the body as passive biological matter has been tested in the face of gene editing, 
stem cell research and tissue engineering. Now biotechnological research tells us that 
bodies may be dead and alive; they may be human and non-human; multiple and yet one; 
or they may host a person’s entire biological information and yet still regarded as an object 
of commodification. The way we think about bodies, and the way we practice them, marks 
a particular tension in the way biotechnology treats our bodies. This book explores the 
conditions of thinking and practicing bodies within affect. The main presupposition of this 
research is that bodies are constituted by mutating and growing transformations that we are 
confronted with as a result of, in particular, body manipulations by the life sciences. 
 The contemporary biotechnological practices that manipulate the body have exposed 
the challenge of accepting and implementing the reciprocal relationship between the 
thought and practice of living bodies. In order to grasp the continuity of thought and 
practice of bodies, I focus on the concept of affect at work in Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy, 
in particular, in his reading of Baruch Spinoza and Jakob von Uexküll. The notion of 
affect is used to understand the relational, contaminating materialities of our bodies, and 
the term “affect” confronts us with the actual implications of its practicing. I argue that 
affect, as a transformative relationality, is induced by bioartists and biodesigners who work 
with living bodies as an artistic medium. Therefore, looking closely at how artists use the 
relational capacities of bodies in their work, I search for the conditions for practicing bodies 
within affect. This book argues that practicing affect demands a different thinking logic 
that addresses material implications for the way we not only understand the body today, 
but also, and specifically, how we practice corporeal and incorporeal bodies within a wide 
socio-political and ethical sphere. 
In order to change our way of thinking about bodies, the notion of contamination is 
employed as a way of studying and analysing relations between multiple fields and points 
of view. Contamination, rather than being in opposition to the idea of purity, is used as 
an affirmation of relations of transformation. The book is structured according to two 
main trajectories: 1) the study of bioart’s practice of “conditioning contaminations,” which 
allows us to map ways of practicing bodies within affect; and 2) an incarnation of this 
mapping within New Materialism and its selected topics, which are crucial in the search 
for the conditions for practicing bodies within affect; that is to say, a need for a human and 
non-human egalitarian reciprocity; an openness to the non-linguistic forms of meaning 
generation; the notion of agency and subjectivity outside the human dominion; the 
responsibility resulting from a “material contamination” that shapes thought and practice. 
Both trajectories of this book combine philosophical analysis, art encounters and reflection 
on life science practices. At the same time, they are disrupted and complemented by 
contaminants. 
 Contaminants disrupt each chapter and constitute a driving force in terms of what is 
important in our encounter with the transformative relations of bodies. Through disruption, 
contaminants are the stories of risky transformations that traverse not only bodies, but 
also disciplines and perspectives about bodies. Yet, each story grows unsettlingly close, 
becoming urgent and important for the fabulation of our mutual multibodies, leaving the 
reader not only with a contaminating way of thinking, but also with an understanding of 
the necessity of this relational thinking for the practice of bodies within affect.
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By reading this text you are incorporating it into your fleshy repertoire. During a focused semiotic 
transmission, more than thoughts change hands. Your basic physiology is altered as you read. 
Protein production is over – and under-regulated by intellectually reactive metabolites. Pride of 
knowledge, gullible acceptance, the deviant chuckle, these are not thoughts without physicality. 
There may be an avenue of interplay between communication and inheritance. If so, then this page 
is a transgenic vector, contagious, infective. Ideas received translate into proteins that have waiting 
receptors for novel gene expressions. Your children will have more or less bushy eyebrows if you 
continue reading. You may become too detached to breed! This is intergenerational selection, 
grammatological eugenics. 
You are now a transmemic GMO!1
An effect is first of all the trace of one body upon another, the state of a 
body insofar as it suffers the action of another body.2
We have knowledge of bodies only through the shadows they cast upon us, and it is 
through our own shadow that we know ourselves, ourselves and our bodies.3
The more we know about the porous and relational nature of our bodies, the more we 
sense how unpredictable and unexhausted the body’s capacity for transformation is. Once 
we cracked and then learned how to edit the DNA code, the endless variations of the long 
chain of changes our bodies may go through, our ideas and ways of living, continue to 
multiply, rhizomatically. We can study the imperceptible parts of our bodies, change them, 
manipulate them according to our desires, or totally reinvent the body’s purpose; yet, we 
do not seem to see these relations of change in action. What we encounter and perceive are 
already the results of these manipulations, formed into given states of bodies. We live in the 
game of shadows, but these are not the platonic ones that would refer to some transcendent 
world beyond the tangible. The shadows – noticeable effects – refer rather to a highly 
relational understanding of our way of being, of our bodies. When you eat, you not only 
1 Adam Zaretsky, “Viva Vivo! Living Art Is Dead,” Leonardo 37, no. 1 (2004): 91.
2 Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco. (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 138.
3 Ibid., 141.
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give energy and nutrition to your body, but you become with the food. When you breathe, 
your lungs not only perform the involuntary movement that provides oxygen to your blood, 
but you become with the environment that breathes with you. When you tweak the DNA 
in a body, you not only change this body’s structure, but transform the practices and ideas 
of what it means to have and be a body, of what it is like to be living. Reading these words, 
you are not detached from them, you become with me, contaminated by my thoughts and, 
maybe, you will grow more bushy eyebrows like mine, one day.
 However, if all is related, if all actions, or lack thereof, have implications for others, can 
transform others, the attempt to grasp these relations seems to be futile. After all, we are 
already changing, contaminating, transforming. Once you try to study those transformations 
in order to understand their implications, these relations are already something else in their 
movement of change. We are already immersed in affect – in relations of transformation, 
events of multiple, imperceptible encounters, like the microbes building your guts, enabling 
your daily digestions. How can we see and, more importantly, why would we need to see 
these relations of transformation? Is witnessing their results not enough? 
 If we are continuously contaminating each other, however, be it in the clean lab creating 
a new genetically modified organism (GMO), or in your kitchen at home, consuming my 
favourite Boston baked beans, what does it makes us – a GMO as our permanent state? 
Modifications, contaminations, happen imperceptibly; we can only notice the effects of 
it happening. We are thus prone to continuous doubt and uneasiness – you never know 
what a particular encounter will make you become! It seems that only in encounters with 
other bodies, when experimenting with these bodies, can we understand how our bodies 
live, how we change and how our change may influence further transformations. By 
bringing scientific practices, philosophical ideas and artistic creations into a state of mutual 
contamination, we can find a way to grasp a body’s relationality. Incorporating thinking and 
narrating new practices might be a way of understanding our mutually mutating bodies.
 I was thus confronted with bodies’ relationality by three unlikely friends: biotechnology, 
which manipulates bodies on the molecular level; art, which creates and speculates with 
bodies’ new sensations and perceptions; and philosophy, which searches for ideas and 
senses in those practices. These unlikely fellows – art, science and philosophy – awkward 
and often not without a mutual hostility, distrust and tension, became my companions in 
the quest for new contaminations. 
 To know more about our bodies, to be able to act, to be able to sustain transformation, 
requires new contaminations between practices, fields and habits. Therefore, conditioning 
and practicing contamination become a necessary starting point for understanding the 
relational nature of our bodies. Yet, how are we to survive the ongoing process of doubt and 
tension that living with contamination involves? More importantly, do we want to avoid or 
induce contamination? Is it even safe to contaminate? In other words, how can we live and 






1.1 Contaminant G like a Gift 
On 12 May 2017, as a part of the project “Trust Me, I’m an Artist”, a series of artistic events 
focused on the ethical frameworks for art working with living matter, the artists Jennifer 
Willet and Kira O’Reilly gave a performance entitled Be-wildering, in the Waag Society 
in Amsterdam. According to the organizers, the main goal of “Trust Me, I’m an Artist” 
“is to provide artists, cultural institutions and audiences with the skills to understand the 
ethical issues that arise in the creation and exhibition of artworks made in collaboration 
with biotechnology and biomedicine.”1 Yet, Willet’s and O’Reilly’s performance provided 
something rather different.
 Dressed in a white coat, tailored into a baroque dress, Jennifer Willet entered a scene of 
ethical examination next to Kira O’Reilly, who was wearing a green costume dress. Attached 
to Willet’s coat dress were bulbs, which seemed to function as Petri dishes, but also looked 
like nipples held by the pink flounces, containing samples from the many encounters that 
artist had experienced when wearing the coat. O’Reilly’s dress was dazzling and it was 
impossible not to look at her and her hat, with a majestic green feather [Figure 1]. The 
artists performed in front of an actual ethical committee consisted of experts in ethics and 
biotechnology, which judged whether their artistic pursuit could be fulfilled according to 
ethical norms. 
 Willet and O’Reilly began the event in a slightly mocking and cheerful tone. They started 
with a conversation, a narration of what was to happen and what their thought processes 
were when preparing for the event. Sipping wine and wandering around in front of the 
1 Trust Me, I’m an Artist, “About – Trust Me, I’m an Artist,” http://trustmeimanartist.eu/about/, accessed 11 
February 2017.
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audience, they debated how to create ethically and whether trust is important within art: 
“Is trust important? Does it demand to be fixed or moving? On what is trust based? Maybe 
it is not about trust or distrust – [in art] you are more alert, ready for change. Not knowing 
what will happen is a condition rather than obstacle.”2
 To the sound of O’Reilly’s dress shimmering, sequins sparkling, and sipping wine, the 
artists engaged in a calm conversation about the possibility of ethically evaluating art, 
and about their latest plan – to gather and spread contaminations, by collecting multiple 
samples and travelling through multiple spaces dispersing green glitter into the water and 
forests of Canada and Finland.3
 Having filled the space with glitter narrations, the artists exited the scene of the 
investigation, giving the ethical committee time to decide whether their project was an 
ethical one.
 The initial reaction from the ethical committee was annoyance at their grotesque play 
and ignorance of ethics: “they were playing us by not giving us the risk assessment.” In 
response, Willet said: “yes, but we gave something to you, we shared a gift with you.” But 
the ethics committee was only concerned with the dangers of contamination: “the danger is 
that the purpose [of the performance] is to contaminate.”4
 The artists gave the gift of fabulation, of thinking about contamination and 
transformation. However, the ethical committee, attached to their fixed norms and 
protocols, could not grasp what had happened. Willet and O’Reilly were conditioning 
affect, while the ethics committee were trying to fix affect. In other words, the artists were 
conditioning the spaces of contamination: they were giving a gift of change, the possibility 
of transformation, while the ethics committee wanted to control, to manage the relations of 
change and direct the movement of change into a desired and stable form.
 This art-ethics encounter seemed doomed to failure from the outset – how can you 
capture what, in fact, cannot be captured, but only lived through? How can one live with 
relations of transformation? Yet, with their creative, dazzling fabulations, the artists gave 
the gift of change – by creating the conditions of contaminations. It is for us to decide 
whether and how to use this gift.
2 Jennifer Willet & Kira O’Reilly, Performance Be-wildering by Jennifer Willet & Kira O’Reilly, 12 May 2017, 
Waag Society, Amsterdam “Events – Trust Me, I’m an Artist,” http://trustmeimanartist.eu/events/, accessed 18 
June 2017.  
3 For a detailed explanation of the project see “Events – Trust Me, I’m an Artist.”
4 Jennifer Willet & Kira O’Reilly, Performance Be-wildering by Jennifer Willet & Kira O’Reilly; conversation with 
the ethics committee, 12 May 2017, Waag Society, Amsterdam.
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Figure 1. Jennifer Willet & Kira O’Reilly, 
Be-wildering, performance, 12 May 2017, Waag 
Society, Amsterdam. Photo by A. A. Wołodźko.
1.2 Thinking with Contamination
There is something symptomatic in the proliferation of references and applications of 
affect within the art and theory concerned with multiple materialities and incorporealities. 
‘Affect’ has become a buzz word in the last decades of cultural, technological, visual, artistic, 
political, semiotic, but also biosemiotic studies concerned both with the life of bodies, 
their material ways of being and with explorations of their meaning outside any linguistic 
discourse.5 As a consequence of its myriad use and definitions, the word affect has come 
to denote, above all, a particular onto-epistemological alternative, offering an image of the 
world that is based on embodied relationality and connectivity. Melissa Gregg and Gregory 
J. Seigworth summarize it as follows:  
5 See, for instance, Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation, 1st edition (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press Books, 2002); Brian Massumi, Politics of Affect, 1st edition (Cambridge,UK/ Malden, MA: 
Polity, 2015); John Protevi, Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic (Minneapolis, MN: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2009); Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth (eds), The Affect Theory Reader (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press Books, 2010); Marie-Luise Angerer, Ecology of Affect (Lüneburg: Meson Press, 2017).
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Affect is born in in-between-ness and resides as accumulative beside-ness. 
Affect can be understood then as a gradient of bodily capacity-a supple 
incrementalism of ever-modulating force-relations-that rises and falls not 
only along various rhythms and modalities of encounter but also through 
the troughs and sieves of sensation and sensibility, an incrementalism that 
coincides with belonging to comportments of matter of virtually any and 
every sort. Hence, affect’s always immanent capacity for extending further 
still: both into and out of the interstices of the inorganic and non-living, the 
intracellular divulgences of sinew, tissue, and gut economies, and the vaporous 
evanescences of the incorporeal (events, atmospheres, feeling-tones).6
In particular, in view of the contemporary biotechnological practices that manipulate the 
body, such as gene editing, stem cell research and tissue engineering, our old views about 
the materiality of the body as a passive bearer of identity are challenged. For instance, what 
once was clearly considered as the inorganic and the organic, human and non-human, has 
now become blurred. Bodies may be dead and alive, may be human and non-human, may 
be multiple and yet one, may contain a person’s entire biological information and yet be 
commodified. Thus, the way we think about what bodies are, and how we practice those 
bodies has become inseparable with these biotechnological practices. Along with new 
technological possibilities came new desires: we hope to not only materially transform the 
structures of our bodies to such a degree that we will think and act differently, but we realize 
that our presupposition and ideas about possible ways of thinking about bodies directly 
shape these practices. Never has the reciprocal relationship between the thought and practice 
been so exposed. Affect has come to denote a contaminating force. It encompasses all that 
is material, bodily, biological, semiotical, psychological, cultural, visual, metaphorical, 
aesthetical, technological and ethical as interrelated dimensions of how bodies are.
 However, the continuous urgency and demand for the identification and categorization 
of the possibilities to directly apply theoretical findings7 seems to result in the notion of 
affect losing its transformative capacity and all that constitutes its novelty. Thinking with 
affect demands a different logic to thinking that has an actual, material implication for not 
only what we understand by the body today, but specifically, how we practice corporeal 
and incorporeal bodies. If the word affect is to be used to understand the relational, 
contaminating materialities of our bodies, we must rethink the actual matters of affect; that 
is: what are the actual implications of practicing affect? 
 In this sense, thinking with affect may offer ways not only of thinking about how to 
change bodies in biotechnological, philosophical and artistic practice, but it may actually 
change the practices of body manipulation. In this book, therefore, I argue that thinking 
with affect presents tangible problems that must be tackled. 
6 Gregg and Seigworth, The Affect Theory Reader, 2.
7 For more on this argument, see the “Contaminant P” section in this chapter.
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We need a particular methodology to study these tangible problems of thinking with affect. 
In order to map the actual changes in thought and practice that affect implies, we must go 
back to the philosophies of, in particular, Baruch Spinoza and Gilles Deleuze, for whom 
knowledge derives from the study of affect, i.e. the study of relations of bodies by mapping 
their implications. An urgent question in this regard, then, is how to map the implication 
of affect, and what happens after we acknowledge the affective nature of our bodies? In 
other words, how can we live with and practice affect? How can we live with contaminating 
encounters, and in what way might contaminating affect actually create new bodies and 
multiply new relations rather than destroy them? As performance by Willet and O’Reilly, 
Contaminant G, explores, how can we accept, but also give the gift of transformation?
 The focus of this book is thus to map the conditions of how to live within affect – how 
to live within contaminating relationality so that the multiple relations that construct our 
bodies, us, can multiply and grow? In order to understand the importance of this question, 
I focus on the definition of affect that includes the notion of contamination. What is affect, 
and how to think with affect will be the subject of the second chapter. For now, it is crucial 
to think of affect as contamination.
 There has been a long historical analysis of the sociology of the concept of contamination 
positioned against ideas of purity, clarity or objectivity, which this book cannot possibly 
do justice to. For instance, within the history of science, laboratory practices were based 
on the understanding of contamination as a threat to “pure medium cultivation,”8 and 
therefore the need to control conditions. Contamination was juxtaposed with the sense 
of purity of and certainty about scientific findings, but also with the sense of autonomy 
and rationality of practicing scientific methods. For this reason, scholars such as Michel 
Foucault and, before him, Ludwik Fleck, the biologist and physician whose work on the 
collective understanding of knowledge production influenced Thomas Kuhn, argued 
that, as relational and contingent, contamination was a conceptual tool for understanding 
how our knowledge works.9 As “defilement, pollution, infection,” and as the “blending of 
forms, words, or phrases of similar meaning or use so as to produce forms, word, or phrase 
of a new type,”10 contamination denotes not only destruction, but also construction by 
multiplication, and the creation of new relations and new bodies, as well as ideas about 
those bodies. 
8 Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies, 1st edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 167; See also Bruno Latour, Steve Woolgar, and Jonas Salk, Laboratory Life: The 
Construction of Scientific Facts, 2nd edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
9 Although Ludwik Fleck did not write explicitly about contamination, the way he analysed the working of 
scientific fact was characteristic of relationality, collectivity and contingency, as opposed to individual reflection 
and the given fact of knowledge; for more on scientific fact see: Ludwik Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn, Genesis and 
Development of a Scientific Fact (ed.), Thaddeus J. Trenn and Robert K. Merton, trans. Frederick Bradley (Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Robert S. Cohen and Thomas Schnelle (eds), Cognition and Fact: Materials 
on Ludwik Fleck, 1986 edition (Dordrecht/ Boston,MA: Springer, 1986); Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: 
An Archaeology of Medical Perception (New York: Vintage, 1994).
10 “Contamination, N.,” OED Online (Oxford University Press, n.d.), http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.leidenuni 
v.nl:2048/view/Entry/40057, accessed 16 March 2017.
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The fear of destruction has created a double bind, in particular, according to Bruno Latour, 
between science and the humanities. Science has pursued purification in the sense of 
accuracy of “subjectivity, politics, or passion.”11 By contrast, within the humanities, there 
has been a struggle to maintain the purity of humanity – the notion of morality, dignity and 
subjectivity – and keep it free of any influence from “science, technology, and objectivity.”12 
Recently, however, another notion of contamination has emerged, i.e. that rather than 
denoting a threat to the “purity” of disciplines, their methods and findings, contamination 
calls for creation.
 For instance, Alexis Shotwell, when writing about the social movements, their 
politics and ethics, argues that “we are in and of the world, contaminated and affected.”13 
As an extension of Latour’s belief that “we have never been modern,”14 Shotwell argues 
that “we have never been pure.”15 Arguing against the notion of purity, by affirming the 
omnipresence of contamination, she explains that: “To be against purity is […] not to be for 
pollution, harm, sickness, or premature death. It is to be against the rhetorical or conceptual 
attempt to delineate and delimit the world into something separable, disentangled, and 
homogenous.”16 In turn, Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, who has written about the multiple 
relationalities of Matsutake mushrooms, argues that we should approach “contamination 
as collaboration,” through which a sum becomes bigger than its parts, and a gathering 
transforms into an event and a “happening.”17 Importantly, encounters and relations are 
unpredictable within such understandings of contamination – we do not know in advance 
how bodies will influence or affect each other.18 Hence, for Tsing, it is necessary to learn 
how to listen to stories and the narrations of multiple encounters as a method of being and 
living with contamination.19
 I therefore use the word contamination as a conceptual tool for thinking about relations 
in a particular way. Contamination, rather than being in opposition to the idea of purity, is 
used as an ontological status quo. I posit that the notion of contamination is an affirmation 
of relations of transformation where tension and change is not just inscribed into the nature 
of our bodies, but welcomed. Rather than focusing on historical and scientific analysis, 
which, like the ethics committee, reveals the urge to fixed and manage relations, this study’s 
11 Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 18.
12 Ibid., 18.
13Alexis Shotwell, Against Purity: Living Ethically in Compromised Times (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2016), 10.
14 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1993).
15 Shotwell, Against Purity, 13.
16 Ibid., 15.
17 Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins 




focus is on the practice of art and its encounters as multiple stories of contamination. Thus, 
narrating art’s encounters within contamination is a way of studying the implications of 
affect, the shadows that envelop – yet, never exhaust – the imperceptible and dynamic 
nature of affect. 
 As the performance by Willet and O’Reilly exposed, contaminations are the condition 
of a creative approach to living matter. Robert Mitchell famously argued that bioart, or 
what he calls vitalist bioart,20 which works with living matter, often using the tools of 
biotechnology and life science, not only creates conditions for contaminations, (which he 
calls “affects”), but also prolongs those contaminations (affects): “bioartworks […] seek to 
extend the experience of affect rather than allowing it to resolve into situated perceptions 
and cognitions.”21 Bioartists’ use of tools from life science and art is not coincidental. 
By blurring the boundaries and looking for ways to expand the contamination between 
disciplines and perspectives of science and art, the practice of bioart with respect to life and 
living bodies becomes particularly focused on affect, even though artists may not explicitly 
refer to affect. Thus, the study of bioart’s practice of conditioning contaminations becomes 
a necessary starting point when understanding the possibility of living and thinking with 
affect. I adopt Mitchell’s ground-breaking analysis of affect in bioart in order to analyse 
affect as part of a wider socio-cultural struggle for thinking and living within transformative 
relations – within the contaminations of affect. By looking at how art and, in particular, 
bioart, conditions thinking and the practice of the relations of transformation, we can grasp 
what affect is and how we can live with it.
 In order to think about bodies within affect, I use the notion of contamination not only 
as a conceptual tool for visualizing relational and mutually transformative materialities, 
but also as a way of writing and thinking. Here, contamination becomes relevant when 
no other method for practicing and thinking bodies within affect is possible. Thus, 
in this study, I create a way of thinking and analysing bodies within affect according to 
contamination. Moreover, the concept of contamination and its way of being, with its 
rhizomatic relationality, forms the structure of this book. In other words, contamination 
becomes a way of understanding and accessing bodies within affect. Thus, each chapter of 
the book begins with an encounter with a contaminant, be it blood, air, food, shit, bacteria, 
organs, multispecies, plants or chemicals, that constructs its own story and provides its 
own narration of living matter transformations. Importantly, each contaminant’s story can 
be shifted easily between chapters and can be juxtaposed with each other by multiplying 
concepts and the problems they generate as they all share some strain of relation with 
each other. In this way, the reader may not only experience the tension that living with 
20 Mitchell distinguishes within bioart works that seek transformation (vitalist) and works that merely reflect 
on biotechnological and biomedical realities (prophylactic). For further analysis, see Robert E. Mitchell, Bioart 
and the Vitality of Media (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2010), 11-12. I do not follow Mitchell’s 
distinction within this book. The definition of bioart is elaborated on later in this chapter.
21 Ibid., 77.
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contamination entails, but also learn how to map and condition affect’s transformative 
capacities. 
 An important aspect of this approach is the style of writing adopted for this research. 
Since a contamination that changes or modulates bodies is hardly a safe phenomenon, 
it is important to reflect this sense of risk and tension in my writing as well. I therefore 
investigate bodies within affect using two trajectories, which pervade each chapter. The first 
is trajectory charged with personal experience and is used to write about encountering art’s 
practice with bodies and the problems that arise when thinking about bodies’ relationality. 
By contrast, the second trajectory has a scholarly and non-personal tone, which I learned 
as a philosophy student. Sometimes, these two trajectories are entirely separate, at others 
they intermingle, producing not only tension for the reader, but also revealing my struggle 
to grasp the ungraspable. Thus, these two trajectories are not complementary. They are not 
a universal overview of perspectives. Rather, I seek sustainable tension and disruption as a 
way to condition the search that belongs to living within affect.
 Finally, contamination, as both a concept and a method, allows me to avoid a linear 
approach to discussing bodies within affect. Rather than juxtaposing the fields of science, art 
and philosophy and comparing and illustrating arguments about their multiple perspectives, 
I create encounters between them. In this way, contamination built on relationality and 
transformation shapes my methodology without a method when practicing contaminating 
bodies within affect.
1.3 Contaminant P like a Patent for Cancer
The particular discrepancy between the practice of affect and its control, between discovering 
the relations of transformation and managing these relations in order to achieve particular 
formations, is present in the practices of biotechnology. Take, for instance, the patenting of 
the human genome, which touches the very intimate and existential realm of what it means 
to have and be a body. Donna Dickenson reports that, according to common law, once a 
part of your body is separated from you, it is legally treated as waste and as not belonging 
to anybody [lat. res nullius].22 Dickenson believes that this disposable attitude to body parts 
that have been detached from the body is due to the traditional distinction between a person 
and raw matter. Unlike a body part, persons cannot be owned as this would undermine the 
notion of human dignity.23 However, as Dickenson states, recent biotechnological practices 
22 Donna Dickenson, Property in the Body: Feminist Perspectives, 1st edition (Cambridge, UK/New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 3.
23 “Man cannot dispose over himself, because he is not a thing. He is not his own property - that would be a 
contradiction; for so far as he is a person, he is a subject, who can have ownership of other things. But now were 
he something owned by himself, he would be a thing over which he can have ownership. He is, however, a person, 
who is not property, so he cannot be a thing such as he might own; for it is impossible, of course, to be at once 
a thing and a person, a proprietor and a property at the same time,” in Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, ed. J. 
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undermine the boundaries between what can be considered as a person and what is just a 
raw body part, which results making the body a much more fluid and hybrid phenomenon. 
 The scale and implications of the hybridity and relationality of the body as a result of 
biotechnological practices can be seen, for instance, within the phenomenon of human 
genome patenting and genetic testing, the most lucrative applications of biotechnological 
innovations.24 Till 2013, it was common practice to patent the human genome once it had 
been isolated from the body. Even though genes are not an invention as such, their isolation 
from a body was considered an innovative practice and thus subject to patenting laws.25 
This resulted in an enormous biomarket, where, in the 1980s-1990s, till 2005, over twenty 
per cent of the human genome was patented in the US.26 A patent is “a legal right granted 
to inventors by national governments to exclude others from making, using or selling their 
invention in a given country,”27 and so, in this context, its function presupposes that parts 
of our own body are legally owned by companies and institutions.28 Most importantly, gene 
patents are usually applied to all methods of their detection. This means that every test and 
tool involved in the management of a particular sequence are covered by patent laws. The 
patent thus reaches a very broad research area, and this may have consequences for future 
innovation and medical care. Since the main role of patents in the biotechnology that has 
induced genetic testing was to allow for private investment in research and development, 
biotechnology has transformed from a common good into a commodification and 
exploitation of the body. 
 Arguably, things have changed once the US Supreme Court banned the patenting of 
“natural” genes in the case of the Myriad Genetics Inc., the company that discovered the 
sequence and location of BRCA1 and BRCA1 – a gene mutation that increases the risk 
of ovarian and breast cancer: “A naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature 
and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but cDNA is patent eligible 
because it is not naturally occurring.”29 However, things become more ambiguous when 
we look not only at the differences, but also at the similarities between DNA and its copy, 
cDNA (complementary DNA). cDNA is “a type of a man-made DNA composition, which 
B. Schneewind, trans. Peter Heath, new edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 157; Dickenson, 
Property in the Body, 5.
24 Robert Cook-Deegan and Annie Niehaus, “After Myriad: Genetic Testing in the Wake of Recent Supreme Court 
Decisions about Gene Patents,” Current Genetic Medicine Reports 2, no. 4 (2014): 223
25 David Koepsell, Who Owns You: The Corporate Gold Rush to Patent Your Genes, 1st edition (Chichester, UK/
Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 5-6.
26 Kyle Jensen and Gloria Bevan, “Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human genome. (Intellectual Property),” 
Science 310, no. 5746 (2005): 239-240, doi:10.1126/science.1120014.
27 Yann Joly and Patricia N. Tonin, “Social, Ethical and Legal Considerations Raised by the Discovery and Patenting 
of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 Genes,” New Genetics and Society 33, no. 2 (2014): 170.
28 Koepsell, Who Owns You; Donna Dickenson, Body Shopping: Converting Body Parts to Profit, 1st edition (Oxford: 
Oneworld Publications, 2009).
29 Supreme Court of the United States Syllabus Association for Molecular Pathology, Certiorari to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit No. 12–398. Argued April 15, 2013. Decided 13 June 2013, http://www.
supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-398_1b7d.pdf, accessed 7 February 2015.
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is made in a lab with an enzyme that creates DNA from RNA template.”30 Not naturally 
occurring, and structurally and functionally different from DNA, cDNA thus complies with 
the patent law. Nevertheless, some critics argue that, despite its structural and functional 
difference, which allows for the further research, the copy (cDNA) still holds exactly the 
same information as the original (DNA).31 Moreover, because cDNA is not distinct from 
the methods it is extracted with, there is no specification of how much intervention is 
actually needed in order for the gene to be legally patented, since mere simple separation 
from the body is no longer a boundary.32
 Despite the lack of boundaries and clear definitions of what a body’s natural state is 
and what its manipulated state is, Myriad, (like other companies involved in human gene 
patenting), practices what is now called personalized medicine. Bodies are practiced as 
autonomous and fixed identities, independent from collective relations.33 As Dickenson 
argues, personalized medicine deliberately positions itself against we medicine, emphasising 
individual responsibility and care, rather than a collective and relational understanding of 
the way our bodies are. We witnessed the power of individual choice when the American 
actress Angelina Jolie announced that she had undergone a double mastectomy due to the 
presence of the BRCA gene in her body. This was in 2013, just before the Supreme Court 
decision in the Myriad case and the actress’s experience provoked a public debate about 
the necessity of testing for the cancer gene. However, the media conveniently failed to 
mention the patent that applied to the BRCA gene, and just how expensive the test to detect 
it was (in 2013, the test cost between US$3,000 and US$4,000).34 Moreover, the decision 
to undergo the mastectomy – which for the average woman does not end with a full breast 
reconstruction as it did in Jolie’s case – was portrayed as being a woman’s – a mother’s – 
individual choice. The discussion of the elective surgery largely ignored any discussion 
of the financial, political or social situation of women, or of the industry involved in 
performing these tests. 
 Importantly, in order for the testing to be accurate and certain, a large database of 
the variation of this mutation is needed. You need “we medicine in order to perform a 
successful me medicine.”35 In other words, to be accurate, any medicine depends on a range 
30 Joly and Tonin, “Social, Ethical and Legal Considerations Raised by the Discovery and Patenting of the BRCA1 
and BRCA2 Genes,” 176.
31 Kristen L. Burge, “Personalized Medicine, Genetic Exceptionalism, and the Rule of Law: An Analysis of the 
Prevailing Justification for Invalidating BRCA1/2 Patents in Association of Molecular Pathology v. USPTO,” 
Washington Journal for Law, Technology & Arts 8, no. 4 (2013): 514.
32 Cook-Deegan and Niehaus, “After Myriad,” 224.
33 Ibid.
34 Gayle Sulik, “Opinion: Why Jolie’s Cancer Test Costs so Much - CNN.com,” Special to CNN, http://www.
cnn.com/2013/05/24/opinion/sulik-patented-genes/index.html, accessed 21 May 2015; Paul Harris in New 
York, “Angelina Jolie’s Cancer Decision Highlights Row over Genetic Technology,” The Guardian, http://www.
theguardian.com/film/2013/may/19/angelina-jolie-cancer-row-genetic-technology, accessed 21 May 2015.
35 Donna Dickenson, Me Medicine vs. We Medicine: Reclaiming Biotechnology for the Common Good, 1st edition 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 47.
Introduction 29
of relational practices and multiple bodies from various social, political and biological states. 
Any distinction, therefore, between “me” and “we” medicine is an artificial one. Medical 
practice has exposed how “me” medicine has already been “we” medicine. The tangible 
danger, however, is that these relational practices become veiled by the abstract categories 
of individuality and autonomy. In other words, while we are already living within affect, and 
are already practicing affect’s contaminations and its multiple relations and implications 
for various spheres of living bodies, we have never really changed our logic with regard to 
affect.
 In the case of Myriad, while, in principle, researchers, share their genome database 
in order to provide an exchange of information for the common good and to promote 
innovation and accurate medical care, fear of competition led the company to stop 
contributing to the data already in 2004. It has also stopped publicising new information 
about variations. As a major performer of tests for the BRCA gene, Myriad has thus 
significantly restricted research on breast cancer. The company’s self-interest, clothed in 
a policy of personalized medicine has stopped the flow of data and, therefore, causing less 
accurate medical care.36 What is worse, after the US Supreme Court decision of 15 April 
2013, Myriad filed a number of lawsuits against laboratories that had started to offer the 
BRCA test more cheaply.37
 What we learn from the BRCA case, is that by failing to change the logic of thinking 
about the bodies and as a result of its perpetuation of the belief in the autonomy of bodies, 
despite their obvious dependence on bodies’ relationality, the gene patenting industry has 
created even stronger hierarchies among bodies. The industry’s policies have enacted a 
strong belief in determinism, ascribed to DNA within the practices of biotechnological, 
economic and political application. The idea of the autonomous body is stronger than the 
actual matters of practice and relations that construct the body. Such practice of the body 
has preserved the nature/culture divide in a bizarrely paradoxical way. 
 The US Supreme Court’s decision perpetuates a belief in the exclusion of nature from 
any economic-political spheres. As long as something does not occur in “nature”, it can be 
patented. However, as shown in the case of Myriad, the copy (cDNA) of DNA that is to be 
patented holds exactly the same information as the original (DNA). The border between 
what occurs naturally and culturally, what is original and what is a copy, is thus blurred. 
Without the “original” DNA there would be no cDNA in the first place. Moreover, what 
is considered as artificial and therefore ready for manipulation and commodification, 
materially influences and transforms what we consider to be “natural”. The promise of cure 
and treatment that has justified the privatization and monopolization of research, ultimately 
influences our own bodies and lives. Patented genes sequences do not regard a particular 
body, but “the body”. Patents have a universal function, which, in turn, incorporates all 
36 Joly and Tonin, “Social, Ethical and Legal Considerations Raised by the Discovery and Patenting of the BRCA1 
and BRCA2 Genes,” 177-78.
37 Cook-Deegan and Niehaus, “After Myriad,” 227.
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our bodies under its law. Once you have a breast cancer, part of you, what you think of as 
the “natural” you, belongs, in practice, to the corporation. The artificial divide between 
the “state of nature” and man-made practice does not respond to our bodies, which are an 
entanglement of living matter and practices.
 Furthermore, the Myriad case is also a striking example because it shows the consequences 
of our lack of understanding that biotechnology has a real material impact on our social 
and political life. Here, the idea of personhood and human dignity cannot do justice to the 
scale of novelty and unpredictability of the biotechnological world. Biobanks, which are the 
modern equivalent of surveillance and property, have resulted in: commodified cell lines, 
such as those in the Henrietta Lacks legal case,38 promises of regenerative medicine via new 
methods that transform a cell from an adult body into any other type of a cell, and CRISPR 
genome editing, which makes the idea of designer babies not just futuristic speculation, but 
a scientific possibly.39 Indeed, these new biotechnological inventions have undermined any 
doubt about the influence that biotechnology already has in shaping our lives. 
 These phenomena are not just the concern of bioethical committees and economic 
policies, they directly touch the multiple political, social and cultural realms of our existence. 
Ingeborg Reichle called the unprecedented power inherent to the use of biotechnology 
“bottom-up eugenics”, which is not based directly on a socio-cultural idea and narration, 
but rather the market and profit.40 As Robert Zwijnenberg argues, biotechnology inevitably 
correlates with such problems as, for instance, human enhancement, posing not only ethical 
and legal problems, but forcing more philosophically and culturally varied questions and 
attitudes, i.e. “who and what do we want to be as humans, and who and what do we want to 
become?”41
 Biotechnological innovations that allow us to manipulate our bodies construct economic-
social realities that do not respond to disciplinary divisions. Economic and political demands 
are strongly entangled with scientific findings, technologies and their agencies, which, in 
turn, inevitably influence social and cultural, individual and the population’s practices, 
as well as our lives and bodies. However, as the Myriad case shows, once these multiple 
entanglements are applied according to the traditional beliefs in autonomy, individuation 
and personalization, which do not respond to the relational nature of phenomena, we enter 
38 Henrietta Lacks, an African American woman born in Virginia, United States of America, died in 1951, aged 
31, of cervical cancer. Her cells were taken from her body without her or her family’s consent. The cells were then 
commodified into a cell line known as the HeLa cell. This gave rise to over ten thousand patents, which have 
been used extensively in medicine and research ever since. However, in 2013, the Lacks family won some right 
to acknowledgment.See “Lacks Family,” Lacks Family Website, http://www.lacksfamily.net/, accessed 21 May 2015. 
See also Rebecca Skloot, The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks (New York: Broadway Books, 2011).
39 Heidi Ledford, “CRISPR: Gene Editing Is Just the Beginning,” Nature News 531, no. 7593 (10 March 2016): 156, 
doi.org/10.1038/531156a.
40 Ingeborg Reichle, Art in the Age of Technoscience: Genetic Engineering, Robotics, and Artificial Life in 
Contemporary Art, preface Robert Zwijnenberg, trans. Gloria Custance, 1st edition (Vienna/New York: Springer 
Vienna Architecture, 2009), 26.
41 Robert Zwijnenberg, “Biotechnology, Human Dignity and the Importance of Art,” Teoria No. 1(2014), pp. 131-
148.
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into the realm of utopian beliefs in purity and clear-cut boundaries between species and 
disciplines. For instance, transhumanists’ desire for designer babies and perfect humans,42 
fuelled by an unquestioning use of technology, is just one among many examples of using 
relationality not as an ontological way of being, but as a means for strengthening the fixed 
ideas about our bodies. We already live and practice affect, that is why, if we do not think 
and act according to its dynamic nature, we create even sharper dualisms, polarizations and 
hierarchies. It is therefore time to map these material and relational ways of understanding. 
It is time to map bodies within affect, in order to meet the challenges of the biotechnological 
future. The question is, how to do that? How can we relationally practice the relational 
nature of our bodies? In other words, how do we make matters of affect matter?
1.4 Contaminant E like an Embryo’s Little Wings
One of the first classes on bioethics in practice that I attended was conducted by Robert 
Zwijnenberg and Amalia Kallergi. It was titled Who Owns Life and involved the bioartist 
Boo Chapple. This lecture was part of a series of hands-on bioethics classes initiated by 
Zwijnenberg at Leiden University since 2006, gathering together students from various 
faculties such as literature, history, philosophy, law and life sciences. The first class of the 
series was with Adam Zaretsky and his project VivoArts: Art and Biology Studio – Wet 
Lab Practice and Bio-Art Pedagogy, which set the tone and experimental nature of the 
subsequent lectures.
 In the class with Chapple, we were asked to join a performance to baptise chicken 
egg embryos, following a protocol of ‘windowing’, as is practiced in developmental study. 
Chapple explained that the embryos never reach their adult stage and so it might be a 
humanitarian act to baptise them. I remember clearly how most of my presuppositions 
about ethics and morality collapsed and appeared meaningless once I was asked to use 
my hands and “get them wet” in the vast matters of the materiality of bodies, in order to 
understand what is actually happening in biotechnology. My “humanistic” idea about life 
and the living body was insignificant, and I was overwhelmed by the sense of powerlessness 
I felt when dealing with issue of body manipulation. 
 The usual procedure for windowing an egg involves making a whole in the shell so that 
you can observe the inside without significantly harming the embryo. First, you remove the 
egg from the incubator into an environment that has a constant temperature of 37 degrees 
and 60% humidity. Before an egg can be windowed, it must be sterilized using 70% ethanol. 
You carefully make a cut in the egg shell following the given instructions about the size, 
42 “Humanity+, Philosophy, http://humanityplus.org/philosophy/philosophy-2/, accessed 25 August 2017.
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angle and pressure necessary to make an opening [Figure 2]. After your study, you must 
close the shell with plastic tape and return the egg to the incubator.43
Figure 2. Windowed egg with 
an embryo. 
Photo by A. A. Wołodźko
In my case, making the incision at the proper angle and in the correct place went smoothly 
and according to the rules. I and my fellow students performed the experiment with a 
careful precision and accuracy, and felt proud to have carried out the procedure successfully. 
Everything changed, however, when the students were able to see a chicken embryo inside. 
The strange fulfilment of the desire to see and explore what is hidden overwhelmed the 
entire group of quasi-scientists. Students of law, art history, literature and philosophy, 
wearing white coats that seemed to shield them from any moral judgement, were poking 
and prodding, extracting the yolk fluid, laughing and cheering. Some baptized the embryo 
by squirting it with water from a syringe. Unable to connect their material discovery with 
fixed ideas and identities, they were playing with the embryos. At the end of the session, all 
the eggs were thrown into the biohazard trash box. I also threw away mine.
 Intriguingly, before the experiment, Chapple carefully explained what the embryos 
would look like in their developmental stage, and outlined what the windowing procedure 
involves, and how she sees the baptism of those embryos as a humane act since they would 
be exterminated before reaching an adult stage. Students were then asked whether they still 
wanted to participate. We must have been so bored with the usual ethics classes, that we 
all enthusiastically put on our white coats, ready for our first experience with living matter. 
The only student that refused to take part was a third-year life science student, who was 
43 Matthew J. Korn and Karina S. Cramer, “Windowing Chicken Eggs for Developmental Studies,” Journal of 
Visualized Experiments: JoVE, no. 8 (October 1, 2007), doi.org/10.3791/306.
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taking the classes to learn about the ethics of biotechnological manipulation. She told us 
that she had joined the classes to learn more than her department was able to offer her. 
I was intrigued when she explained, after the class, that this experiment was useless and 
unethical. According to her, the performance of baptising the windowed egg served no 
purpose in terms of developmental learning and was just some artistic project. 
 I took the chicken embryo that had been ascribed to this girl home. I felt it would be 
a pity to throw away it like that, and I was also feeling guilty about destroying the one I 
had opened so easily. I had an idea about performing the same experiment in a different 
environment. I wanted to see what would happen in a space like my home kitchen. I 
suspected that the place and the circumstances influence the experiment’s findings. 
Therefore, when I arrived home, I put the egg in a fridge. The next day, I performed the 
same experiment, this time with the aim to extract the embryo and keep it in the alcohol, 
as a reminder of this baptism-performance experience. However, I had not anticipated my 
reaction when performing exactly the same act as the day before, but without my white 
coat, laboratorial environment, teachers and others who were doing exactly the same. I 
knew it would be different, yet I did not foresee that I would actually be shaking on seeing 
that this eleven-day-old embryo was not a mass of wet yolk, but a little being, which already 
had the form of a chicken [Figure 3]. I could see the beak, little wings and legs. I found 
myself thinking that this whole experiment was pointless and even cruel. I realized that, 
despite myself, I had been driven by immediate emotions and moral judgement: because I 
could recognize and identify the yolk as a chicken, I was able to question my action, I was 
able to feel responsible. My moral position and even empathy, was thus only driven by my 
ability to identify and to categorize according to a given understanding of what is a living 
being that deserves life. I was caught in my need for anthropomorphising; my morality was 
anthropocentric. Only then did I understand a little better what Boo Chapple had tried to 
show us. 
1.5 New Material Contaminations
We know that all knowledge and meaning must have context; yet, we act and learn in a 
non-contextual way. Secured within our disciplinary boundaries, we have no chance to 
experiment with other perspectives, contaminations and their challenges. Moreover, within 
the short hands-on bioethics classes, I had soon come to realize that we actually have no 
methodological tools to address the problems that we were being confronted with, such 
as the commodification of living bodies in a more situated, relational and processual 
character. We take context, its material tools and methods for granted, instead of inquiring 
about what their role is in the formation of meaning. Above all, after many discussions with 
the students and teachers of the Who Owns Life course, it gradually became obvious to me 
that we do not have the semiotic tools to address this contaminated, local and embodied 
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production of meaning. We were all approaching the dilemmas from the closed perspective 
of focusing on human subject and human-like identities, fixed laws and disciplinary 
boundaries. We thus seemed to lack the understanding that our bodily state, habits and 
presuppositions significantly influence what we take as knowledge. We do not know how 
to relate with radical difference, how to act in a situation where perspective and habits 
are contaminated, or how to approach something that we cannot categorize and compare 
to what we already know. Instead of following fixed rules and established methods when 
studying the relationality of bodies and its practice, there seems to be an urgent need to 
implement relationality and contamination as a valid material understanding. This need 
results in a shift from the priority of epistemological fixation on truth, to an onto-ethical 
attentiveness about how we select what is important and how we deal with consequences 
of such choices. 
Figure 3. Embryo from windowed egg, 
kitchen experiment. 
Photo by A. A. Wołodźko
Annemarie Mol described this shift in philosophical thinking as a change of question, 
from: “how can we be sure?” to “how to live with doubt?”44  In her analyses of the body in 
contemporary medical practice, she moves from epistemology, which is concerned with 
44 Annemarie Mol, The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice (Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 
2003), 165.
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the accuracy of our representations of reality, towards a more ontological perspective, 
understood as a focus on how the objects of our study are enacted in practice. In this sense, 
Mol is arguing for the multiplication of reality: “objects come into being – and disappear 
– with the practices in which they are manipulated. And since the object of manipulation 
tends to differ from one practice to another, reality multiplies.”45 Her question is thus 
focused on relations, how the objects of our study – in her case, bodies in medical care – are 
related to each other, while bearing in mind that each multiplied body is as real as any 
other. In that sense, for Mol, knowledge is a matter of ontology understood as practice 
and enactment, rather than representation and truth. As such a practice of multiplicity, 
constructed meanings are uncertain, fragile and often volatile. 
 This transitory character of the multiple notion of the body, has been exercised 
continuously in Zwijnenberg’s classes. Rather than discredit such generation of meaning 
due to its epistemologically uncertain nature, students were forced to confront the question 
of how to take it seriously. The challenge to take seriously what is elusive and partial, 
consequently, constructs a highly ethical position: “somehow we must learn to understand 
how it is that given the possibility, we can still act.”46
 The affirmative approach to doubt, understood in terms of a volatile notion of the 
meaning of bodies, is what Donna Haraway famously defines as situated knowledge. She 
transforms the traditional idea of objectivity, based on Thomas Aquinas’s corresponding 
notion of truth and the idea of disengagement of the subject from the object of study, into 
a more partial perspective: “Objectivity is not about disengagement but about mutual and 
usually unequal structuring, about taking risks in a world where “we” are permanently 
mortal, that is, not in “final” control.”47 Partiality, unlike relativity, which, she argues, is 
only a mirror of the representational idea of truth, is grounded in responsibility and care. 
Haraway argues that a situated approach to knowledge demands an ontological shift: it 
“requires that the object of knowledge be pictured as an actor and agent, not as a screen or 
a ground or a resource.”48 As shown in Zwijnenberg’s lab classes, this involves introducing 
a sense of risk and experimentation to the humanistic reflection that acknowledges 
responsibility and care in the face of human, but also non-human multiple agencies. The 
debate around the body is transformed here into a more material logic that involves what, 
in academia, has recently come to be known as “a new material thinking”.
 “New materialism” grew from an understanding that our bodies must be approached 
in terms of relational thinking. Scholars such as Rosi Braidotti, Elizabeth Grosz or Stacy 
Alaimo have been arguing that the practice of relational thinking about bodies is fostered, 
in particular, by the contemporary biotechnological practices that make biology and life 
45 Ibid., 5.
46 Ibid., 165.
47 Donna J. Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 
Perspective,” Feminist Studies 14, no. 3 (1988): 595-596.
48 Ibid., 592.
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the main focus of humanistic concerns.49 New materialist thinkers thus urge rejecting 
the epistemological dualism of mind and body as well as the idea that living matter is 
subordinate and passive.50 By engaging in an analysis of life as a non-human and non-
organic generative force, new materialist scholars force us to rethink the notion of matter 
and life within philosophical, cultural and political studies, in a more egalitarian, self-
critical and non-essentialist way.51 This means that, rather than understanding living bodies 
in terms of fixed properties, they understood bodies as being composed of relations and 
processes, dynamic, folding, continuously contaminating each other. New materialism thus 
breaks with the a-biological perspective on the body within the humanities, and shifts the 
discursive analysis to highly relational thinking.52 It calls for a readdressing of the question 
of knowledge production, which is not a representation of the world, but rather a relational, 
ethological and shared process of meaning construction beyond anthropocentrism. Because 
of that new focus on meaning production, recently, Jakob von Uexküll’s notion of umwelt 
and relational understanding of meaning production in the animal world has received 
much attention. I will explore his ideas in the context of material notion of meaning later. 
For now, it is important to note that the questions that have been raised mainly within 
biosemiotics and zoosemiotics,53 have become part of new materialism and reinforce a 
discussion on the material and environmental notion of meaning production within wider 
socio-cultural and political study.
 Importantly, new material non-anthropocentrism as a mode of thought is not about a 
sudden deprivation of the human perspective. After all, as humans, we have a particular 
body that determines how and what we can experience. The focus is rather on the particular 
materiality of this experience that implements various non-dualistic and collective 
understandings of the way we live and how we gather our knowledge. In that sense, it is 
much more than a non-dualistic shape of methods and values. Rather than discursive 
deconstruction of the human as a normative idea and a methodological paradigm, it is 
about a material and relational approach to already existing concepts such as the body, life 
and matter. 
49 Elizabeth Grosz, The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely (Durham, NC: Duke University Press 
Books, 2004); Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman, 1st edition (Cambridge, UK/Malden, MA: Polity, 2013); Stacy 
Alaimo, Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
2010).
50 Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (eds), New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (Durham, NC/ 
London: Duke University Press Books, 2010); Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin, New Materialism: Interviews & 
Cartographies (Ann Arbor, MI: MPublishing, University of Michigan Library, 2012).
51 Donna J. Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2007); Cary Wolfe, 
What Is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2009); Joanna Zylinska, Bioethics in 
the Age of New Media, 1st edition (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009); Rosi Braidotti, Transpositions: On Nomadic 
Ethics (Cambridge [etc.]: Polity, 2006); Braidotti, The Posthuman, 2013.
52 Braidotti, Transpositions; Braidotti, The Posthuman, 2013; Roberto Esposito, The Third Person, 1st edition 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2012); Protevi, Political Affect, 2009; Alaimo, Bodily Natures.
53 See, for instance, Wendy Wheeler, The Whole Creature: Complexity, Biosemiotics and the Evolution of Culture 
(London: Lawrence And Wishart Ltd, 2006).
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Rosi Braidotti explains this in terms of the radical distinction between posthumanism and 
postanthropocentrism, where the former denotes disciplinary problems within philosophy, 
history, cultural studies and what she describes as classical Humanities, and the latter 
embraces transdisciplinary attentiveness and relations between “science and technology 
studies, new media and digital culture, environmentalism and earth-science, biogenetics, 
neuroscience and robotics, evolutionary theory, critical legal theory, primatology, animal 
rights and science fiction.”54 In other words, postanthropocentrism as a non-anthropocentric 
shift in thinking did not grow from anti-humanist, deconstructive premonitions, but rather 
from affirmative, material and transdisciplinary necessity for a more relational and vital 
understanding of our various ways of being, knowing and acting. Above all, it involves 
a semiotic turn that finds construction of meaning in various human and non-human, 
organic and inorganic agents and their reciprocal relationality and interactions.
 The entanglements and relations between science, culture, nature become, or rather 
always have been, so varied and complex that we have finally realized that we must change 
our approach. While recent decades have seen the rise of the actor-network theory within 
the social sciences, which presupposes that everything is universally and homogenously 
connected, new materialists think in terms of contaminations; thus, for them, connections 
are everything. There are ethical and ecological consequences to such a position that 
focuses on particular relations rather than the universality of interconnectedness. While 
Timothy Morton argues that ecology starts with a radical openness to everything,55 I adopt 
new materialist thought and propose to change the logic of thinking. Thinking with bodies 
within affect demands a different focus. Thinking with affect is initiated by an attentiveness 
to particular differentiations in relations – each relation contaminates, changes and 
transforms bodies in a radically different way. The challenge is thus how to relate so that we 
can continue to practice contaminations? 
 Moreover, according to Joanna Zylinska, because we are all entangled there is a 
requirement of responsibility.56 Importantly, however, as Alexander R. Galloway and Eugene 
Thacker noticed, the idea of connectivity is already embedded within “a new management 
style, a new physics of organization that is real as pyramidal hierarchy.”57 Regarding the 
example of networks in cybernetics, Galloway and Thacker explain how a network, as a 
system of interconnectivity, is always ruled by protocols – immanent expressions of control. 
The main consequence of uncritical application of network systems in ecological and 
ethical debate is the treating of living bodies and biology, in general, as such an information 
network system, in which life is something to be managed and instrumentalized. In this 
way, biotechnology found an easy route through the ethical committees, for instance, since, 
54 Braidotti, The Posthuman, 2013, 57–58.
55 Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 1.
56 Joanna Zylinska, Minimal Ethics for the Anthropocene (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Library, Open 
Humanities Press, 2014).
57 Alexander R. Galloway and Eugene Thacker, The Exploit: A Theory of Networks (Minneapolis, MN: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2007), 29.
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as another type of network, the body became an instrument for enframing the information 
system. As such, life and the body became easy to manufacture,58 as the earlier example of 
gene patents showed. Although Zylinska signals that her new minimal ethics is based on 
differentiations and the dynamism of connections – and, in that sense, is “non-systemic” 
and “non-normative”59 – in order for her plea to be realized in practice, stronger emphasis 
on the understanding of partiality and its actual consequences becomes crucial. 
 When we emphasize partial relations – local or global, yet always already situated in a 
particular context – then these relations carry a profound strength and consequences. They 
gain not only a particular politico-historical scale, but also have onto-ethical implications. 
Suddenly, relations determine our very existence. In that sense, the emphasis that relations 
are everything, rather than that everything is related, becomes crucial. We realize that 
our actions produce new relations, which, in turn, trigger new sets of relations and new 
problems. The question of ethics is thus the question of material entanglements, which 
generate situated forms of knowledge, material contaminating realities of living and 
practicing affect that we create and are created by. For this reason, in my study of bodies 
within affect, I adopt Nina Lykke and Anneke M. Smelik’s material sense of meaning, which 
they formulate as “the new material-semiotic.” As they argue, “we must develop scientific 
thinking at the intersection of different domains and learn to think in terms of processes 
and interrelations.”60
 The limitations of the research that follows does not allow me to do justice to the 
complexity and scope of the material semiotics that grew from the material feminist theories 
of such scholars as Rosi Braidotti, Elizabeth Grosz, Donna Haraway, Claire Colebrook, Jane 
Benett, Karen Barad and Stacy Alaimo.61 My reading of their work thus focuses on those 
aspects of new materialism that are important to my study of contaminating bodies within 
affect, namely: 
 ќ a need for a human and non-human egalitarian reciprocity; 
 ќ an openness to the non-linguistic forms of meaning generation; 
 ќ the rethinking of the notion of life and agency outside the human dominion;
 ќ the awareness of a “material contamination,” which denotes that, because matter 
becomes inseparable from meaning, each encounter is intrinsically ethical.
The various influences and points of reference of new materialism have created a powerful 
conceptual basis for thinking about bodies. This book is a continuation of new material 
thought and its struggle to find new material methodologies. The main questions of new 
58 Ibid., 48.
59 Zylinska, Minimal Ethics for the Anthropocene, 21.
60 Anneke M. Smelik and Nina Lykke (eds), Bits of Life: Feminism at the Intersections of Media, Bioscience, and 
Technology (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2008), xiv.
61 See Stacy Alaimo and Susan J. Hekman, Material Feminisms (Bloomington, IN [etc.]: Indiana University Press, 
2008); Iris van der Tuin, “‘New Feminist Materialisms,’” Women’s Studies International Forum 34, no. 4 (July 1, 
2011): 271–77.
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material thinking will be analysed here with regard to how to practice the material way of 
thinking within affect. The main entry point for this search is the tension between three 
unlikely friends that deal with contaminating matters: art, science and philosophy.
1.7 Bioart’s Gift 
Tension between art, science and philosophy was of particular interest to Deleuze and Guattari 
for whom all three constitute and define thought.62 I employ here their understanding of 
the relationship between art, science and philosophy, which carries a particular tension: 
“the three thoughts intersect and intertwine but without synthesis or identification.”63 Each 
field is different and yet related to the other by challenges and hesitations. Nevertheless, for 
Deleuze and Guattari, it is the particular nature of art that produces affect. Art generates 
relations of contaminations, it produces those relations by initiating transformations 
and movements. Both Deleuze and Guattari see art as “a compound of perceptions and 
affects”;64 art preserves affects, but, they argue, “if art preserves it does not do so like 
industry, by adding a substance to make the thing last.”65 Preservation does not fix things 
or capture them in their instability. On the contrary, art preserves that which cannot be 
captured, i.e. what belongs to a moment, but not to identities and particular bodies. What 
art preserves, according to Deleuze and Guattari, are affects and percepts, where affects are 
understood not as feelings but transformations of feeling, and percepts not as perceptions 
but transformations of ways of seeing. I argue, therefore, that the practice of art has already 
established a particular way of thinking with affect, which conditions how to practice and 
produce transformations, modulations of bodies. Thus, by studying the particular methods 
of art’s preservation of affect we can come closer to understanding the vast implications of 
affect. 
 Following Gilles Deleuze, I argue that art not only works according to affect, i.e. 
according to the relational and transformative way of being of bodies, but it produces new 
affects, new relations of contaminations. Nevertheless, in this book, I have deliberately 
selected bioart case studies which undertake the problems and implications of bodily 
manipulations in practice. It is important to note that Deleuze never wrote on bioart or 
art that uses living organisms as its medium, although artists’ use of plants and animals in 
their practice – and not only as a point of reference – was already documented first in the 
1930s and later in the 1970s.66 Moreover, my study of the relation between art and living 




66 For comprehensive historical and contemporary documentation and analysis of art’s relation with science and 
living matters see Reichle, Art in the Age of Technoscience; George Gessert, Green Light: Toward an Art of Evolution, 
1st edition (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2010).
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bodies with regard to affect cannot be based on Deleuze’s writings on affect in art due to 
his focus on the specificity of the medium: in cinema, for example, it was about the change 
of habits of perception of time and space;67 in literature, affect regarded the transformation 
of a sign;68 in painting – transformation of line and colour;69 in music – transformation of 
refrain.70 However, Deleuze’s way of writing about affect in relation to a particular medium 
already hints at how to think about affect within contemporary art practices. For Deleuze, 
affect within art is about the transformation of a particular medium. When art employs 
living bodies in its practice, the generated affects are related to the transformation of life 
and the body itself. 
 Although the issue of bodily manipulation and speculation about what might be possible 
within natural science has already been reverberating in art since the beginning of the last 
century, within, for instance, Dada and Futurism,71 I would argue that the imagination 
and approach of today’s art with respect to bodily modulations and contaminations gains 
a new importance. These practices not only work with living bodies, and speculate on the 
scientific tools and practices that change those bodies, but they also create rituals of their 
transformations. As the Contaminant E of Chapple’s performance has already shown, these 
rituals are not aimed at a unified image of the body, or a unified concept and truth about 
the body. Rather, they seem to create spaces where, as Mitchell noted, transformations 
can occur, where the affects of bodies can be generated and prolonged.72 This practice of 
transformation in bioart directly touches the relations and contaminations of bodies. Also 
known as transgenic art or wet art, I argue that it is about the transformation of what we 
understand by life and living bodies – that bioart becomes conditioning contamination.
 Bioart engages with biotechnological tools and employs living materials such as cells, 
tissue, bacteria or DNA as its expressive medium.73 By definition, then, bioart marks a break 
with clear-cut boundaries. By working “on the level of an actual intervention into living 
systems,”74 bioart not only blurs fixed distinctions between artistic and biological media, 
as well as between what can be defined as living and artificial, as human and non-human 
body, it also makes visible the lack of boundary between the two. If art, as Deleuze and 
Guattari write, is to preserve uncontained affects, and if science, as they argue, is to contain 
67 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema I: The Movement-Image, 1st edition (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
1986); Gilles Deleuze, Cinema II: The Time-Image, 1st edition (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
1989).
68 Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs (London: Continuum, 2008).
69 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).
70 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. by Brian Massumi 
(London: Continuum, 2004), 329-41.
71 Reichle, Art in the Age of Technoscience, 1.
72 Mitchell, Bioart and the Vitality of Media, 77.
73 See Jens Hauser, “Bio Art – Taxonomy of an Etymological Monster,” Hybrid. Living in Paradox, Ars Electronica, 2005, 
http://90.146.8.18/en/archives/festival_archive/festival_catalogs/festival_artikel.asp?iProjectID=13286, accessed 
4 September 2013.
74 Monika Bakke, “Zoe-philic Desires: Wet Media Art and Beyond,” Parallax 14/3 (2008), 21
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and provide references and actualizations of affect in the state of things,75 then bioart forces 
art and science into a curious relationship of affect with its implications. If bioart preserves 
living bodies, then it also regards the preservation of movements as the implications of 
body manipulations for the way we act.76 In this sense, the most interesting question when 
encountering the phenomenon of bioart is not about its character, i.e. whether it is art or 
simply bad science, and how it should be treated; rather, it is what does bioart actually do 
when dealing with living matter?77 That is, how does bioart work with contaminations of 
affect – how does it practice bodies within affect? 
 Bioartists consistently appear to begin with the Spinozian question of what the body 
can do? Adopting this speculative approach, rather than constructing a reflective image of 
the status quo, creates new realities in which the problems and implications of particular 
body manipulations acquire a material dimension. By experimenting with contaminations 
between bodies, bioartists work with questions such as: how can we know what the body 
is when the material reconfigurations change? How does our practice transform our 
presuppositions and knowledge? How is the new possible and how should we act when 
confronted with the new? 
Importantly, the notion of the new within bioart is not treated as opposite to old or as an 
improved version of that which is considered to be old – such a definition would demand 
thinking according to categories, and a comparison and linear understanding of time and 
space. As Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin argue, when talking about new materialism, 
“new” is rather focused on the multiple relations that are at work; thus, new refers to now, i.e. 
to “this very moment,”78 which we can also call affect. The new in a new material approach, 
as Dolphijn and Van der Tuin stipulate, indicates the continuous rewriting of the now.79 
Hence, I argue that being within affect as exercised in bioart is not a fixed and given state. 
As previously mentioned, the challenge arises because the relations of affect are risky; we 
are in doubt within affect, that is, we simply do not know what the bodies can do and how 
transformation and contamination will change bodies until we encounter them. Being and 
thinking within affect demands the continuous rewriting of the meaning and implications 
of the relations of transformation. Bioart’s practice thus becomes one of many new stories 
of contaminating encounters. 
75 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 126.
76 See an introduction to art and science collaboration in the context of bioart practice by Robert Zwijnenberg, 
“Preface. Art, the Life Science, and the Humanities: In Search of a Relationship,” in Ingeborg Reichle, Art in the 
Age of Technoscience, xv-xxxii; also Zwijnenberg’s article on urgency of art and science collaboration that bioartists 
reveal: “A Two headed Zebrafish,” Moebius Journal 1/1 (12 December 2012), http://moebiusjournal.org/pubs/14, 
accessed 21 February 2014.
77 See my article on the notion of the body’s intensity in Deleuzian philosophy actualized in bioart, where I 
addressed this question: Agnieszka Anna Wołodźko, “Between Bio(s) and Art – Intensities of Matter in Bioart,” in 
Ann-Cathrin Drews and Katharina D. Martin (eds), Innen - Außen - Anders: Körper im Werk von Gilles Deleuze 
und Michel Foucault, Edition Moderne Postmoderne (Publisher, Transcript Verlag, 2017), 221-236.
78 Dolphijn and Van der Tuin, New Materialism, 94.
79 Ibid., 116.
42 Chapter 1
Moreover, reflection informs every stage of the manipulative and creative process of bioart. 
Indeed, “doing is thinking” equates here to and is virtually inseparable from “thinking 
is doing”. An excellent bioart formation that experiments with biotechnological body 
manipulations within art is the artist-run research laboratory, the Tissue Culture and 
Art Project (TC&A), created by Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr.80 In response to the lack of 
discursive platforms addressing the issues and dilemmas of biotechnological realities, Catts’ 
and Zurr’s work expresses the need to redefine what life and the living body is when life 
has itself become a commodity. The problematization of bioartists’ ironic and challenging 
attitude towards tissue culture and living matter manipulation is demonstrated in works 
such as: The Semi-Living Worry Dolls (2000) [Figure 4a, b], the first tissue engineered 
sculptures to be presented alive in a gallery context; Pig Wings (2000-01) [Figure 5a, b], an 
installation featuring living pig tissue taken from bone marrow stem cells and used to grow 
three different types of wings; Semi-Living Steak: Disembodied Cuisine (2003) [Figure 6a, b], 
a work in which a meat steak is grown from a frog’s skeletal muscle, without necessitating 
the killing of the animal donor; and finally, Victimless Leather (2004-08) [Figure 7a, b], 
which involves the growing of living tissue into a leather-like coat-shaped form.81
 In this book, the selected narrations of contaminants share the above-mentioned 
TC&A’s struggle to rethink the roles and implications of biotechnological practices. Bioart’s 
practice and its contaminants, which begin and disrupt each chapter of this book, ask how 
can we practice those biotechnological bodies in their relationality, which biotechnology 
itself seems to fail to sustain. The work of bioartists reveals a speculatively pragmatic 
question about how to transform bodies in a way that does not result in the immediate 
universalization and destruction of bodies? The discussion of contaminants in this book 
raises questions that emerge from a deeply affective understanding of how our bodies are 
and how they become; questions such as how to practice affect while producing affects. 
 In the following chapters, I will investigate bioart’s distinct potential for the formation of 
relational and contaminating approaches that could be implemented in the study of affect. In 
this way, I am not interested in mapping any art theory, or in providing any comprehensive 
analysis of bioart as a form of art. Instead, my study regards bodies within affect; in other 
words, the conditions that allow bioart to produce and create spaces where affect can be 
generated and prolonged. Such an approach implies treating the bioart contaminants 
discussed in this book as documents and narratives of these practices.
80 See the home page of the laboratory, which is part of the University of Western Australia, http://www.symbiotica.
uwa.edu.au/, accessed 21 February 2014.
81 For a more detailed analysis of the work with regard to a Deleuzian understanding of the body and materiality, 
see Wołodźko, “Between Bio(s) and Art.”
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Figure 4 a, b. Tissue Culture and Art Project, The Semi-Living Worry Dolls, 2000,  
http://lab.anhb.uwa.edu.au/tca/semi-living-worry-dolls/, accessed 17 March 2017. 
Figure 5 a, b. Tissue Culture and Art Project, Pig Wings, 2000-2001,  
http://lab.anhb.uwa.edu.au/tca/pig-wings/, accessed 17 March 2017.
Figure 6 a, b. Tissue Culture and Art Project, Semi-Living Steak at Disembodies Cuisine exhibition, 2003, 
http://lab.anhb.uwa.edu.au/tca/disembodied-cuisine/; http://lab.anhb.uwa.edu.au/tca/semi-living-steak/, 
accessed 17 March 2017. 
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Figure 7 a, b. Tissue Culture and Art Project, Victimless Leather, 2004-2008, 
http://lab.anhb.uwa.edu.au/tca/vl/, accessed 17 March 2017. 
Importantly, the understanding of bioart as documentation that emerges in this book, 
is far from an aspiration to bring the reader a detailed and full recollection of events or 
objects. As such, the notion of documentation would be intertwined with the problems of 
representing artworks that I want the reader to avoid. Rather, a processual and relational 
practice of bioart that is a result of working with living media forces the understanding of 
documentation as described by Groys, namely: 
art does not appear in object form – is not a product or result of a “creative” 
activity. Rather, the art is itself this activity, is the practice of art as such. 
Correspondingly, art documentation is neither the making present of a past 
art event nor the promise of a coming artwork, but rather is the only possible 
form of reference to an artistic activity that cannot be represented in any 
other way.82
The categories of representation make no sense within bioart due to the character of the 
living medium that it works with. While the biotechnological practices of manipulation of 
life and living bodies render any essentialist understanding of life, nature and the natural 
meaningless, the practice of bioart makes a double redefinition. What happens when you 
make artificially alive something that was neither artificial, nor living? For Groys, bioart’s 
capacity to bring to life what has never been in the context of living bodies makes it 
intrinsically caught up within biopolitics.83 I will argue, however, that bioart’s transformative 
approach to living matter overcomes even the biopolitical struggle to categorize the natural 
82 Boris Groys, Art Power (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 54.
83 “Art becomes a life form, whereas the artwork becomes non-art, a mere documentation of this life form. One 
could also say that art becomes biopolitical, because it begins to use artistic means to produce and document 
life as a pure activity. Indeed, art documentation as an art form could only develop under the conditions of 
today’s biopolitical age, in which life itself has become the object of technical and artistic intervention”; “Art 
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and artificial. These transformative capacities seem to be one of the conditions of thinking 
with affect and, indeed, what it actually means to think with affect. 
 Moreover, I start from the presupposition of the epistemic notion of art, which allows me 
to take particular contaminants as being reliable and insightful practices of the generation 
of meaning regarding living matters today. Ultimately, this will lead my study of bodies 
within affect to the outline of art’s epistemic character, which, in turn, provides an answer to 
the question: how should we act when we start to examine and take seriously the affective, 
contaminating nature of our bodies? By studying the processes of how bioart deals with 
these contaminations in this way, I will map the multiple matters of affect for thinking with 
affect. 
1.8 Chapters
The main concern of this book is to study the conditions of how to think and practice bodies 
within affect. My research employs the notion of contamination as a way of studying and 
analysing relations of multiple trajectories between fields and perspectives in order to avoid 
linearity of the argument and method. Nevertheless, two entry points can be distinguished 
that shape the structure of this book: firstly, the study of bioart’s practice of conditioning 
contaminations allows us to map ways of practicing bodies within affect. The second entry 
point is thought incarnation of that mapping within new material thought. For this reason, 
the subsequent chapters are constructed according to the aforementioned new material 
characteristics, namely:
 ќ a need for a human and non-human egalitarian reciprocity (chapter 2); 
 ќ an openness to the non-linguistic forms of meaning generation (chapter 3); 
 ќ the notion of agency and subjectivity outside the human dominion (chapter 4);
 ќ the responsibility resulting from a “material contamination” that shapes thought and 
practice (chapter 5).
Chapter 2, Animal Relations, includes a discussion of the notion of affect as human and 
non-human reciprocity. In particular, it examines how bioart’s experimentations with 
human-non-human body relationality determines our understanding of what this relation 
is and what it does. As already argued, thinking in terms of relations of contamination of 
affect implies thinking with the new material focus on onto-epistemologies, where relations 
generate the possibility of creativity and novelty. In simpler terms, I will discuss how 
something like a new body can emerge within the multiple relations of transformations. 
 Chapter 2 tells the story of Marion Laval-Jeantet and Benoît Mangin, an artistic duo 
called Art Orienté Objet (AOO). They performed “Que le cheval vive en moi” (“May 
documentation is thus the art of making living things out of artificial ones, a living activity out of technical 
practice: it is a bio-art that is simultaneously biopolitics.” Ibid., 54, 57.
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the Horse Live in Me” 2011) in which the artist injected horse’s blood into her body. 
By analysing how they used an experiment as an event of multispecies relationality and 
contamination, we gain a more vivid understanding of the implications and conditions 
of relations within affect. This involves, first, rethinking what we should take as a relation 
within art’s production and, second, how this reflects the notion of affect, in order to finally 
discuss: how affect may be seen as a relation that can generate bodies and what kind of 
bodies emerge as a result of this relation. 
 There are various traditions and strains of explaining what affect is and how it can 
be applied to contemporary thinking about living matters. However, the differences 
between these various implementations of affect are not without major consequences and 
significance for the actual validity of affect for a non-anthropocentric, situated and material 
understanding of bodies. Chapter 2 thus seeks to clarify the misuse and misreading of affect. 
 The implications of taking affect seriously, that is, of acknowledging and acting upon the 
relational nature of our bodies, force us to be open to the non-linguistic forms of meaning 
generation. In Chapter 3, Tasting Meaning, I therefore discuss the new material semiotics, 
where the significance of the a-signified in the encountered and experienced, but not yet 
named, is exercised in bioart’s approach to living matter as food. 
 The notion of affect, as discussed in the Chapter 2, suggests that the material production 
and happening of what emerges is important for our encounters with bodies. It seems, 
however, that an understanding of how such material meaning is generated is only possible 
in the actual, bodily experience. Importantly, such writings about the experience that 
produces unique meanings does not imply that we must make choices about what to 
exclude, i.e. between what makes sense and what does not. There are multiple levels of 
meaningful living, which, when considered equally, pose radical changes for what we take 
as living bodies. By mapping what is happening within bodily relations, we can grasp how 
meanings become significant. 
 The encounters between bodies that are the focus of Chapter 3, as in the second chapter, 
concern multispecies bodies. I engage with human-food contamination, which includes not 
only animals, but also plants and chemicals. What happens in your mouth when you eat the 
smog of the city? The artistic research project The Smog Tasting, by The Center for Genomic 
Gastronomy (CGG), run by Zack Denfeld and Cathrine Kramer since 2010, investigates the 
biotechnologies and biodiversities of the human food system. It provides some answers, but 
mostly throws up unexpected problems. The understanding of the contaminations of affect 
necessarily shapes material semiotics, where meaning is entangled with matter. 
 Thinking about affect and with regard to affect thus changes not only what we 
understand by those bodies that emerge from within relations, but also what kinds of 
meanings are produced. In the face of biotechnological practices that render bodies literally, 
materially multiple, we urgently need to find corresponding material conceptualizations 
that, in turn, are able to sustain the practice of relational and materially significant bodies. 
We must be able to capture what it actually means to live, to practice affect in order to 
Introduction 47
then be able to transform those practices. In Chapter 4, Living Within Multiplicity, I ask 
what the implications of fostering bodies multiple and dynamic relationality are once the 
anthropocentric conceptualization of bodies’ agencies and meanings change.
 Rosi Braidotti argues that in order to think about the agency of bodies in an affective 
way, we must shift our focus from identities that are “egoindexed” into subjectivities that 
reflect the processual and relational character of bodies.84 In other words, affect forces us 
to touch the non-human within the many layers of our all-too-human bodies. Braidotti 
conceptualizes this understanding of non-unified subjectivities, agencies, selves that are 
beyond the logic of fixed identities and yet materially important as nomadic. She writes: 
Being nomadic, homeless, an exile, a refugee, a Bosnian rape-in-war victim, 
an itinerant migrant, an illegal immigrant, is no metaphor. Having no passport 
or having too many of them is neither equivalent nor is it merely metaphorical 
[...] These are highly specific geo-political and historical locations – history 
tattooed on your body.85
 
I follow her understanding of non-unified, yet materially significant subjectivity by focusing 
on one of the implications of nomadic subjects within the bio(geo)political dimension of 
biotechnologically manipulated bodies that accumulates in the concept of multiplicity. 
Deleuze’s writings on multiplicity and difference provide a sense of a conceptual path that 
we could take when grasping the phenomena of multispecies. Yet, even Deleuze could 
not predict the actual material implications that biotechnological findings have today on 
the dynamic and relational character of the body. In turn, science alone cannot grasp the 
conceptual novelty that its ‘material’ findings foster. In Chapter 4, I therefore confront the 
inevitably pragmatic question of how thinking about multibodies within affect demands 
dynamic practices and the politics of the multiple.
 Encountering the Contaminant of the movie Przekładaniec (1968), directed by Andrzej 
Wajda, which is based on a script written by Stanisław Lem, I will introduce the possibility 
of thinking in terms of the multiple. I start from the standpoint that this barely known 
(also in Poland) science fiction movie – nota bene, the only movie made by Wajda in this 
genre – is a rhetorical move. Besides my personal desire to revitalize the marginalized 
speculative work of a director who is generally believed to only make movies about Polish 
history, I want to draw attention to the multiple narratives of the struggle of how to think 
multiplicity. Although this book is focused on bioart’s practice with bodies within affect, 
bioart’s speculative way of thinking can be found in the speculative methods of cinema and 
84 “Whereas identity is a bounded, ego-indexed habit of fixing and capitalizing on one’s selfhood, subjectivity 
is a socially mediated process of relations and negotiations with multiple others and with multilayered social 
structures.” Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Theory: The Portable Rosi Braidotti (New York: Columbia University Press 
E-book, 2011), chapter: “Introduction”.
85 Rosi Braidotti, Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming, 1st edition (Cambridge, UK/ Malden, 
MA: Polity, 2002), 3.
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literature. Thus, when writing about multiplicity in this chapter, I use multiple speculative 
tools in order to map the struggles and ways of narrating the practice of the multiple. By 
disrupting the chapter with another Contaminant, in this case Microbiome Security Agency 
(2015) I further discuss how, today, facing the realities that Lem could only have imagined, 
we can create new stories that will shape new tools for practicing the multiple that affect 
engenders.
 The concluding chapter, Ethics of Contamination, queries the consequences of thinking 
within affect for the way we can practice its relational and dynamic character within our 
multibodies. This question of consequences, which is inseparable from the drive to create 
and transform, is discussed along two distinct Contaminants. The line of flight that guides 
my thinking about how to practice bodies within affect, becomes here risky because it is 





Affects are precisely these nonhuman becomings of man.1 
2.1 Contaminant B like the Blood of a Horse
In preparation for the performance “May the Horse Live in Me”, staged over several months, 
Marion Laval-Jeantet had injected horse immunoglobulins into her blood stream in order 
to develop a tolerance to the foreign animal blood. The injection of foreign animal blood 
can be fatal for the human body, therefore, the blood had to be made “safe,” the artist 
explained. It was thus deprived of “bulky cells such as red blood cells, white blood cells, 
macrophages, etc.” What Laval-Jeantet actually injected was “the plasma, which contains 
hormones, lipids, and several kinds of proteins (immunoglobulins, cytokines, etc.) among 
other things.”2 However, the extraction and apparent purification of horse’s blood from 
substances harmful to humans, did not mean the performance was entirely safe. For this 
reason, the artists could not find a gallery anywhere in Central Europe to host the event. 
The moment they signalled the need for paramedics to be present and possibly assist during 
the event, their project met with refusal.3
 The final performance of Laval-Jeantet injecting the horse blood plasma [Figures. 8 a, b, 
c, d] took place in the Galerija Kapelica, (Ljubljana, Slovenia) in 2011. Due to the gradual 
and controlled build-up of tolerance, this injection did not result in Laval-Jeantet going 
into anaphylactic shock – a severe allergic reaction to a foreign chemical. However, because 
the extracted components of the horse’s blood are closely tied to the nervous system, the 
artist admitted that in the two weeks following the performance she experienced weakness, 
1 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, (London: Verso, 1994), 169.
2 Marion Laval Jeantet, “May the Horse Live in Me,” Hemispheric Institute E misférica, http://hemisphericinstitute.
org/hemi/fr/e101-jeantet-essay, accessed 9 September 2015.
3 Marion Laval-Jeantet and Benoît Mangin, “Prix Forum I Hybrid Art - Art Orienté Objet - EN - YouTube,” https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=dxztkwiAJCY, accessed 9 September 2015.
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anxiety and oversensitivity. After the transfusion of blood, the artist put on stilts, which 
were designed to imitate a horse’s legs, and carried out a communication ritual with the 
horse. The horse, called Viny, was the same animal from which the blood was taken and 
with whom the artist, accompanied by an animal behaviourist, had become acquainted 
during the ten days of blood injections. 
 Initially, the idea had been to inject panda blood into a human, due to pandas being 
under the threat of extinction. Despite the artist’s argument that she was willing to become 
a sort of surrogate for the animal, by extending the panda’s life through her body, no zoo 
agreed to the collaboration. Given the servile nature of the horse’s relationship with humans, 
it became an easier choice. Moreover, as the artist explains, the immunological system of 
a horse, in comparison to other farm animals, is the most distant from that of humans. A 
sheep could have been an alternative, however, Laval-Jeantet and Mangin felt the horse, as 
a larger animal, constituted a greater challenge.4
 The performance ended with the extraction and freezing of the artist’s hybridized 
blood. As Art Orienté Objet subsequently explained, it was all about meeting with the other 
body. The extracted blood, although already coagulated, revealing the invasive result of the 
meeting, became a sort of a relic of the encounter.5
 Despite the institutional and discursive negotiations that forced the artists not only to 
follow necessary protocols and policies, but also to change their initial ideas, their work 
remained remarkably non-teleological and non-instrumental. The performance was 
not about representing some scientific goal and seeking some transhumanist idea of the 
fixation of the body into a desired form. After all, although monitored and under medical 
supervision, the performance appeared to express the impenetrability of the body and the 
pursuit of expanding the body’s porosity. The artists seemed to draw attention to the notion 
of the human as already posthuman, or rather postanthropocentric – as being already 
beyond the fixed and given notion of the body, reaching towards its intensive, relational 
and multispecies dimension and towards affect as a relational way of becoming.
 Importantly, this expression of relationality in the form of a meeting of two distinct 
bodies is far from neutral. Art Orienté Objet’s experiment examines what I call affect’s 
relationality as a risky form of transformation. AOO talks in terms transistasis – instead of 
searching for a convenient balance between bodies, it provokes imbalance, and stimulation 
from a stable and safe state. The relationality that they exercise becomes contamination 
which may result in the acceleration or destruction of bodies. The only aim was “to try 
to feel in another way than human,” as Marion Laval-Jeantet explains. The possibility to 
evaluate such contamination could only be achieved through the act of self-experimentation 
with one’s own body while relating to another. Regarding affect, in this case, the relation 
of contamination fosters experimentation that is unlike anything we know from science 
– instead of proving what is there, it creates, invents, modulates and transforms. The 
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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contaminating matters of affect thus concern the conditions in which bodies, through their 
deviations and transformations, create each other, anew.
Figures 8 a, b, c, d. Art Orienté Objet, May the Horse Live in Me, 2011, footage from the performance in 
Galerija Kapelica,(Ljubljana, Slovenia), http://aoo.free.fr/works-2011-001.html, accessed 17 March 2017.
2.2 Experimentations that Resist Identification
Experiment, as a method and a tool, has a long and non-linear history within natural 
philosophy, science and medicine.6 It is generally said that experiment as a scientific method 
of manipulation and intervention constitutes the beginning of the Scientific Revolution, 
which left behind the strictly observatory and analytical approach within science.7 Today, 
experiments have become a demonstration, a proof of the truth or falsification of a 
hypothesis: “An action or operation undertaken in order to discover something unknown, 
6 On the history of experiment and its philosophical importance see Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening: 
Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
7 See a short historical outline of the understanding of difference between observation and experimentation by Saira 
Malik, “Observation Versus Experiment: An Adequate Framework for Analysing Scientific Experimentation?,” 
Journal for General Philosophy of Science 48, no. 1 (1 March 2017): 71-95, doi:10.1007/s10838-016-9335-y; See also 
Martin Curd, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, 2nd edition, Routledge Philosophy Companions 
(Florence: Taylor and Francis, 2013), 191-202.
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to test a hypothesis, or establish or illustrate some known truth.”8 The method of scientific 
experiment has become inseparable from the precise conditions and quantitative relations 
that can be repeated in order to ensure the universal or general validity of findings. In other 
words, scientific experiment is designed to be repeated in order to be valid. This sense of 
repetition presupposes a resemblance between singular events and general laws, since to 
repeat means to maintain the same numerical relations. As Deleuze notices, such scientific 
experimentation: “is thus a matter of substituting one order of generality for another: an 
order of equality for an order of resemblance.”9
 As such, scientific experimentation depends on the primacy of identity, which allows 
for the classification and representation of things. The structures based on identity, 
representation and signification allow us to function within a discourse that is commonly 
recognised as meaningful. The problem starts, however, when we take the logic of identity 
as prompting difference – that is, as the claim to induce something new on the basis of 
a negative relation to what is already there. Isabelle Stengers calls this model of novelty, 
founded on the mechanism of negation or going against the status quo, “a contrasted unity” 
between young, beardless scientists who claim to contradict or modernize established 
bearded science. However, such endeavours, as she puts it, result in a strengthening of that 
which was supposed to be overturned: “The kind of science that the youth has learned is the 
bearded one […] the dreams of the youth, his ambitions, are bearded ones.”10 Affect, like the 
relations of contamination, cannot therefore be based on this notion of experimentation. 
The contaminant in the performance of “May the horse live in me”, not only provides 
arguments why, but also shapes a distinct understanding of experimentation as creation, 
rather than as a demonstration of truth.
 Whether Art Orienté Objet’s artistic experiment perpetuates the old paradigms can 
be analysed more closely from the perspective of the practice that it performs, namely 
xenotransfusion. As Robert Zwijnenberg argues, when writing about the performance 
“May the horse live in me,” the history of blood transfusion from non-human species to 
human, a practice that dates back to the seventeenth century, served mainly to improve 
or enhance the health of humans. Animal life and body play an instrumental role in this 
relationality. As he writes: “xenotransfusion was performed numerous times in Europe, 
despite the fact that it seldom led to the patient’s recovery. […] the beneficial effects of 
xenotransfusion were reinforced by the notion that the blood was the bearer of emotions.”11 
8 “Experiment, N.,” OED Online (Oxford University Press), http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/view/
Entry/66530, accessed 10 September 2015.
9 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 3.
10 Isabelle Stengers, “Deleuze and Guattari’s Last Enigmatic Message,” Angelaki 10, no. 2 (2005): 154, doi.
org/10.1080/ 09697250500417399.
11 Robert Zwijnenberg, “Stranger Connections. On Xenotransfusion and Art,” in Institutional Critique to 
Hospitality: Bio Art Practice Now. A Critical Anthology, ed. Assimina Kaniari, Athens: Grigori Publications 
[Εκδόσεις Γρηγόρη], Art History and Theory 5 (2017), 131.
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It was the belief that blood has transformative capacities that could enhance and improve 
the health of humans that perpetuated the practice.
 Unlike the historical practice of xenotransfusion, AOO’s performance was not about 
being more human, or acquiring a healthier body. As Zwijnenberg analyses the performance 
within the historical context, the blood transfusion performed by the artists was “not in 
order to improve her health at the expense of the horse, but in search of a biological and 
affective proximity to the horse.”12 It thus seems that AOO does not perpetuate the logic of 
“bearded science.” The artists conducted an experiment that, while it maintained “safety” 
protocols, was roughly reduced to a condition that guaranteed a non-lethal result. The 
experiment was not designed to improve something. Instead, it was a trial.
 The AOO artists appear to express what the body can do when it meets another body. 
The possible outcomes were already known, and the artists gave no sign that they intended 
to prove or disprove the existing facts. Instead, they exercised the power to use one’s own 
body to test out its biologically, socially and culturally established borders: “the purpose was 
to try to feel.”13 This “try out,” renders the etymological roots of the verb “to experiment,” 
which in Latin – experīrī – means “to try.”14
 Nevertheless, Zwijnenberg points out that the attempt to break boundaries in AOO’s 
performance is tinted with dark tones. Instead of actually overcoming any boundaries and 
hierarchies between species bodies, the artists may actually strengthen existing ones. After 
all, the horse remained passive during the whole process of transfusion, and it was a human 
that was the main focus of the experiment. As Zwijnenberg concludes, 
Que le cheval vive en moi [May the horse live in me] signals the end of 
our naïve belief that we can reach a new relationship with animals without 
radically reconsidering our traditional notions of this relationship; we have 
to look for new ways that can respond to new materialism’s urgent call for a 
nonhierarchical relationship between humans and non-humans.15
 
In other words, if the AOO experiment is to transform “bearded science”, it must not only 
break the old logic and categories, but also create new ones.
 I argue that in the AOO performance, the artists initiate a notion of experimentation 
that, rather than being based on identity as demonstration of truth, is based on processes 
of contaminating relationality through which bodies are created rather than identified. 
Such a creative practice of experimentation is reached by embedding the notion of the 
partiality of the observer in their approach. Within the experiment, the participating bodies 
become partial in a sense that no-one is positioned as the autonomous, objective performer. 
12 Ibid., 134.
13 Laval-Jeantet and Mangin talk at, “Prix Forum I Hybrid Art – Art Orienté Objet – EN – YouTube.”
14 “Experiment, N.”
15 Zwijnenberg, “Stranger Connections,” 135.
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What matters in the experiment are rather the things studied, that is, bodies and their 
capacities, coordinates that pose particular values and ways of practice when relating with 
the living multispecies bodies. In this way, partiality becomes a key concept when grasping 
the particular notion of relationality that foregrounds what can be understood by affect and 
its implications. Within AOO’s practices of relationality, there are no subject or objects that 
would belong to the experiment, that would determine its aims and results. Nor is there any 
experiment that would belong to the particular object and subject. Nevertheless, to ensure 
that the experiment occurs, its participants must maintain a particular condition. Thus, 
partiality becomes a condition of a form of experimentation that is based on relationality.
 A partial observer finds herself within a relationship that does not belong to her, or to the 
things studied. For Deleuze and Guattari, “partial observers belong to the neighbourhood 
of the singularities of a curve, of a physical system, of a living organism.”16 Importantly, 
partiality as such does not mean acknowledging any limitation or necessity of a particular 
agentive position of the observer. “The observer is neither inadequate nor subjective,”17 
Deleuze and Guattari argue. Rather, the partiality of the observer constitutes the occurrence 
of the experimentation – the partiality itself as it happens.18
 Experimentation based on the partiality, in other words, on a relationality that means 
none of the participants holds a leading or autonomous position, becomes a resonance 
in situations of transformation. Rather than discovering what is true, experimentation 
functions according to what Deleuze and Guattari call “the truth of relative.”19 Within the 
experiment, we are not occupied with uncovering and finding the truth or with examining 
the conditions of truth. Nor are we focused on proving a thesis – we are not writing 
manifestos, as Deleuze argues.20 Instead, while experimenting, we are mapping what is 
happening, we are sketching the conditions, creating the programmes and protocols of 
“how to do” rather than “what to do”, so that new relations may be produced: “Seeing, seeing 
what happens, has always had a more essential importance than demonstrations.”21
 Importantly, for Deleuze and also with respect to AOO’s performance, it is not that we 
undermine the validity of the truth itself in this partial notion of experimentation. We are 
not presupposing the impossibility of truth or its critique by mapping the relations that 
happen during the experiment. Rather, we encounter a different logic that is driven by a 
16 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 130.
17 Ibid., 129.
18 “Even in quantum physics, Heisenberg’s demon does not express the impossibility of measuring both the speed 
and the position or a particle on the grounds of a subjective interference of the measure with the measured, but 
it measures exactly an objective state of affairs that leaves the respective position of two of its particles outside of 
the field of its actualization, the number of independent variables being reduced and the values of the coordinates 
having the same probability. Subjectivist interpretations of thermodynamics, relativity, and quantum physics 
manifest the same inadequacies. Perspectivism, or scientific relativism, is never relative to a subject.”  Ibid., 129-30.
19 Ibid., 130.
20 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 48.
21 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 128.
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different than truth sense of importance. When AOO entered the laboratory using tools 
and scientific methods, they did so not to imitate and fulfil particular presuppositions, or 
to verify assumed hypotheses or undermine scientific practice. Rather, their performance 
was driven by a simple, yet profound need to encounter the body’s functions and capacities. 
By experimenting within the partiality of the encounter, they created new, transformative 
relations of affect.
 Experimentation as such is a way of entering into the space of relations that are 
already in the middle, between and within bodies. In its performance, AOO’s partiality 
occurs between bodies, undermining any assumptions about their fixed and autonomous 
characteristic, exploring instead their porosity and fluidity. Deleuze would frame such an 
exploration, which begins from relations between bodies, in the context of resistance, as a 
protest against identity and autonomy of bodies: “Relations are in the middle, and exist as 
such. This exteriority of relations is not a principle, it is a valid protest against principles.”22
 Through its experimentation, AOO resists the principle of fixed and autonomous 
bodies. However, their resistance, as Isabelle Stengers puts it: “does not mean to criticise 
or to denounce but to construct.”23 The artists do not criticise the logic of identity, they do 
not denounce the dominant presupposition that humans desire to relate with other, less 
privileged animals. After all, Viny, the horse, had no say in whether he wanted to participate 
in the encounter. However, rather than criticize existing practices when relating to animals, 
which would demonstrate and identify, for instance, their moral position, the artists follow 
a different logic. Through experimentation and encounter, a human and a horse become 
partial – they are foreigners, neighbours of their own artistic, animal, biotechnological and 
interspecies realm. Such experimentation, an encounter with relations, becomes thus the 
necessity to resist identification as a form of creation. The creation of new relations of 
transformation becomes, in other words, a form of resistance.
2.3 Contaminant S like the Sacrifice of a Pig
On 26 January 2017, the image of the first human-pig embryo appeared in major newspapers 
and websites worldwide as well as scientific journals and online platforms [Figure 9]. 
Contextualized within the rhetoric of fulfilling the scientific dream, the embryo was praised 
for its promise “of generating tissue and organs for transplantations into humans.”24
22 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 55.
23 Stengers, “Deleuze and Guattari’s Last Enigmatic Message,” 152.
24 From video “Scientists from the Salk Institute discuss the breakthrough,” in Hannah Devlin, “First Human-Pig 
Chimera’ Created in Milestone Study,” The Guardian, 26 January 2017, sec. Science, https://www.theguardian.
com/science/2017/jan/26/first-human-pig-chimera-created-in-milestone-study, accessed 17 March 2017.
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Although the procedure is still in its infancy, and only a few human cells have survived in 
a non-human body,25 the discussion around the possibility of animal-human relationality 
has been fierce.26
Figure 9. Four-week-old pig embryo 




accessed 17 March 2017.
Importantly, neither the pursuit of enhancement, nor the ethical concerns accompanying 
such endeavours portrayed these biotechnological chimeras as monsters today. The word 
“chimera”, after all, is the name of a monster from Greek mythology, which has a lion’s head, 
goat’s body and serpent’s tail. It was considered to have the most illogical body composition 
and, consequently, it was embraced with fascination, but it was also feared.27 Similarly, a 
different Greek mythological figure such as Minotaur, with the body of a man and head of a 
bull, was a sign of punishment for disobedience. Its role was to evoke terror and prevent any 
deviations from what was considered to be the norm. In this way, within the mythological 
imagination, animal characteristics in humans are an expression of wrongdoing, immoral 
behaviour or heresy.28 By visualizing the lack of boundary between bodies, the mythical 
chimera was able to sustain the order of things, keep the binary boundaries intact, maintain 
fixed identities and ascribe essential moral values and roles rather than blur them. Myths, 
as Levi Strauss argues, “provide a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction,”29 
rather than sustaining it.
25 See Jun Wu et al., “Interspecies Chimerism with Mammalian Pluripotent Stem Cells,” Cell 168, no. 3 (January 
26, 2017): 473–486.e15, doi.org/10.1016/j.cell.2016.12.036.
26 Devlin, “First Human-Pig ‘Chimera’ Created in Milestone Study”; James Gallagher, “Human-Pig ‘Chimera 
Embryos’ Detailed,” BBC News, 26 January 2017, sec. Health, http://www.bbc.com/news/health-38717930, 
accessed 17 March 2017; Nicholas Wade, “New Prospects for Growing Human Replacement Organs in Animals,” 
The New York Times, 26 January 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/science/chimera-stemcells-organs.
html, accessed 17 March 2017.
27 See Anne Roes, “The Representation of the Chimaera,” The Journal of Hellenic Studies 54 (1934): 21–25, doi.
org/10.2307/626487.
28 See Phillip Karpowicz, Cynthia B. Cohen, and Derek J. Van Der Kooy, “Developing Human-Nonhuman 
Chimeras in Human Stem Cell Research: Ethical Issues and Boundaries,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 15, 
no. 2 (2005): 107–8; Shane Patrick McNamee, “Human-Animal Hybrids and Chimeras: What’s in a Name?,” JAHR 
– European Journal of Bioethics 6, no. 11 (6 May 2015): 47–48.
29 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, (New York: Basic Books, 1963), 229.
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Figure 10. Creating human-pig chimera embryos, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/
science/2017/jan/26/first-human-pig-chimera-created-in-milestone-study, accessed 17 March 2017.
Today, biotechnological chimeras have a soft pink colour and are accompanied by 
equally rose-coloured diagrams explaining the processes of transformation [Figure 10]. 
Rather than generating fear in order to sustain habitual and biological boundaries, the 
new chimeras promote transformations and mutations. With the new biotechnological 
possibilities – methods such as xenotransplantation, i.e. the transformation of living cells 
and tissue from one species to another – boundaries are blurred, diminishing any fears 
from the past. Accompanied by a rhetoric of the myriad advantages for human health and 
well-being, there is a newfound trust in human and animal relationality and its necessity if 
we – humans – want to lead a better, more sustainable life.
 As Donna Haraway wrote in her Cyborg Manifesto: “the boundary between scientific and 
social reality is an optical illusion.”30 Within the new biotechnological, biomedical practices, 
we are already what she calls cyborgs, chimeras that render the distinction between organic 
and inorganic, human and animal, irrelevant. The lack of significance of the old categories 
is grounded in a shift of thinking in terms of what we find important. Rather than fixating 
on what is, what is essential, we focus on how could we live otherwise: “The cyborg is our 
ontology […], it gives us our politics. The cyborg is a condensed image of both imagination 
30 Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, 1st edition (New York: Routledge, 
1990), 149.
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and material reality.”31 As such, the cyborg is “committed to partiality,”32 Haraway argues. 
The cyborg, the contemporary biotechnological chimera, is without resentment of the past, 
of the search for lost identity. It rather becomes the persona of creative experimentation, 
embodying the continuous process of mutating and living in-between.
31 Ibid., 150.
32 Ibid., 151.
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Figures 11 a, b, c, d. Elio Caccavale, Utility Pets, 2004, http://hypernatural.com/museum/elio_caccavale.
html, accessed 19 March 2017. 
In this way, the image of the first human-pig embryo seems to express the hope of Haraway’s 
cyborg. The soft colours, the wetness of the moment captured by the microscope’s camera, 
evokes the excitement of the encounter with life, with the new and mysterious form of 
living body, calling for care, rather than fear. However, alongside fascination and the 
desire to fulfil the scientific dream, the questions of how to live, how to practice these new 
biotechnological bodies embedded in a radical human-animal relationality creep in.
 The urgent question in the face of these biotechnological chimeras is thus not when and 
how the science can create them, but how to live when the boundaries are blurred, how to 
practice the human-nonhuman relationality that we have become? In the biotechnological 
age, it is science that produces new images of bodies, while it seems that it is for art to 
experiment with how we are to live within them.
 Utility Pets (2004) by Elio Caccavale is such a speculative experimentation with the 
new image of our multispecies bodies [Figures 11 a, b, c, d]. Caccavale imagines here what 
life might be like once xenotransplantation becomes our everyday reality: “In an imagined 
not so-distant future, shortly after birth, people will be given a piglet with their own DNA 
engineered into it. The pig, known as a knockout pig in the scientific jargon, is a form of a 
living insurance policy – an organ bank.”33 This speculative project, however, explores how 
our relations with these animals might develop and function when the clear boundaries 
between species are blurred. The animal used to serving as food or companion becomes 
33 “Utility Pets,” Work, V2_Institute for the Unstable Media, http://v2.nl/archive/works/utility-pets, accessed 16 
March 2017.
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something in-between, neither to be consumed, nor to be played with, and yet both. The 
pig is to become you, it is already part of you, carrying your genes, which makes the animal 
a blood-related family member, rather than a pet.
 With the new interspecies reality, new questions and practical dilemmas emerge: how 
should you live with a pig not only as your pet, but as a part of you? Caccavale imagines 
thus a series of toys and stimulations for pigs, to ensure not only that they have a healthy 
existence, but are happy and connected to human life: 
The Utility Pet products include a low-resolution TV exclusively for pigs, 
which they can control by themselves: a pig toy with a microphone and a radio 
handset allowing the owner to listen to the pig enjoying itself; a smoke-filtering 
device allowing a person to smoke in front of the pig without it suffering the 
consequence of passive smoking; and a comforter – a psychological product 
made from the snout of the sacrificed pig, which serves as a memento after 
the xenotransplantation has been carried out, and helps people come to terms 
with the contradictory feelings generated by this complex situation.34
Caccavale imagines ways of maintaining and exploring the close relationship between 
human and non-human. Instead of focusing on the uneven power relationality between 
species, as result of the obvious utility of the pig for the human purposes, the speculative 
work experiments with a relationship of compassion, care and ensuring a sense of happiness 
for the non-human. A deep, yet asymmetrical relationship between human-pig prompts 
a realization, not only about the need to manage the risks of xenotransplantation, but 
mostly about ensuring new ways for both species to live contentedly. In this way, instead 
of demonizing the biotechnological future that has already become a scientific possibility, 
bioartists such as AOO and biodesigners like Caccavale experiment with contaminations 
by creating the spaces that make them possible. Through creation of contaminations as 
part of the process of understanding and living, the new hybrid bodies become themselves 
transformative ways for us to live, whoever we may become – selfish killers, companion 
species or both?
2.4 The Becoming of Affect
Bioartists and biodesigners actualize the sense of experimentation, in the sense that to 
experiment is to enter the sphere of relations and make them anew. This happens not 
by destructing the old established relations, but by adding another one, and another to 
34 “Wild Things (Blowup Reader 1),” Page, V2_Institute for the Unstable Media, 60, http://v2.nl/archive/articles/
wild-things-blowup-reader-1, accessed 16 March 2017.
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the already existing.35 Importantly, the sense of relationality exercised in AOO’s and 
Caccavale’s contaminants is not determined by the participatory bodies. This means that 
neither the blood of Viny mixed with the human body of Laval-Jeantet, nor the human-pig 
companionship completely regulate what will actually happen during the encounter. Rather, 
the contaminants discussed create the spaces where the human-non-human relationality 
may be practiced and experimented with – lived through.
 Deleuze calls such a phenomenon the exteriority of relations with regard to their terms.36 
This implies that the change of relations does not change the bodies that participate in such 
relationships. In the case of the work of AOO, this would mean that the artist’s encounter 
with the other body cannot result in a change of either body. Instead, it only creates a new 
relation; it adds to the existing relationship between the human and the horse. How, then, 
can we talk about the sense of relationality that engenders and produces bodies? However, 
Deleuze stipulates: “This exteriority of relations is not a principle, it is a vital protest against 
principle.”37
 To experiment, that is, to enter a relation, is to question the primacy of identity. It is 
an attempt to create that begins not from a sense of given identity, but from a relation – a 
form that occurs in-between bodies. What, then, is a relation that foregrounds the AOO 
experiment and Caccavale’s speculative project? To think in a relational way and to practice 
these relations implies taking these questions seriously: can we create encounters that 
change not only relations between bodies, but also the bodies themselves? If a manipulation 
does not really change the body, but, on the grounds of the exteriority of relations to their 
terms, we can only manipulate these relations, we need to ask about the implications of such 
manipulation.
 Biotechnological manipulation of bodies that blur any fixed boundaries are driven 
by the sense of transformation, which, telos, is a sheer exploration of a body’s capacities. 
Bioartists and biodesigners promptly explore these transformations that expand bodies and 
their materiality by making a body’s borders more porous and more relational. Deleuze 
conceptualized such a drive towards transformation in the notion of becoming as an 
ontological basis for every life and creation. Becoming happens beyond given subjects, 
identities and the comparisons between them. As Deleuze and Guattari write, becoming, 
as a movement of transformation, “places elements or materials in a relation that uproots 
the organ from its specificity, making it become “with” the other organ.”38 Becoming is an 
event that can be captured by a verb rather than a noun. This means that it is important to 
experiment with what bodies can do, rather than focus on what they are. This is a Spinozian 
plea, drawn from his Ethics and put into motion:
35 See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 68–69.
36 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 55.
37 Ibid.
38 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. by Brian Massumi (London: 
Continuum, 2004), 285.
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Nobody as yet has determined the limits of the body’s capabilities: that is, 
nobody as yet has learned from experience what the body can and cannot do, 
without being determined by mind, solely from the laws of its nature insofar 
as it is considered as corporeal. For nobody as yet knows the structure of 
the body so accurately as to explain all its functions, not to mention that in 
the animal world we find much that far surpasses human sagacity, and that 
sleepwalkers do many things in their sleep that they would not dare when 
awake clear evidence that the body, solely from the laws of its own nature, 
can do many things at which its mind is amazed. Again, no one knows in 
what way and by what means mind can move body, or how many degrees of 
motion it can impart to body and with what speed it can cause it to move. 
Hence it follows that when men say that this or that action of the body arises 
from the mind which has command over the body, they do not know what 
they are saying, and are merely admitting, under a plausible cover of words, 
that they are ignorant of the true cause of that action and are not concerned 
to discover it.39
Experimentation with bodies’ capacities leads to the construction of the unexpected, of 
new knowledge, “nonhuman becomings of man,”40 human-pig bodies, and horse-woman 
friendships that become creations that cannot be presupposed. Since we do not know what 
our bodies can do, by experimenting, seeing what happens, we create spaces of relationality, 
the body’s capacities at work. Deleuze and Guattari, following Spinoza, call such generation 
of new relationality through experimentation alliances:
Alliance or the pact is the form of expression for an infection or epidemic 
constituting the form of content. In sorcery, blood is of the order of contagion 
and alliance. It can be said that becoming-animal is an affair of sorcery 
because (1) it implies an initial relation of alliance with a demon; (2) the 
demon functions as the borderline of an animal pack, into which the human 
being passes or in which his or her becoming takes place, by contagion; (3) this 
becoming itself implies a second alliance, with another human group; (4) this 
new borderline between the two groups guides the contagion of animal and 
human being within the pack.41
39 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, III P2 Scholium, in Baruch Spinoza, Spinoza: Complete Works, ed. Michael L. Morgan, 
trans. Samuel Shirley, 1st edition (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2002), 280.
40 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 169.
41 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 272.
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Becoming as experimentation with contagion situates itself within a relationality that 
generates new bodies. The contagion of becoming creates unexpected alliances, cyborgs 
and chimeras that transgress their borders. Becoming of bodies happens thus within 
relationality, as a movement of transformations beyond fixed subjectivity and presupposed 
purpose; it is continuously driven by the “force of methamorphosis.”42
 This continuity of becoming as a movement of transformation, experimentation that 
happens within relationality and between bodies, demands an equally relational way of 
thinking. The logic driven by becoming is not based on identity and boundaries outlined 
by subjectivity. Rather, the thinking that transformative experimentations and contagious 
becomings enforce must take a transformative movement of relationality. How, though, 
should we use such an affective logic of transformative relations in a way that sustains, 
rather than resists, the movements of contamination? In other words, how can our chimeras 
foster change, rather than perpetuate old fears and ideas?
 Eugene Thacker’s definition of “biotech,” is useful in this regard. He argues that the 
biggest concern in the discussion of the new bodies within biotechnological practices is not 
their disembodiment or the practice of body manipulation:
Biotech is not to be confused with bioengineering or prosthetics; that is, 
biotech is not about interfacing the human with the machine, the organic 
with the nonorganic. Rather, biotech is about a fundamental reconfiguration 
of the very processes that constitute the biological domain and their use 
toward a range of ends, from new techniques in medicine to new modes of 
agricultural production, and to deterrence programs in biowarfare.43 
Rather, biotech forces the use of relationality in generating new, hyper-biological bodies.44 
The threat concerns our ignorance of how biotech uses this relationality. In biotech 
practice, biological is more biological, while what is considered to be natural is even more 
natural. Bodies are to be purified from diseases, given new imperceptible, yet sustainable 
capacities so that every enhancement becomes the fulfilment of the dream of an already 
given idea. As Thacker explains, within biotech, the practice of relationality is done “by 
harnessing biological processes and directing them towards novel therapeutic ends.”45 By 
implementing such processes of relations into given ideas, bodies are presupposed not as 
an event generated through relationality, but as encoded information, ready to be coded 
and decoded. A relational understanding of bodies is used here to manipulate such ideas as 
health, beauty and human dignity according to presupposed, fixed aims. Thacker calls this 
42 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Continuum, 2002), 39.





“biotech informatic essentialism,”46 which does not ignore the relational and processual 
nature of bodies, but primarily uses the relational nature of bodies to maintain desired 
identities, hierarchies and values.
 In other words, when used within fixed frames of identity and its desires, relationality 
loses its transformative capacity. When we put bodily relations and processes into 
practice in a way that governs those bodies, rather than creating and experimenting with 
their capacities, then the old hierarchies, ideas and power structures are strengthened. 
Affect, understood as relations of transformations, when unspecified and misused, may 
thus strengthen essentialism. Rather than experimentation by creation of the spaces 
of relationality, affect might be a tool for fulfilling given ideas through the fixation and 
identification of bodies. While I have already outlined the basic understanding of affect – as 
transformative and contaminating relations – to understand its profound implications and 
the importance of its use, a closer analysis of affect as an analytical and yet practical tool is 
urgent. I argue that in order to understand the implications of affect, that is, bodies within 
affect, in a way that would not follow essentialist presuppositions, as specified by Thacker, 
it is crucial to familiarize ourselves with the conceptual history of affect and why it was 
introduced into the philosophy in the first place. In order to analyse relationality beyond 
Thacker, I return to Spinoza’s writings on affect.
 Spinoza’s understanding of affect outlined in Ethics reveals the particular animality of 
relationality that is imperative in my study of bodies within affect. In the next section, I will 
focus on the main characteristic of affect as discussed by Spinoza and examine how it was 
rewritten in Deleuze’s study, in which affect is argued to be (a) distinct from emotion; where 
it is discussed as (b) an encounter and movement of thought and body; and where affect is 
(c) expressive – it not only happens between bodies, but it also generates those bodies. In 
this way, by focusing on these three characteristics, the delineation of the implications for 
the practice of affect will become clearer.
  
2.4a Affect: Affectus or affectio?
Within the contemporary use of affect there is much confusion about what affect is. 
Affirmatively applied within cultural and political studies, the notion of affect is usually 
without a firm distinction and specification. The word “affect” is treated interchangeably 
with emotions, with the state of the body and the body’s power for action. At the same time, 
affect when used as synonymous with affection can mean being against representation and 
identification and instead imply more embodied approaches of analysis and understanding. 
 However, as Deleuze has already remarked, this confusion derives from the wrong 
definition and interchangeable use of two terms that Spinoza distinguished from each other: 
46 Ibid., 92.
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affectus and affectio.47 Indeed, when we look, for instance, at the translation by Samuel 
Shirley of a passage from Spinoza’s Ethics in Part III, Definition 3, the terminological 
confusion begins:
 
By emotion I understand the affections of the body by which the body’s power 
of activity is increased or diminished, assisted or checked, together with the 
ideas of these affections. Thus, if we can be the adequate cause of one of these 
affections, then by emotion I understand activity, otherwise passivity.48
 
The same passage is translated by W. H. White and A. H. Stirling as: 
By affect [in Latin: affectum, II declenation Acc. from affectus] I understand 
the affections [affectiones, III declenation Acc. plur. from affectio] of the 
body, by which the power [potentia] of acting of the body itself is increased, 
diminished, helped, or hindered, together with the idea of these affections 
[affectionum, III declenation Gen. plur. from affectio]. If therefore, we can be 
the adequate cause of any of these affections [affectionum], I understand the 
affect [affectum] to be an action, otherwise it is a passion.49
White and Stirling, like Deleuze, notice Spinoza’s differentiation regarding affectus and 
affectio, and translate affectus as affect and affectio as affection. The translation of the word 
affectus as emotion is unfortunate and misses the meaning of the word affectus as used 
by Spinoza. The etymology of the word “emotion” refers to the Middle French esmocion, 
esmotion, emotion (French émotion) and Latin moveo. Emotion denotes “civil unrest, public 
commotion,” “agitation of mind, excited mental state, movement, disturbance;”50 and 
moveo that means “to move, stir, set in motion, shake, disturb, remove.”51 However, the 
word emotion also refers to “strong feelings, passion; (more generally) instinctive feeling 
as distinguished from reasoning or knowledge,”52 and, as such, was used, for instance, by 
Descartes to describe the motion of spirit that agitates and disturbs the thoughts.53 The 
distinction between affect and emotion becomes clearer, however, and also important for 
47 Gilles Deleuze, “Lecture on Spinoza at Vincennes in 24.01.1978,” trans. Timothy S. Murphy, webdeleuze, https://
www.webdeleuze.com/textes/14, accessed 24 April 2017.
48 Spinoza, Ethics, in Spinoza. Complete Works, 278.
49 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, trans. W. H. White and A. H. Stirling, (Ware: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 2001); In 
brackets are the Latin terms used in this passage by Spinoza, see Spinoza: Works in Latin, http://users.telenet.be/
rwmeijer/spinoza/works.htm, accessed 11 September 2015.
50 “Emotion, N.,” OED Online (Oxford University Press), http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/view/
Entry/61249# eid5521328, accessed 17 September 2015.
51 “Charlton T. Lewis, Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary, Mŏvĕo,” http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=
Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3Dmoveo, accessed 24 April 2017.
52 “Emotion, N.”
53 René Descartes, The Passions of the Soul (Hackett Publishing, 1989), 338–39.
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our further understanding of relationality of affect, when looking at Deleuze’s distinction 
between affectus and affectio.
 In the lectures on Spinoza at Vincennes on 24 January 1978,54 in order to signal the 
importance of the distinction between affectio and affectus, Deleuze introduces the relation 
between affectus and an idea. He asks: “what is an idea?” As he further explains: an idea “is a 
mode of thought which represents something. A representational mode of thought.” Affect 
(affectus), for that matter, is a “mode of thought which does not represent anything.” Deleuze 
adopts Spinoza’s causal understanding of affect, where affectus is positioned alongside the 
word transitio [Ethics, III, P59S]. The Latin transitio refers to “going across or over, a passing 
over, a passage.”55 Affectus “refers to the passage from one state to another,”56 and, as such, 
Deleuze argues, it is purely transitive and therefore cannot indicate or represent something.
 Affectio, on the contrary, is a kind of an idea. The Latin affectio means “a change in 
the state or condition of body or mind, a state or frame of mind, feeling.”57 It is an effect 
of a body acting upon another body. Moreover, because every action of a body involves 
contact with another, it always leaves a trace [Ethics, II, P17]. When affectio is translated 
as affection, it refers to the state of a body that has undergone a transformation. As such, 
affection becomes “a mixture of bodies” – with one body acting and leaving traces of this 
action upon another body. Importantly, as a kind of idea, affectio is already a particular state 
of the body. It thus involves a representation and identification of the act of transformation, 
from which it is, nevertheless, never separated. 
 For Spinoza, the distinction between affectus and affectio has crucial implications for 
our understanding of how we acquire knowledge about bodies. My argumentation also 
reveals the particular importance of relationality when thinking with affect. However, 
before we delve deeper into this, it is imperative to look closer at what Spinoza considers as 
knowledge with regard to the sense of affectio and affectus.
 According to Spinoza, affection (affectio) does not result in “true” knowledge. If it 
constructs knowledge, it regards only “the nature of the modified body,” and not the body 
that it is modifying. In other words, we know only the results of the body’s action, which we 
can observe in the changed state of the other’s body. Affectio does not, however, elicit the 
explicit cause of this change – the exact nature of the acting body. Consequently, Spinoza 
considers affection to construct inadequate knowledge: “the ideas we have of external 
bodies indicate the constitution of our own body rather than the nature of external bodies” 
[Ethics II, P16, C2].58
54 Deleuze, “Lecture on Spinoza at Vincennes in 24.01.1978.”
55 “Charlton T. Lewis, Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary, Transĭtĭo,” http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do
c=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3Dtransitio, accessed 24 April 2017.
56 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Robert Hurley, 1st in English edition (San Francisco: City 
Lights Publishers, 2001), 49.
57 “Charlton T. Lewis, Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary, Affectĭo,” http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc
=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3Daffectio, accessed 11 September 2015.
58 Spinoza, Ethics, trans. W. H. White, 63.
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By adequate knowledge, Spinoza means understanding all causes and determinations. 
However, due to our finite mode of existence – our mortality – all that we can perceive 
is the result of another body’s actions; that is to say, we can only perceive affections of 
affects. Thus, we can only come close to an adequate knowledge, the knowledge of all 
causes, through what Spinoza calls “common notions.” Common notions are things that 
are common among other bodies, such as the sense of extension, motion and rest [Ethics 
II, P38, P39]. However, how can we gain these common notions? How can we grasp what 
is common among bodies? According to Spinoza, we cognize common notions during 
encounters with other bodies. Only through relations with other bodies can we perceive 
what is common with our body: “the more things the body has in common with other 
bodies, the more things will the mind be adapted to perceive”59 [Ethics II, P. 39, Corollary]. 
In other words, to acquire adequate knowledge, the common notions, we must experience 
multiple connections, encounters with other bodies – we must experience various affects. 
The more relations (affectus) we experience, the closer we come to the generation of 
adequate knowledge. 
 Careful reading of Spinoza’s differentiation between affectio and affectus, between 
relations and the ideas or states of bodies resulting from these relations, allows us to 
acknowledge the importance of relationality between bodies. Although our knowledge 
about bodies is anticipated by ideas about those bodies (affections), through encounters 
with other bodies (affects), we can overcome the stability of affection and come closer to 
what Spinoza considers adequate knowledge. In this way, the particular affectus–affectio 
relation is not based on determination. Affects cannot be determined by affections. To put 
it differently, our relations with other bodies cannot be determined by our ideas about those 
bodies. AOO’s performative experiment analysed earlier in this chapter tacitly exercises 
this indeterminism: we may have an idea of a horse and a human body, we may also have 
an idea about the principles and laws that determine the cause of the experiment; however, 
exactly what happened during the encounter between these two bodies, the dynamic 
intensity between the artist’s body and the horse’s blood, remain indifferent to the given 
representations. This is what Deleuze meant by the exteriority of relations. He indicated the 
need to enter a relationship for the sake of stepping away from the modes of fixed states of 
bodies. The sphere of relation is the sphere of encountering what bodies can do, a sphere 
where the movement of bodies’ power as potentia is at work. 
 Affect is a passage, a transition between bodies and it should be understood as a dynamic 
movement. Indeed, it cannot be captured and defined in terms of properties, since then we 
would presuppose its characteristic to be of that of a state or of an idea. Precisely this falling 
into representation while losing the dynamism of an encounter happened to the artists of 
AOO when they wanted to capture that which could not be captured in their experiment. 
When the artists tried to seize the intensities of the encounter between two bodies by 
extracting the mixed blood into the Petri dish, it resulted in the blood coagulating. The 
59 Ibid., 78.
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dynamic and violent character of blood transformation resulted in its destruction in the 
moment of identification, and even the artists that participated in this experiment could 
not control the event of transformation with their desire to commodify it into a given 
object. However, what is crucial for our understanding of affect is not the fact that we 
cannot capture it, but rather that, because we cannot capture affect in the form of a given 
object or idea, it forces us to take a different approach – it implies different tools of practice. 
 Because, as Spinoza argues, “bodies are distinguished from one another in respect of 
motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in respect of substance”60 [Ethics, II, 
P13, Lemma 1], affect implies a different approach, one not based on the sense of identity 
and properties of things. Affect, as the relational way of being of bodies, involves a sense of 
the difference between bodies, which necessarily renders a relational understanding of the 
body. Moreover, the relationality of affect not only regards the way of being of bodies, but 
also bodies’ continuous determination by relations with other bodies: “A body in motion or 
at rest must be determined to motion or rest by another body, which was also determined 
to motion or rest by another, and that in its turn by another, and so on ad infinitum”61 
[Ethics, II, P13, Lemma 3]. Finally, the notion of affect that determines the relational nature 
of bodies, also determines the relational character of knowledge about bodies – it is a 
determination resulting from ongoing and multiple encounters.
 In order to know the body, we must first understand how bodies act and relate to 
other bodies. This was an unusual statement during Spinoza’s era, since all bodily states 
and relations were generally considered to contradict Nature and were the result of a weak 
human disposition. However, on the basis of his monism, where res extensa and res cogitans 
are the one substance, the one thing, albeit expressed in different ways [Ethics, II, P21, 
P7S], Spinoza argues that all human conduct and affects, rather than being essentially 
different from Nature and even contradictory to Nature [Ethics, III], belong to the power 
of nature. Spinoza thus introduces an understanding of bodies that is based on the degree 
of movement and rest, and the capacity for movement and rest. Knowledge involves 
bodies’ adaptability within affects as affectus; in other words, it becomes a movement of 
transformative encounters [Ethics II, P13, S]. It is, therefore, invalid to search for essence 
or identity in our bid to understand bodies, as this will only lead us to a body state that 
contradicts body’s continuous changes and transformations. Such a definition of affect 
implies a different practice, one that focuses on mapping and experimenting encounters.
2.4b Good and bad encounters
Affect can not only be mistaken for emotion, it can also be considered as having a fixed set 
of relations that correspond to all bodies. In order to appreciate the necessity for relational 
thinking when considering the relationality of affect, the study of kinds of relations and 
their movements is therefore crucial.
60 Ibid., 58.
61 Ibid.
 Animal Relations 71
Figure 12. Diagram representing the kinds of 
encounters as described by Spinoza. 
Drawing by A. A. Wołodźko.
Described in terms of causes, Spinoza distinguished two kinds of encounters–affects: 
passions and actions [Figure 12]. Passions originate outside one’s body and, therefore, 
we can only know their inadequate cause since its effect, although perceived in our body, 
cannot be definitely traced and fully determined. Actions, on the other hand, are affects 
originating in our bodies. They constitute an adequate cause, because their effects are 
clearly distinguishable and perceived. However, unlike passions, actions are rare. Moreover, 
because of humans’ finite mode of existence, it is impossible to fulfil their requirement 
for exhausted knowledge. Full understanding is a characteristic belonging only to God, 
Nature or Substance – Spinoza treats all three interchangeably. However, as I elaborated in 
the previous section, we can come closer to gaining adequate knowledge by initiating and 
multiplying our encounters with bodies. 
 When bodies in relation agree with each other, when bodies agree with their conatus 
(agree with their drive to life), they construct a third relation that preserves both their 
conatûs, [Ethics, IV, P31, P38, P39]. These encounters can be called good affects. Despite 
being passive and thus constructing inadequate knowledge, they positively influence one’s 
well-being, because they preserve, rather than destroy body. These are the passions that 
Spinoza calls joy.62 Even if Spinoza considers passions to generally diminish our power 
to act, the passions of joy involve some degree of action. The joyful passions preserve our 
drive to life and therefore increase our power to act. In this account, when passions agree 
with our conatus, they produce joy, increase our power, or even encourage us to prolong 
this relation. Thus, our desire comes not from being passive, but comes from our conatus, 
our drive to increase our power in order to act.63 When the body in relation cannot be 
combined with the other, when relations disagree with each other, this is considered to be 
a bad encounter, in the sense that, rather than preserving a body’s conatus, it destroys it 
or harms it. It thus reduces the body’s power to act. Spinoza calls such bad encounters sad 
passions. 
62 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin, 1st edition (New York/ Cambridge, 
MA: Zone Books, 1992), 239.
63 Ibid., 240.
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Encounters between bodies generate intimate and risky relations that may have unequal 
results for different bodies. Hence, Caccavale’s project becomes crucial when looking to 
understand the implications of affect’s relationality. Caccavale created ways of being in an 
allied relationship with the pig. His visualization of relationality and new ways of practicing 
it had a partially human perspective – they were driven by passion. Moreover, because the 
Utility Pets served more humans than the pig, and the preservation of human life presupposed 
the death of another animal life, the relationality that we encounter in this case oscillates 
around sad passion for the pig and semi-joyful passion for the human – prolonging life, yet 
not without the human feeling a sense of remorse and loss. The intensity of this vibration 
between joy and sadness is undoubtedly fostered by the blurred boundary between the two 
species. Nevertheless, this human-pig asymmetrical relation generates a unique way of life 
that transforms what both a pig’s and a human’s body might do. The Utility Pets literally feed 
on the dynamic and blur the distinction between actions and passion, and the necessity to 
explore multiple, complex, awkward and “weirding” relationality in order to understand 
what it would be like – that is to say, what the implications are of blurring the boundary 
between species – to practice animal relationality.
 The practice of relations between pig and human in Caccavale’s speculative project, 
albeit from only one, human, perspective and with a fatal ending for the pig, produced a 
mutual alliance that enriched both lives – this is what Spinoza would call joyful passion. 
Even though it may only be partial (because it does not result in full knowledge about its 
cause and it ends with the death of one of the bodies), the human-pig relation produces new 
experiences. By mapping of these multiple relations, Caccavale creates new understanding 
about what human-pig bodies may do and how they might co-exist. Spinoza would have 
considered both of the passive encounters in this case to have been carefully studied, 
regardless of their relation to the degree of power. The very act of comprehending passions, 
regardless of whether they are sad or joyful, leads us to knowledge of their causes, which, 
eventually, transform our passivity into activity. Neither joyful, nor sad relations are fixed 
and given, and each encounter, due to its dynamic and transformative character, constantly 
shifts and transforms not only the bodies, but the relations themselves. 
 Moreover, Spinoza’s clear distinction between sad and joyful passions does not mean that 
they are inherently separate. Joyful and sad passions constantly intermingle.64 This is due to 
the fact that we are partially and particularly involved in relations that determine our bodies 
and actions. Our existence is affected by other bodies, and is already accommodated by 
them.65 Most importantly, as Deleuze concludes, there is no opposition or essential dualism 
between passive and active affects. We can increase our power through joyful passion, but, 
simultaneously, sad passion can block this increase; despite this, the latter still exercises 
the power to act, albeit in the lowest degree. We can reinforce our activity of knowing by 
multiplying relations. Only through encounter can we understand which bodies agree with 
64 Ibid., 244.
65 Ibid.
 Animal Relations 73
each other or not and what their capacities and functions are. In this sense, Spinoza outlines 
what the notion of transformation through affect might be. As Genevieve Lloyd puts it: 
Through understanding the affects, replacing the inadequate ideas they 
initially involve with more adequate ones, we do not simply retreat from the 
turmoil of passion into a realm of thought. The affect itself is transformed 
from a passion – an inadequate idea of a transition to a greater or lesser state 
of activity – to an active rational emotion, incorporating an adequate idea.66
Since to understand the body is to know what the body can do, what are its capacities 
and functions, knowledge about passion has a transformative character. Importantly, in 
the encounter that transforms bodies neither body nor mind has a priority: “for what the 
body can do no one has hithherto determined, that is to say, experience has taught no one 
hitherto what the body without being determined by mind, can do and what it cannot do 
from the laws of nature alone, in so far as nature is considered as corporeal,”67 [Ethics, 
III, P2 Scholium]. Spinoza considers passions to be the flows of rest and motion that are 
both mental and corporeal. These ‘passive’ affects, although they constitute the source of 
inadequate knowledge, can bring understanding about the cause of things and, consequently, 
understanding about our bodies. Hence, instead of characterizing the juxtaposition of 
thinking/mind and affected/body as a problem of how the two can communicate, Spinoza 
outlines the corresponding nature between mind and body. For Spinoza’s contemporary 
Descartes, for instance, passions, as the passive feelings of a body, were not only opposite 
to the active mind, but also prone to the mind’s control, because they did not reflect 
Nature’s majesty.68 Spinoza’s monism, however, rejected Descartes’ dualistic approach on 
the grounds of ontological egalitarianism and a reciprocal relationality between what was 
considered mind and body. 
 The binary relation of body-mind, even though harmonious, presupposes a hierarchical 
moral order that requires one to surrender for another to succeed. Spinoza breaks the 
hierarchical order of faculties with his notion of parallelism (which should be read as 
a unity), because the passions of the body are also the passions of the mind [Ethics III, 
P2 Scholium]. Neither body, nor mind is separate from each other, but rather they are 
simultaneous. There is thus no harmony based on the dialectical structure of action and 
passion, thesis and antithesis, joy and sadness. There is no transcendence that allows 
for action or finality. Instead, Spinoza thinks about relationality in terms of not only the 
material encounter of bodies and corporeal generation of meaning, but also in terms of 
an encounter characterized by continuous risk and doubt. To encounter the body means 
66 Genevieve Lloyd, Part of Nature: Self-Knowledge in Spinoza’s Ethics, 1st edition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1994), 86.
67 Spinoza, Ethics, trans. W.H. White, 101.
68 Descartes, The Passions of the Soul.
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generating meaning about this body, without prior knowledge of its full capabilities. The 
transformative capacity of relationality is thus a creation that regards both incorporeal truth 
and corporeal body as something that needs to be continuously mapped and experimented 
with. 
 We do not know in advance which relations are bad and which might, ultimately, be 
joyful, i.e. which relations can lead us to action and which can diminish our understanding. 
We must first create the conditions for a new relationality to emerge. The short analysis 
of Spinoza’s use of affect demonstrates that affect is something to be considered as neutral 
– something that incorporates bad as well as good encounters, which are never arbitrary, 
but rather situated. We do not know in advance which encounter will be good or bad; 
therefore, we must experiment, to see what happens first. Even then, the observation might 
shift. What for one body appears to be good and joyful, may be destructive for another. 
Affect implies the continuous process of experimentation and mapping relationality. The 
understanding of affect as affectus inevitably leads to a particular understanding of ethics. 
Within thinking with affectus, ethics becomes the practice of learning how to secure the 
spaces that allow relationality to occur. This particular understanding of ethics will be 
explored later (Chapter 5). For now, the last crucial characteristic of affect as affectus awaits.
2.4c Affect as expression
Why would someone want to inject another species’ blood into their own body? When 
AOO performed their experiment of becoming with the horse, rather than the struggle to 
express and represent some given sense of an idea about what the body is, their approach 
focused on the conditions of that particular practice: how to shake the fixed border between 
the bodies? The processes of experimentation as encounter that affect embodies focuses 
on the conditions of creation, on how to secure the spaces that allow relationality and 
contamination to occur, and how to continue relationality’s transformative movements. 
This different logic, which affectus implies, presupposes a search for genesis, for conditions 
that allow an encounter to have a generative rather than a representative capacity. Affect, as 
such, constitutes the ontological condition of bodies – expression through relation. 
 Expression here has a particular meaning, which Deleuze devoted an entire book to 
when discussing the philosophy of Spinoza.69 I cannot do justice Deleuze’s analysis of 
expressionism in Spinoza here, so I will focus on a particular element of his analysis, which 
will help our understanding of affect’s distinct sense of relation that not only connects 
bodies, but also generates transformation of those bodies. 
 Deleuze characterizes Spinoza’s immanent philosophy as the philosophy of expression. 
On the basis of Spinoza’s monistic philosophy, which is based on the presupposition of one 
substance that is infinitely actualizing itself, all that is, is an expression of that substance. In 
69 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy.
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addition to the concept of Substance, Spinoza distinguished modes and attributes. For our 
purpose, i.e. understanding the generative character of affect, it is important to consider 
how Deleuze explains those modes and attributes, since scholars are not definite in this 
matter and fail to take into account the generative capacity of affect.70
 Deleuze clarifies Spinoza’s differentiation of propria (modes) and attributes as a relation 
between these adjectives that which give no substantial knowledge, and verbs that express 
qualities and essences.71 Propria thus belong to the structure of sign and signified, while 
attributes to expression and expressed: “A sign always attaches to a proprium; it always 
signifies a commandment; and it grounds our obedience towards it. Expression always 
relates to an attribute; it expresses an essence, that is, a nature in the infinitive; it makes 
it known to us.”72 Deleuze describes the expressive character of attributes as affirmative. 
Affirmation means that attributes do not need the logic of identification in their relation of 
expression. Identification is based on negativity and opposition – in order for something to 
be perceived you must use the logic of comparison, based on what it is not.73 As Deleuze 
explains, attributes express rather the essence of substance in a way that constitutes substance 
growth and dynamic nature.74 Nevertheless, the notion of expression as an indication of 
transformation becomes more apparent for our purpose when we consider how Deleuze 
distinguishes Spinoza’s expression from the concept of participation. 
 Deleuze refers to Plato to outline three meanings of participation: material (to be part of 
something), imitative (to imitate), and demonic (to receive something from a demon).75 In 
all cases, participation was constructed from the perspective of being outside of the relation 
of participation. That is to say, as observers, we either do not see divisions, or we possess 
some prior idea or model on account of which we grant imitation.76 Thus, according to 
Deleuze, a post-platonic notion of participation is an inversion of Plato’s perspective, i.e. a 
shift from an outside perspective to an inside one. This inside perspective on participation 
70 See the extensive analysis of the difference between Deleuze reading of Spinoza’s expressionism and the usual 
reading through the philosophy of Hegel and Descartes: Simon Duffy, The Logic of Expression: Quality, Quantity 
and Intensity in Spinoza, Hegel and Deleuze, (Aldershot/ Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2006).
71 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, 50–55.
72 Ibid., 57.
73 Ibid., 60.
74 Ibid., 80–81; On the analysis of the univocity of the Substance and attributes, of what is universal and singular or 
what Spinoza also calls natura naturans (Nature, Substance, God) and natura naturata (nature, modes, bodies) see 
Audrey Wasser, “Deleuze’s Expressionism,” Angelaki 12, no. 2 (1 August 2007): 49–66; Using Deleuze's concept of 
difference, Wasser elaborates on the transformative capacity of the expressionism and the capacity of immanence 
to generate the new while avoiding determinacy; for the further study of the expression that is determined by 
difference see Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 40–41. 
75 Deleuze refers here to Plato’s notion of a demon, which Plato described as a demiurge, creator, craftsman of the 
universe, see Plato, Timaeus and Critias, trans. Robin Waterfield, 1st edition (Oxford/New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009).
76 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, 169.
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focuses on genesis or production. It is a triad of giver, given and recipient, which Plotinus 
called an emanation: “To participate is always to participate through what is given.”77
 When we look at participation from an outside perspective and with regard to Spinoza’s 
understanding of expression, it fails to meet the requirement of immanence. Hence, 
emanation, rather than participation, seems to be logically much closer to immanence. 
When defined causally, as Deleuze does, within emanation there is a production of 
which causes remain in themselves. The difference between emanation and expression 
lies, however, in the way both “systems” produce things. In immanence, cause and effect 
remain in themselves. In emanation, although the cause is immanent, the effect transcends 
its causes: “The emanative cause produces through what it gives, but is beyond what it 
gives.”78 There is inscribed exclusion in emanation and, as Deleuze argues, it contradicts the 
affirmative nature of immanence. Emanation presupposes the exclusion and hierarchical 
superiority of its effects. 
 The exclusion of participation and emanation when thinking about expressionism 
leads Deleuze to the final characterization of expression as immanence. The notion of 
expression presupposes unity as a property of substance – an equality of being that implies 
no hierarchical structures. From such characteristics of expression, which generates but 
also transforms bodies, the sense of relationality appears to be messy, full of surprises and 
risks. Relationality demands a constant negotiation and experimentation. 
 The significance of Spinoza’s philosophy, according to Deleuze, lies in the immanence 
that releases expression from representation and subordination. As such, it equates being 
with knowing, which Deleuze calls expressive knowledge.79 Therefore, in his introduction 
to the third part of Ethics, Spinoza writes that we should not “bewail, laugh at, mock, or, as 
is more generally the case, detest”80 affects; rather, through its study, we can truly possess 
an understanding of them. Thus, the concept of affect as affectus becomes, for Spinoza, 
an attuned relational way of gathering and forming bodies. He combines and relates his 
understanding of affect with a sense of agency, causality and knowledge about bodies,81 
allowing us to consider the material and generative implications of relationality, where to 
know is to materially participate in something. 
 This material participation in bodies’ relationality and transformation pervades the 
work of AOO and Caccavale discussed in this chapter. AOO and Caccavale were already 
working with affect, yet in a non-specified, non-defined way. They were creating spaces of 
encounter, of relationality, to create a sort of experimentation, to test what bodies can do, 




80 Spinoza, Ethics, trans. W.H. White, 97.
81 The third chapter of this book is devoted to the material notion of meaning that affect implies.
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whole philosophical clarification of affect and its importance is meaningless in the face of 
more tangible artistic endeavours that directly experience relationality. 
 However, such a conclusion of priority of practice over theory immediately positions 
me in the dualism of faculties and experience that the relationality of affect undermines. 
To practice affect is also to change the way of thinking about affect, about bodies and the 
relations it transforms and generates. Without bioart encounters, we would not have created 
and experienced the intensity of animal relationality as exercised by AOO and Caccavale. 
But without Spinoza’s affectus, I would not have been able to point to and formulate that 
experience either. Affect as affectus implies immanence of thought and practice, but also 
their mutual and constant negotiation. To live within affect, to practice bodies within 
affect, demands the shaping and securing of spaces that facilitate such negotiations and 
experimentation. 
 The animality of affect can be understood through actual participation, an alliance with 
a mutating body, with its movements, flows and messiness and openness to continuous 
transformation and rethinking of ways to achieve this. However, beware, one never stays 
the same after engaging in such contaminating relations – one transforms and mutates 
expressing the relationality of continuous contaminations.
2.5 Facing Critique of Affect
Despite the Spinoza-Deleuze perspective on affect as transformative relationality, as 
previously mentioned, affect has mainly been analysed as affection – as a state of a body or an 
idea of that state, such as an emotion.82 The importance of affect for a wider understanding 
of how bodies relate and what this relation might be, has frequently been subordinated to 
the psychological study of emotions. As affectio, the study of affect survived mostly along 
the lines of Cartesian argumentation, in which, given its presumed subjectivity, affect is 
considered to necessitate repression or control by the mind for the sake of the validity of 
knowledge.83 Moreover, a significant criticism of affect has emerged, which has mapped a 
particular form of its development. This lack of differentiation between affect and emotion 
undermines and questions the possible implementation of affect within humanistic theory, 
which is concerned with the wide cultural, political and social implications of bodies’ 
relationality. 
82 See the multiple takes on affect, which, although they acknowledge existing discourses on differentiations, tend 
not to distinguish between affect, emotion, feeling and pre-cognitive response: Charles Altieri, The Particulars of 
Rapture: An Aesthetics of the Affects (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Teresa Brennan, The Transmission 
of Affect (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, 
Performativity (Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2002); Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2007).
83 For a critical analysis of the ‘affective turn’ in philosophy see Marguerite La Caze and Henry Martyn Lloyd, 
“Editors’ Introduction: Philosophy and Affective Turn,” Parrhesia 13 (2011): 1–13.
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The inability to distinguish between relations of transformations and those that strengthen 
ideas of identification tends not only to perpetuate old hierarchies between bodies, but 
also leads to the critique of any attempt to express and prolong its transformations. For 
this reason, Shannon Bell, when writing about the Paul Virilio concept of extreme art, 
compared the performance of, among other works of bioart, “May the Horse Live in Me,” 
to the “manifestations of the accident of art […] [that] came into being as a response 
to war and to its spectacle of terror and shock value, which has only increased in speed 
and intensity.”84 Considering Virilio, who defines art’s relationship to science as “the 
expressionism of a MONSTER, born of the labour of a science deliberately deprived of 
a conscience […]not a literary or artistic genius anymore, but a GENETIC GENIUS,”85 
bioart, in particular, appears as the spectacle of fear before the monster. Once defined as a 
deviation from something, as the idea of fear, affect as relations of transformations becomes 
neglected and caricaturized as a mere spectacle of curiosity, deviation from norm, from that 
which is considered to be fixed. As Virilio cries: 
the hybridization of man and animal. How can we fail to see that these 
‘scientific extremists,’ far from merely threatening the unicity of the human 
race by trafficking embryos, are also taking their axe to the whole philosophical 
and physiological panoply that previously gave the term SCIENCE its very 
meaning?86
Moreover, the main argument against the use of the concept of affect presupposes the 
necessity of maintaining not merely bodily-species “purity”, but also, fixed disciplinary 
divisions. Arguments against the use of affect revolve around the alleged appropriation 
of neuroscientific findings for humanistic aims and research. In the struggle to find 
some communication between science and the humanities, Constantina Papoulias and 
Felicity Callard suggest that affect is a part of what they call a “spontaneous philosophy.” 
“Spontaneous,” in this sense, implies a simplification of complex neuroscientific theories 
in order to ensure the significance and actuality of one’s theoretical claims. The difference 
in the understanding and use of affect between disciplines is often thought to create more 
problems than it solves. For instance, in neurobiology and developmental psychology, affect 
is studied as a part of a regulatory system that assures the formation of coherent relations 
between individuals. When affect is used as “a placeholder for the inherent dynamic and 
84 Shannon Bell, “Accident of Art,” in The Virilio Dictionary, ed. John Armitage, 1st edition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2013), 21.
85 Paul Virilio, Art and Fear, trans. Julie Rose (London, New York: Continuum, 2004), 50; capitalization in original.
86 Ibid., 51.
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mutability of matter”87 in philosophical and cultural analysis, it is said to significantly 
contradict science.88
 However, within the concerns of this book and the relational matters of affect already 
discussed in this chapter, it is necessary to confront the critique of affect that draws upon 
Spinoza-Deleuze readings.89 Under particular scrutiny is Brian Massumi, who actualizes 
Deleuze’s philosophy in his Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation, already 
a canonical text for the affective turn.90 Perhaps the most significant argument against 
Massumi’s notion of affect is his idea of the autonomy of affect and his appropriation of 
science in understanding this autonomy. Before moving to particular arguments, it is 
necessary to examine Massumi’s reading of affect more closely.
 Following Massumi’s description, within cultural theory, affect introduces the notion of 
intensity to encounters between bodies. In his concept of the autonomy of affect, he tries 
to overcome the dominion of structures based on discourses that firmly rely on qualified 
identities, points of reference and representations. He develops an understanding of affect 
as an intensive expression-experience-based event.91 In this sense, he follows Spinoza-
Deleuze’s use of affect as affectus. Here, affect is translated and used as a passage between 
states, in contrast to the psychological use of affect as affectio – as a state of bodies’ fixed 
disposition, such as emotion or feeling. For Massumi, affect as affectus is autonomous from 
the states of bodies, thus from affection. Affect’s autonomy is not just a methodological call 
to overcome the discursive and linguistic methodology of “cultural-theoretical vocabulary,” 
dominated by the theories of signification, characteristic of the notion of affectio.92 Most 
of all, Massumi argues for a way of thinking and acting that is independent from linguistic 
signification. When he writes about the autonomy of affect as an openness to relations and as 
a dissimilation of function, he refers to the a-signification of affect, a concept introduced by 
Deleuze and Guattari.93 A-signification of affect means that affect does not carry meaning 
or function, but it is not entirely excluded from any semiotic characteristic either. Rather, 
87 Constantina Papoulias and Felicity Callard, “Biology’s Gift: Interrogating the Turn to Affect,” Body & Society 
16, no. 1 (2010): 31.
88 Ibid., 39.
89 Eugenie Brinkema, for instance, argues that the signification of affect within Deleuzian studies is too general and 
thus empty: “Deleuzians, with their emphasis on affect as a pure state of potentiality, tend to be particularly guilty 
of the sin of generality. This terminological lump risks the vagueness of purely negative definitional endeavors 
and largely cedes specificity—generic, emotional, historical—to cognitivists in literary and media studies, who 
have taken Aristotelian taxonomizing to heart in their ever-narrowing treatment […] When affect is taken as 
a synonym for violence or force (or intensity or sensation), one can only speak of its most abstract agitations 
instead of any particular textual workings. Thus, the turn to affect has tended to make the same argument time 
and again—each a version of, “We urgently have to attend to X!” where X stands for a member of the set {excess, 
affect, sensation, embodiment, intensity, resistance, whatever}” in The Forms of the Affects (Durham, NC/London: 
Duke University Press Books, 2014), xviii.




93 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 75–78.
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as creative and spontaneous, and having the capacity for transformation and change, affect 
generates new, non-linguistic meanings94 that are not supported by a regime of cognitive 
semiotics grounded in the signifier/signified paradigm.95
 Nevertheless, because of the characterization of affect as an encounter and experience, 
Clare Hemmings claims that Massumi’s concept of affect is unable to confront social 
and political criticism.96 Using Simon O’Sullivan’s words, she argues that when you take 
seriously the idea that “you cannot read affects, you can only experience them,”97 affect 
dissolves any critical, political and cultural potential for scrutiny. When affect can only 
be experienced and not be identified, it remains outside meaningful discourse.98 We can 
conclude from such a claim, however, that any phenomenon that functions in the non-
linguistic realm of experience is prone to socio-cultural meaninglessness. The problematic 
of such a conclusion is blatantly clear.
 Ruth Leys similarly criticizes the presumed non-signification of affect due to its 
non-identifiable character. She draws consequences from Massumi’s characterization 
of affect such as the automatic response that happens before consciousness as well as a 
sense of intentionality.99 According to Leys, such a notion of affect renders one’s existence 
as a barely reactive activity, cut off from complex socio-political contexts. Affect, when 
deprived of meaning, presupposes neuro-essentalism and a correlationist fixation on the 
subject’s perception and perspective. Moreover, when affect is understood as an encounter 
that happens outside semiotic structures, it leads to the presupposition that we can think 
about meaning formation and generation only as a product of reflection and cognition, 
reinforcing, in turn, the old body-mind dualism. 
 Since Massumi wants to overcome the representational understanding of bodies by 
presupposing the non-reflexive and non-intentional notion of affect that generates bodies. 
He certainly appears to be close to strengthening dualism between body and mind. Affect, 
understood in terms of an automatic reaction of the body taking place below the threshold 
of consciousness, implies a radical break by the body with any sense of creativity and 
meaningful production. Here, therefore, Massumi would demonstrate that only the mind 
has a capacity for cognition and intention and that meaning occurs independently from the 
body’s re-action.100
94 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 35; See also Agnieszka Anna Wołodźko, “Materiality of Affect: How Art 
Can Reveal the More Subtle Realities of an Encounter,” in This Deleuzian Century, (eds) Rick Dolphijn and Rosi 
Braidotti (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 171–173.
95 Stephen Zepke, Art as Abstract Machine: Ontology and Aesthetics in Deleuze and Guattari (New York: Routledge, 
2011), 121.
96 Clare Hemmings, “Invoking Affect: Cultural Theory and the Ontological Turn,” Cultural Studies 19, no. 5 
(2005): 562-563
97 Simon O’Sullivan, “The Aesthetics of Affect: Thinking Art Beyond Representation,” Angelaki: Journal of 
Theoretical Humanities 6, no. 3 (2001): 126.
98 Hemmings, “Invoking Affect,” 563.
99 Ruth Leys, “The Turn to Affect: A Critique,” Critical Inquiry 37, no. 3 (1 maart 2011): 450–451.
100 Ibid., 456.
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However, Massumi’s understanding of affect relies on a differentiation between affectus and 
affectio. He reads the notion of affect in the sense of the word affectus – i.e. as a passage 
between bodies that is independent from the given states of bodies and their representation. 
He acknowledges that affect is not an affection. His understanding of affect presupposes 
the sense of relationality. Only through this profound understanding of relationality – 
relationality that draws heavily upon Deleuze’s-Spinoza’s understanding of the parallelism 
of body and mind – can he argue for the relational generation of bodies: 
The autonomic tendency received second-hand from the body is raised to 
a higher power to become an activity of the mind. Mind and body are seen 
as two levels recapitulating the same image/expression event in different but 
parallel ways, ascending by degrees from the concrete to the incorporeal, 
holding to the same absent center of a now spectral – and potentialized – 
encounter.101
In this way, affect allows for a relational understanding of our bodies emerging within an 
encounter. In the event of an encounter, actions and passions are inseparable. Affect, within 
which bodies in relation emerge, becomes a middle ground: 
Spinoza’s Ethics is the philosophy of becoming-active, in parallel, of mind and 
body, from an origin in passion, in impingement, in so pure and productive a 
receptivity that it can only be conceived as a third state, an excluded middle, 
prior to the distinction between activity and passivity: affect.102
As Massumi stresses, the question of affect’s potency lies not in the critique, but in the 
possibility of the new that results from a non-dialectical sense of relationality. His 
understanding of the autonomy of affect takes the shape of a radical openness to relations, 
rather than the fixation on a particular set of structures. He thus turns to the problem of 
genesis as a truly political and cultural issue: 
The stakes are the new. For structure is the place where nothing ever happens, 
that explanatory heaven in which all eventual permutations are prefigured in 
a self-consistent set of invariant generative rules. Nothing is prefigured in the 
event. It is the collapse of structured distinction into intensity, of rules into 
paradox. It is the suspension of the invariance that makes happy happy, sad 
sad, function function, and meaning mean.103
 




Even if some of the critical voices are significant, their concerns mostly relate to 
methodological clarity, which ultimately supports the disciplinary divisions and 
prioritization of epistemology over ontology. What such evaluations miss, despite their 
crucial and urgent concern for the specificity of the humanities, is the contaminating 
condition of affect that blurs any stubbornly posed demand for disciplinary divisions and 
purity.104
 Massumi acknowledges his “shameless” reliance on science, and yet he emphasizes the 
need to pursue this ungrateful endeavour just for the sake of changing the humanities. He 
calls for reshaping humanistic methods and concepts, in order to find what is unique to the 
humanities. For him, affect opens a transversal journey where various findings and methods 
are juxtaposed in order to create transformative encounters: “The point, once again, is not 
to make the humanities scientific. The point is to borrow from science in order to make a 
difference in the humanities.”105 Through his close reading of Deleuze-Spinoza, Massumi 
opens the possibility of relational thinking within cultural and political theory, drawing the 
possible line not only for the transformative and relational logic of thinking with affect, but 
also carving the radical implications of affect that this book undertakes – new modulating, 
mutating, animal understanding of how bodies and their understanding is produced 
and practiced when art, philosophy and science become continuously intermingling and 
challenging each other. 
 Instead of adopting the rhetoric of evidence in theoretical approach, I argue that the 
point is to change the questions that form the basis of our analysis. This shift in thinking can 
be established when we change the epistemological inquiry of ‘what can I know’ into ‘what 
must I do’ and ‘what can I hope.’106 Such a shift from epistemology to ethology responds to 
the Deleuzian-Spinozian notion of affect as a relation and a passage. Here, affect becomes 
a method that is related to existence and action. Consequently, affect becomes a combined 
object and practice, where each of its components cannot be separated from each other. 
 Accordingly, while I agree with the arguments against the appropriation of psychological 
and neuroscientific facts in philosophical research, there has been a convenient omission 
of the relational and processual understanding of affect long before any of the mentioned 
branches of ‘hard science’ were established. However, simplification threatens to immobilize 
all that affect promises to carry. The fierce debate around the nature of affect and why it has 
become so important today influences its actual and conceptual practice. In contrast to this 
theoretical dialogue, I argue that bioart’s relational practice with contaminating materialities 
of bodies allows us to confront affect, where passions are inseparable from actions. Bioart’s 
experimental approach to the body offers a fresh and yet strangely familiar perspective on 
104 Papoulias and Callard, “Biology’s Gift,” 46–49.
105 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 20–21.
106 Alain Badiou, “Preface” in Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. 
Ray Brassier (London/New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010), vii.
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how affect as relation is possible in practice. Bioart generates actual consequences of its 
practices for thinking about bodies.
 After all, Deleuze and Guattari already wrote on art’s distinct potentiality for the 
generation of affects and percepts.107 The question that bioart highlights, however, seems to 
be the result of a serious account of what Deleuze and Guattari signalled. It is the question 
that Spinoza asked and which, although urgent, remains unanswered and somehow lost in 
today’s discussion on affect: how to act when we take seriously the affectus that generates 
our bodies? Today, this Spinozian understanding of agencies that collectively construct 
bodies and their multiple meanings marks the line of thinking and practice of affect that 
actually matters. Unlike in any other encounter, the actual consequences and implications 
of this relationality are exercised in artistic practice. Within bioart’s practice, a radical shift 
in thinking happens, which means that rather than focusing on finding truths, on defining 
states of things, we are more concerned with genesis, conditions of creation and their 
implications.
2.6 Fabulations of Affect
Fabulate, v. …to relate as a fable or myth… 
To talk or narrate in fables... 
To invent, concoct, fabricate.108
Affect deviates, induces change and contaminations and, as such, it becomes the creative 
capacity, albeit not without the risk of encountering the unknown and unpredictable. 
The creative capacity of affect as exercised in the discussed work of AOO and Caccavale, 
oscillates not between fiction and reality, between imagined and given, but, as Deleuze 
would say, “in the new mode of story.”109 This new mode of story, as later described by 
Deleuze and Guattari, is a “creative fabulation,”110 that “exists only from the perspective 
of a series of powers, always referring to each other and passing into one another.”111 This 
creative fabulation of affect does not belong to memory;112 as Deleuze argues, it does 
not follow the structure of identity, but rather that which is yet to come – the relations of 
transformations. 
107 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 163–169.
108 “Fabulate, v.,” OED Online (Oxford University Press), http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/view/
Entry/67410# eid4920006, accessed 11 May 2017.
109 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema II: The Time-Image, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minesota Press, 1989), 155.
110 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 171.
111 Deleuze, Cinema II, 139.
112 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 168–71; Deleuze, Cinema II, 131–42.
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The particular relationality of fabulation, of relations that, rather than connect to what is 
already there, stretch out to shape new bodies, to create new paths, thus has an aesthetic 
dimension. Affect creates new sensations and new perceptions. To fabulate is to create. 
There is, however, something distinct that affect engenders when read with Spinoza and 
Deleuze, and as practiced within bioart. It can be argued, nevertheless, that we do not need 
a new concept of relationality when talking about art’s practice, because we already have 
that in art theory. In particular, Nicolas Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics (1998) opened a 
crucial discussion on the role of art as generation and production of meaning that allows 
us to think about relationality in art more clearly. I argue, however, that affect as practiced 
by bioart offers distinct implications for understanding the contamination of bodies that 
existing theories within art cannot grasp alone. Bourriaud’s idea of relationality has been 
important not only for the analysis of art in the 1990s, but also for recognizing the line of 
transformations and challenges that practicing affect with bioart engenders. I will therefore 
briefly recall the main characteristic of relational aesthetics to further map the distinct and 
important implications of affect. 
 Within the phenomenon which he described as the commodification of human 
relationships into “standardized artefacts,”113 Bourriaud asked whether it is still possible 
for art to generate relationships with the world. By following Guy Debord’s the Society of 
the Spectacle, he argued for the universal mediation of human relationships through images. 
However, he did not follow Debord’s focus on the individual. Instead, Bourriaud argued 
that the most important thing “in our post-industrial society” is not the emancipation 
of the individual, but the emancipation from the individual: “freeing-up of inter-human 
communications, the dimensional emancipation of existence.”114 He thus claimed that there 
is a possibility of art becoming relational when it takes “as its theoretical horizon the realm 
of human interactions and its social context, rather than the assertion of an independent 
and private symbolic space.”115 He defined art as a state of encounter. For him, art generates 
a form from random encounters that must be lasting in order to, like glue, hold together a 
particular composition of relations.116
 However, art understood in terms of relational aesthetics, as outlined by Bourriaud, 
renders the work of art merely a medium that facilitates relations that can only occur 
between humans, i.e. artists and spectators: “The artist’s practice, and his behaviour as 
producer, determines the relationship that will be struck up with his work. In other words, 
what he produces, first and foremost, is relations between people and the world, by way 
of aesthetic objects.”117 As such, the concept of relational aesthetics was criticized by the 
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art historian Claire Bishop for its intentional notion of relation and interaction. Relational 
aesthetics renders art not only contextually dependent, but also intentionally reliant. In 
this way, it comes close to representation – relational aesthetics thus lacks the generative 
potential that it aspires to. Rather than transformation, it not only presupposes art’s fixed 
aim and role, it also assumes unified subjects. Such a reading of relational aesthetics is 
possible, since, as Bishop argues, the idea of what is subject and how it acts is based on a 
shared notion of identity, ready to fulfil the artist’s intention.118
 Bishop proposes her own notion of relationality as practiced within art, which she 
formulates as participation. She writes about reflection embedded in the act of encounter. 
As she argues, when encountering the work of art, the process of thinking, activated by 
making things present and available to awareness, is more important than the actual act 
of fulfilling the intention of the artist. In that sense, the notion of agency is shifted to the 
spectator and the work itself.119 By characterizing the art work as a project, the artist as 
collaborator, and the viewer as participant, Bishop maps art as autonomous. Autonomy of 
art should be understood here in terms of art’s capacity to generate and construct, rather 
than represent, meaning, which, in turn, endows the work of art with political influence. 
The notion of autonomy is not based on its radical distance from the context, society, 
politics or ethics. It recalls the autonomy of Massumi’s affect, which rather than reflect, 
shifts and transforms meanings. 
 The particular understanding of the fabulations of affect are clearly present, albeit slightly 
mutated, in this brief, art theoretical analysis of relationality. In their practice, the bioartists 
attentively exercise what Deleuze mapped as the intensive notion of the non-essentialist 
materiality of the body, emergent and pulsating. This means that instead of asking what the 
body is, bioartists practice rather what it does. Through the non-teleological methodology of 
experimentation, they focus our attention on the dynamic capacities of “living” matter. It is 
crucial that this materialist vital force of the body generates dynamic and risky encounters. 
The performance by Art Orienté Objet was a balance between a harmful and an enriching 
experience. It demanded a careful, long preparation and adjustments so that the artist’s 
body could become accustomed to being affected in order that she be open for a radically 
different and transforming material intervention.120
 In this way, bioart can be seen as belonging to the participatory art mapped by Bishop, 
since it shares some of its characteristics. For example, it shares the use of the rhetoric of 
presence and agency, and its use of living tissue materials, with participatory art.121 Here, the 
118 Cf. full argumentation against the notion of Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics by Claire Bishop, “Antagonism 
and Relational Aesthetics,” OCTOBER Fall 2004, vol.110, 51–80. 
119 Ibid., 79.
120 Agnieszka Anna Wołodźko “Between Bio(s) and Art – Intensities of Matter in Bioart,” in Innen – Außen – 
Anders: Körper im Werk von Gilles Deleuze und Michel Foucault, (eds) Ann-Cathrin Drews and Katharina D. 
Martin, Edition Moderne Postmoderne (Publisher, Transcript Verlag, 2017), 221-236
121 See Joseph Dumit, “Foreword:Biological Feedback,” in Tactical Biopolitics: Art, Activism, and Technoscience 
(eds) Beatriz da Costa and Kavita Philip (Cambridge, MA/London: The MIT Press, 2010) xii-xiv; Hans Gumbrecht, 
Production of Presence: What Meaning Cannot Convey, 1st edition (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).
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artists are also collaborators with various scientific institutes and communities. Moreover, 
due to its vital character, the object of art becomes rather a long-term project. Finally, as 
in participatory art, the beholder is no longer just a viewer, but becomes a participant.122 
However, unlike the participatory art that makes human entities the main subjects, bioart 
focuses on the notion of the materiality of the body and life as the subject rather than the 
object of inquiry. Its autonomy is thus forged upon its focus on the ontological status of 
bodies outside the organic and species division, and within relational schemes.123 The sense 
of participation presupposes an immanent nature of relationality as mapped by Spinoza-
Deleuze. This means that relationality not only generates those bodies, but also that bodies 
themselves produce new relations, creative fabulations. 
 The relationality of affect transforms and demands a transformative sense of narrating 
such an encounter, one that operates within fictions or fabulations, rather than within 
the boundaries of aesthetics. Ranciére defines aesthetics as the regime of the sensory, the 
distributions of sensations “that create specific forms of ‘commonsense’.”124 Aesthetics 
as such functions according to the logic of the state of things; it is concerned with the 
properties of things, ascribed fixed interpretations and relations. If we are to think within 
affect as relations of transformation, we need a different approach to the sensory, one that 
is already practiced in the AOO performance, which captures and facilitates the movement 
of transformations while transforming.
 In its search for the conditions of creation and relations of transformations, the AOO 
performance, rather than facilitating interactions between human and non-human, 
facilitates bodies in their relationality. This notion of relationality that is embedded in the 
discussed performance signals the dynamic and processual understanding of the body – 
the body that is generated within relations. Here, the notion of Spinoza-Deleuze’s affect 
becomes the creative fabulation of mutating bodies, impossible to capture and yet there, 
fabulating and inventing the continuous movement of contaminations. 
 Bioartists’ experimental approach reveals that “the exercise of thought comes primarily 
through its incorporation.”125 In order to know the body, you must first experiment with 
what it can do, whether there are boundaries and how these boundaries, or lack of them, 
have any other implications. In this way, the notion of affect opens a route to direct contact 
of meaning with matter. As a sign that does not circulate within the representational system 
of signifiers, but rather emerges as an assemblage of bodies within encounter, affect “puts 
the sign back into contact with the material and vital plane of consistency that constitutes 
122 Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship, (London/New York: Verso, 
2012), 2.
123 See a further elaboration of this argument in Agnieszka Anna Wołodźko, “Against Nature – Against the Body? 
Ecocritical Role of Bioart,” in Creative Expression and the 21st Century Education, (eds) Małgorzata Suświłło and 
Adam Grabowski (Olsztyn: UWM, 2015), 65-79.
124 Jacques Rancière, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, trans. Steven Corcoran, (London/New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2010), 149.
125 Marion Laval-Jeantet, “SELF-ANIMALITY,” text,http://art-science.univ-paris1.fr/plastik, http://art-science.
univ-paris1.fr/plastik/document.php?id=559, accessed 3 June 2011.
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it.”126 In this way, affect redefines the encounter between bodies, revealing the dimensions 
of an event. By thinking in terms of affect, meaning appears not as given for interpretation, 
but rather as something created during the encounter. What is meaning and how affect, in 
its relationality and opposition to the signifying nature of affection, can be considered as 
a sign that is inseparable from matter, and primarily, how such material understanding of 
bodies can be practiced, is the subject of the next chapter.





 A work of art is worth more than a philosophical work; 
for what is enveloped in the sign is more 
profound than all the implicit signification.1 
“Do you know what is in your food?”
Genomic Gastronomy Investigation
3.1 Contaminant T like a Taste of Smog
A dusty, slightly stifling flavour with a bit of sweetness – this is how the smog of Rotterdam 
tastes. The city in my mouth, swallowed and digested, became yet another element 
generating my body. The tiny bite of a cookie taken with hesitation and excitement, released 
the stream of chaotic questions and hesitation: is it safe for my easily upset stomach? Is it 
healthy to eat smog? What is actually inside the food I am now chewing? Can I really taste 
the city? Is it possible that we can understand something through taste?
 The implications of taking affect seriously, that is, of acknowledging and acting upon 
the contaminating, transformative nature of relationality of our bodies, forces us to consider 
all the above questions in an equally serious manner. While chewing the bites of a city, a 
strange materiality reveals itself in the significance of the cookie named “Rotterdam” and 
the a-signification of its taste, in the encountered and experienced, but not yet named – 
will the cookie I am chewing contaminate and transform my body? What would such a 
transformation mean? 
 Smog Tasting is part of an investigation cycle by The Center for Genomic Gastronomy 
(CGG), established in 2011 and run by Zack Denfeld and Catherine Kramer. In the first 
part of the project titled Smog Tasting 1.0 [Figure 13] the artists harvested air from polluted 
cities. It was done by making egg foam within open city spaces: “Egg foams are up to 90 
percent air, and whipping the eggs causes particulate matter to be trapped in the batter,” 
they explain.2 The project had a politico-ecological tint. The artists initially wanted to serve 
1 Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs (London: Continuum, 2008), 20–21.
2 “Smog Tasting – The Center for Genomic Gastronomy,” http://genomicgastronomy.com/work/2011-2/smog-
tasting/, accessed 25 November 2015.
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the baked egg foams to politicians and business owners. At the same time, they denied any 
risks from its consumption, since “One should not worry too much about getting sick from 
these cookies: we breath this air every day!”3
 The second part of the project, Smog Tasting 2.0, was a particular simulation of the 
polluted air. The smog data from cities all over the word were translated through an equation 
into an edible recipe [Figure 14]. Each pollutant corresponded with an amount of a specific 
spice. For instance, particulate matter (PM10), the name used to denote a collective of 
solid or liquid particles of dust, smoke, soot pollen and soil,4 was replaced by black pepper. 
Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2), a reddish-brown gas emitted through the combustion of fossil 
fuels5 was represented by an amount of wasabi powder. Finally, Sulphur Dioxide (SO2), a 
colourless gas emitted by the combustion of fossil fuels,6 was translated as Indian black salt. 
The recipes were printed in the catalogue handed out at the performance event. Moreover, 
the participants could taste the cities, cooked according to the recipe, discovering for 
themselves how the smog might taste [Figure 15]. 
 The third part, Smog Tasting: Smog Synthesizer [Figure 16] recreated Smog Tasting 1.0, 
which took place on the street under UV light. “Smog is formed by a mixture of different 
pollutants reacting together – a reaction that is usually catalysed by baking the chemical 
mixture in the sun.”7 CGG thus wanted to recreate this process in a closed environment that 
would simulate a smell and flavour of air from any part of the world, once you know the 
data of its pollution.8 The artists have designed a small smog chamber where it is possible to 
synthetize pollution of particular cities. You can make an egg foam inside the chamber while 
this polluted air circulates. As CGG explains: “By transforming the largely unconscious 
process of breathing to the conscious act of eating, the smog-tasting cart creates a visceral, 




4 “Particulate Matter — Environmental Terminology Discovery Service — EEA,” http://glossary.eea.europa.eu//
terminology/sitesearch?term=Particulate+Matter+&bgresponse=, accessed 25 November 2015.
5 “Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) Emissions —,” Indicator Specification, http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/
indicators/eea-32-nitrogen-oxides-nox-emissions-1, accessed 25 November 2015.
6 “Sulphur Dioxide — Environmental Terminology Discovery Service — EEA,” http://glossary.eea.europa.eu//
terminology/sitesearch?term=Sulphur+dioxide, accessed 25 November 2015.
7 “Smog Tasting: Smog Synthesizer – The Center for Genomic Gastronomy,” http://genomicgastronomy.com/
work/2015-2/smog-synthesizer/, accessed 25 November 2015.
8 The project was a collaboration with Nicola Twilley, the author of the ‘Edible Geography’ blog, and received 
advice from Professor David Cocker and Mary Kacarab from UC Riverside. For further information see “Edible 
Geography | Thinking Through Food,” http://www.ediblegeography.com/, accessed 24 March 2016.
9 “Smog Tasting: Smog Synthesizer – The Center for Genomic Gastronomy.”
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Figure 13. The Center for Genomic Gastronomy, Smog Tasting, 2011, http://genomicgastronomy.com/
work/2011-2/smog-tasting/, accessed 17 March 2017.
Figure 14. The Center For Genomic Gastronomy, Smog Tasting 2.0 Meringue Recipe, From Test_Lab 
Genomic Gastronomy Program.Pdf, 2014, http://v2.nl/files/2014/articles/Test_Lab%20Genomic%20
Gastronomy%20Program.pdf/view?searchterm=genomic%20gastronomy, accessed 17 March 2017. 
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Figure 15. The Center For Genomic 
Gastronomy, Smog Tasting 2.0, From Test_
Lab Genomic Gastronomy, Http://V2.Nl/
Files/2014/Events/V2-Test-Lab-Genomic-
Gastronomy-Documentation/Testlab_15.
Jpg/View, accessed 17 March 2017. 
Figure 16. The Center for Genomic 
Gastronomy, The Smog Synthesizer, 2015, 
Photo by Jordan Ralph Design, http://
genomicgastronomy.com/work/2015-2/
smog-synthesizer/, accessed 17 March 2017. 
In this three-part project, CGG reveals multiple levels of how meaning functions and 
how it is generated within encounter. It can signify what is referring to the already given 
information and, at the same time, it can produce something new and unexpected. In 
their work, CGG confronts us with that which cannot be named, with the experience of an 
imperceptible body of air. The artists demonstrate the multiple complexities of production 
and the generation of meaning through taste. Their numerous performances and workshops 
are focused on the experience of tasting and eating food, which would otherwise remain 
unnoticed. The lack of transparency and controversies surrounding food production (the 
actual history and the source of food ingredients) is not necessarily a background to their 
work, but it is equally important in the close encounter with what you are about to eat. 
What can be closer and more intimate than the food in your mouth? Thus, CGG acts upon 
this unique, yet ordinary sense of intimacy that triggers the intensity and actuality of the 
whole process of eating. They ask: can this intimacy of taste – of a mixture of multiple 
bodies – produce something new, can it mean something?
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3.2 Taste of Affect
For decades, the humanities have prioritized people’s linguistic meaning formation – human 
reflections and textual analyses. While within art history and cultural studies there has been 
a wide understanding of meaning production, expanded from text to various “new media” 
– first photography, then film, now digital media – today, particularly in view of bioart’s 
practice, we are faced with the generation of meaning by living media. Till now, humanistic 
study has considered questions such as what is life and what are living bodies to be purely 
matters of biological analysis, devoid of any significant socio-cultural meaning.10
 However, if we take everything that makes sense and if we consider the making of what 
matters to be only a human cognitive endeavour, how are we to consider such phenomena 
as body modification and manipulation? If everything can be reduced to the human power 
of making sense, of producing what is significant, why do we need to construct moral codes, 
ethical rules and laws within biotechnological practice, for instance? Should all those issues 
and questions relating to the manipulation of bodies fit into the current normative and 
hierarchical system, according to a shared human cognitive capacity? However, rather than 
being easy to manipulate, bodies in biotechnology escape control – their agency leaks and 
affects what we consider to be the given and fixed rules.
 Because bodies, from particles to large animals, are not passive, but active agents of 
change and transformation, human cognition is not the ultimate measure of things. When 
your own genes can be patented, when vibrant materialities of chemicals and particles can be 
mutated and used to mutate your own body, the question of meaning and how it is generated 
must be rethought. We need to ask ourselves: how can we talk about contemporary living 
bodies while maintaining old analytical tools of prioritization where meaning is solely a 
product of linguistic reflection? How can we seriously and consequently discuss a non-
anthropocentric understanding of bodies given the implications of life commodification and 
manipulation if we maintain a vision wedded to the linguistic (semiological) construction 
of meaning?
 Catherine Kramer argues that “it is about time that taste as another sense should have 
same prominence as an art form and the experience of taste how that affect you.”11 The artist 
seems to argue for the validity of the sensuality of taste. She seems to urge for the opening 
up of anew field of understanding that, even though it is not based on linguistic systems, it 
can generate a meaningful experience. The way that the notion of taste is exercised within 
their cooking-eating performances reveals that, rather than focusing on taste as a valid 
judgement, we should consider taste as a reciprocal relationality. In their performances, 
one enters into contaminating relationality through taste and, consequently, it becomes 
evident how bodies affect and how one is affected by them. However, in order to grasp the 
10 See Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman, 1st edition (Cambridge/Malden, MA: Polity, 2013), 67.
11 CGG centre, Trailer – Zack and Cat, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=7o6iQGHW-
IE, accessed 17 March 2017.
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implications of such a reading and practice of taste in terms of meaning that maintains the 
dynamic and contaminating characteristic of affect, it is important to distinguish taste from 
judgement.
 CGG’s seems to equate taste with Kant’s disinterested ability to judge an object. Indeed, 
it might be a part of an aesthetic judgement, “one that is not influenced by charm or 
emotion”;12 yet, it “rests on subjective bases, and whose determining basis cannot be a 
concept.”13 For these reasons, namely the condition of disinterestedness and the lack of 
given conceptualization, some contemporary scholars see a link between Kant’s description 
of taste and the definition of affect.14 For instance, Steven Shaviro considers Kant’s aesthetic 
judgement and the theory of beauty, in particular, to be a theory of affect and singularity. 
Taste, for Kant, is a relation between object and subject, of how an object is presented to the 
subject.15 Shaviro argues that, for Kant, taste neither refers to a concept, nor does it rest in 
an object in the form of a given property; rather, it is a feeling of disinterestedness. Shaviro 
explains this disinterestedness in aesthetic judgement in terms of a possibility to experience 
that which is separated from me, what is not myself and what draws “me out of myself.” He 
argues that, as such: 
aesthetic judgment is detached from need. Kant notes that a starving person 
will eat just about anything; it is ‘only when their need has been satisfied’, 
only when they are well fed and assured of remaining so, that people have the 
leisure to develop and express their taste with regard to food. It’s only when 
I don’t need something that my liking for it, my being affected by it, can be 
‘disinterested and free’.16
Taste is a capacity to respond to how the object presents itself to the subject, irrespective 
of what this subject finds important.17 The singular presentation of taste, in which Shaviro 
sees the characteristic of affect and which, I suggest, renders CGG work, is described by 
Kant, however, as the result purely of a harmony between the faculties of the subject, rather 
than harmony between different bodies. Thus, for Kant, harmony that results in taste is 
a cognitive process that initiates the ability to judge. Moreover, for Kant, the harmony of 
cognitive powers that conditions taste: 
12 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar, 1st edition (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1987), 69.
13 Ibid., 74.
14 See Ridvan Askin et al. (eds), Speculations V: Æsthetics in the 21st Century, (Punctum Books, 2014).
15 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 75.
16 Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), 
5; Kant, Critique of Judgment, 52.
17 Shaviro, Without Criteria, 2–3; Kant, Critique of Judgment, 63–64.
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is unique in kind and provides absolutely no cognition (not even a confused 
one) of the object; only a logical judgment does that […] it brings to our 
notice no characteristic of the object, but only the purposive form in the 
[way] the presentational powers are determined in their engagement with 
the object.18
 
From this follows that, although it has no cognitive capacity and it is beyond what subject 
may find important and desirable, for Kant, taste is dependent purely on the subject’s ability 
to judge.
 However, as discussed in the previous chapter, while affect as affectus does not 
originate in either of the bodies in the AAO performance, it is also not only a result of the 
harmonization of one’s faculties. Affectus is the encounter that, if it results in harmony, 
then it is a harmony of not only cognitive capacities of a human, but of bodies’ multiple 
and varied capacities. At the same time, affect holds the possibility of risk in terms of 
the encounter between those bodies. In other words, taste, if it is to generate an affective 
notion of meaning, cannot be considered according to Kant’s notion of taste as an aesthetic 
judgement. Affect causes taste to originate within bodies that are already multiple, in their 
mutual relationality, and not within a singular body’s faculties.
 This brief diversion to examine Kant’s philosophy of taste, although rudimentary, serves 
here to sufficiently demonstrate the contrast between the novelty of CGG’s notion and use 
of taste and that of Kant’s sense of aesthetic judgement. Although, at first sight, it might 
seem to share similarities with affect, particularly with its relational understanding,19 
considering the judgement of taste as affect adds more confusion to what the implications 
of affect might be and why practicing bodies within affect might be important.
 By contrast, in their work, CGG exercise a sense of taste that is not only disinterested, 
but is also a risky encounter. It is a method for investigating contaminations. As such, 
taste not only allows for encounter with that which is outside myself, but it also allows 
for external change and transformations of myself. In the CGG performances, taste has a 
meaningful purpose to construct or change what is given. Such a notion of taste demands 
a different approach. It is not a harmonious encounter with one’s faculties, where all the 
ingredients melt into a single, unified object, ready for us to consume – to judge. None 
of the ingredients of the cooked egg foam disappears in the harmonious taste. On the 
18 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 75.
19 See Kojin Karatani’s analysis of Kant’s philosophy of a subject, where he proposes a different reading of the paradox 
of Kant’s Copernican Turn. While Copernicus marked a shift from geocentrism as ego-centrism to heliocentrism, 
Kant’s proposition to constitute objects by the form of projection by the subject has been stated rather as a shift 
towards anthropocentrism or subject-centrism. Regardless, however, of post-Kantian interpretations and claims 
that Kant is a precursor of the philosophy of subject, the author argues for a relational understanding, where 
Kant maps a subject’s cognitive boundaries. The Copernican Turn, according to Karatani, means that in order to 
understand the subject, we must turn it into an object, things-in-itself, which marks a considerable shift in the way 
we may think about subjectivity. For further analysis of the argument see Kojin Karatani, Transcritique: On Kant 
and Marx, trans. Sabu Kohso, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).
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contrary, taste becomes a way to encounter all the ingredients, seemingly hidden behind 
the representation of what we believe to be food. In their investigatory performances, the 
artists of CGG highlight the complex, ambiguous and often uneasy relationality of the food 
that we eat, or rather, that we become with. This is what Rick Dolphijn characterized as “the 
immanence of consumption,”20  namely, the complex relationality and the coexistence of 
places and people, their food and the way of eating, “in how they come together.”21 In other 
words, in CGG’s work, taste becomes an investigation of mutations, of risky and uneasy 
encounters of bodies within affect.
3.3 Contaminant C like Cobalt-60
The CGG’s project Cobalt-60 Sauce (2013) was an investigation into the radiating and 
mutating capacity of Cobalt 60 – a radioactive by-product of nuclear reactor operations22 
[Figure 17]. Cobalt 60 has been extensively used in medicine “as a radiation source to arrest 
the development of cancer,”23 but also in the food industry, where radiation is used to cause 
plant mutation. The artists explain that the practice of selecting the desired mutation has 
proliferated since the end of World War II.24 Yet, despite this use of mutated plants for 
over 60 years, the lack of any labelling on food products is common, resulting in a lack of 
awareness and, consequently, discussion on the nature, role and actual extension of food 
modification.
 Cobalt-60 Sauce is “a barbeque sauce made from mutation-bred ingredients featuring 
radiation-bred ingredients such as: Rio Red Grapefruit, Milns Golden Promise Barely and 
Todd’s Mitcham Peppermint.”25 It was served with Doritos at the MU gallery during the 
exhibition “Matter of Life Growing New Bio Art & Design”, in Eindhoven (28 November 
2014 – 1 March 2015) [Figure 18]. When I tasted it, it reminded me of a curry tomato sauce, 
which only added to the sense of its commonality. I could have eaten it before without even 
knowing about its mutagenic nature. In this case, then, taste was not used as a moment of 
aesthetic judgement. Indeed, the sauce was presented as familiar, as something that has 
been used for decades, although now it stands next to detailed historical information about 
the origin of its ingredients. The bottle of the sauce, next to the tap that dispensed it, was 
20 Rick Dolphijn, Foodscapes: Towards a Deleuzian Ethics of Consumption (Delft: Eburon Publishers, Delft, 2005), 
7.
21 Ibid., 7.
22 “CDC Radiation Emergencies | Radioisotope Brief: Cobalt 60 (Co60),” http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/
isotopes/cobalt.asp, accessed 16 December 2015.
23 “Cobalt-60 | Chemical Isotope,” Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/science/cobalt-60, 
accessed 16 December 2015.
24 “Cobalt 60 Sauce – The Center for Genomic Gastronomy,” http://genomicgastronomy.com/work/2013-2/
cobalt-60-sauce/, accessed 16 December 2015.
25 Tom Howells, Experimental Eating (London: Black Dog Publishing, 2015), 13.
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standing in front of a large poster visualizing a barbeque party in a suburban garden. The 
accompanying information about the origin and history did not constitute any ultimate 
experience, however. 
Figure 17. The Center for Genomic Gastronomy, Cobalt 60 Sauce, 2013, http://genomicgastronomy.com/
work/2013-2/cobalt-60-sauce/, accessed 17 March 2017. 
Figure 18. Cobalt 60 Sauce The Center for Genomic Gastronomy at the MU exhibition “Matter of Life 
Growing new Bio Art & Design” (28 November 2014 – 1 March 2015). Photo by A. A. Wołodźko. 
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The audience was asked to taste the sauce that they were already familiar with, but now in a 
different way. Through the act of taste, they were invited to enter the sphere of investigation 
rather than consumption. Although not available at the expo in Eindhoven, in the hand 
out catalogue for V2(2014)26 CGG published the recipe for the sauce, inviting everyone 
to view the investigation process: “HACKER is tasked with locating and collecting the 
hidden mutation bred ingredients that are silently sitting on supermarket shelves, and 
CHEF decides to combine them together into a barbecue sauce.” Instead of informing and 
representing their artistic research, they rather embodied a line of research that welcomed 




Makes about 32 cups
40-60 whole dried milder, smoky chile
4 cups peppermint tea (made with 4-6 teabags)




2 cups raw pumpkin seeds
2 ruby red/rio star grapefruits, juiced
8 oranges, juiced
8 limes, juiced
3 bulbs garlic, chopped
10 red onions (1.6 kg)
2 bottles of ketchup (20 oz each)
3 cans of tomatoes (28 fl oz each)
1 bottle of soy sauce (20 oz)
1 bottle of canola oil
1 bottle apple cider vinegar (473 ml)
1 bottle red wine
1 bottle port
2 cups Macallan’s scotch whiskey
2 lbs sugar
salt
26 V2_ Institute for the Unstable Media at Rotterdam, “Test_Lab: Genomic Gastronomy,” Event, V2_Institute for 
the Unstable Media, http://v2.nl/events/test_lab-genomic-gastronomy, accessed 24 March 2016.
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PREP CHILE
Cut the stems off the chile and slice open to remove seeds and ribs. Set aside.
PREP RICE POWDER
Heat heavy skillet. 
Toast rice over medium high till brown and toasted. 
Do not burn. 
Let cool. 
Put in spice grinder or food processor to make a powder.
PREP SPICES
Toast the spices in a small skillet until fragrant. 
Let cool. 
Grind to fine powder in spice grinder or blender.
RECIPE
1.
Quarter and slice onions. In a pot, add 3 tbs canola oil: heat over medium high. 
Add onions.
Stir to coat with oil. 
Sweat onions 10 mins till translucent; 
reduce heat to med high and stir in1 cup sugar. 
Cook, stir occasionally, until onions have caramelized, about 10 minutes. 
Do not burn.
When onions are caramelized, 
stir in 3 cups wine, 1½ cups port, 2 cups whiskey, and salt. 
Cook off the alcohol for about 10-20 minutes. 
Set aside.
2.
Place pumpkin seeds on cookie sheets – distributed evenly. 
Toast in low oven until browned. 
Do not burn. 
Set aside and let cool. 
Grind in blender or food processor. 
Do not over-grind into nut butter.
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3.
Add all ingredients except citrus and apple cider vinegar to a large pot. 
Add a couple of handfuls of sugar. 
Simmer all ingredients in large pot until tomatoes are sweet (3-4 hours).
4.
Let cool (1-2 hours). 
Working in batches (as necessary), 
ladle sauce into a food processor/blender and make a smooth puree. 
Press each pureed batch through a sieve into a bowl or another large pot. 
When this process is complete, add all citrus juice. 
Taste. 
Add salt and apple cider vinegar to taste.27
CGG initiates spaces where it is possible to search for what is not yet present – for what 
is named, but not yet encountered. The artists created spaces of tension between what is 
given, shaping information into processual and material form, material relations. They do 
not hide ingredients by showing only the results. All of their cooking performances are 
done in front of and with the audience. Their focus on taste as the encounter with relations 
has further consequences for opening up thinking about taste as meaning generated in 
relationality. CGG’s work creates spaces of learning but not informing. Taste becomes a 
sign, but a particular one – a sign that does not signify and yet creates meanings.
3.4 Sign Wars
In order to understand why taste is a relation that escapes signification and yet creates 
meaning, and therefore why it could be important for our study of bodies within affect, it 
is first necessary to briefly consider two major schools of semiotics that have, according 
to the contemporary semiotician John Deely, significantly influenced what we consider as 
meaning today: in the field of literature, Ferdinand de Saussure’s notion of semiology; and 
in the field of philosophy, Charles Sanders Pierce’s semiosis.28 Although it is beyond the 
scope of this book to explore the vast development and complexity of the debate on the 
field of semiotics, I will briefly map the main characteristics of De Saussure’s and Peirce’s 
understanding. A brief analysis will outline the major distinctions of signs and their 
implications for a relational understanding of meaning.
27 CGG, “Test_Lab Genomic Gastronomy Program.pdf,” File, V2_Institute for the Unstable Media, 9, http://v2.nl/
files/2014/articles/Test_Lab%20Genomic%20Gastronomy%20Program.pdf, accessed 3 June 2017.
28 John Deely, Basics of Semiotics. Advances in Semiotics, 1st edition (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
2004), 3–4.
Tasting Meaning 101
As noted by Deely, De Saussure, the proclaimed founder of semiology, argued that there is a 
lack of certainty about the validity of science investigating “the nature of signs and the laws 
governing them.”29 Nevertheless, De Saussure ascribed linguistics a special place in the field 
of human knowledge – its laws will be the laws of knowledge. According to Wendy Wheeler, 
this analogical approach to language and what we consider as knowledge means that De 
Saussure’s model of semiology has not only become the model for linguistic knowledge, but 
it has also shaped our understanding of the human. The claim of the science of signs, which 
is mainly focused on text, concerns the metaphysics of the construction of reality. However, 
if language alone can construct and carry meaning with regard to human intentionality, 
then this makes humans “most fully comprehended when they are thought of primary as 
isolated and monadic self-interested individuals.”30 Moreover, language is considered to 
have provide schemes for how social and cultural structures are constructed in general.31 
The profound implication of such mechanisms becomes clearer when we look at the main 
characteristics of De Saussure’s semiology.
 According to De Saussure, a sign has a psychological nature. It is immaterial in the sense 
that it “is not a link between a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound pattern.”32 
The concept is an abstract element that De Saussure calls signification. In addition, sound 
pattern, unlike sound, which has a physical dimension, is more connected to discourse than 
to the materiality of the vocal apparatus. As he explains: “Without moving either lips or 
tongue, we can talk to ourselves or recite silently a piece of verse.”33 In this way, De Saussure 
mapped a two-sided understanding of a sign that is based on the relation of negation, always 
already referring to something that is not. This negative differentiation allows us to grasp 
the meaning of a sign: “The sound of a word is not in itself important, but the phonetic 
contrasts which allows us to distinguish that word from any other. That is what carriers the 
meaning.”34 The difference between signs is actually based on an antagonism: signs “are not 
different from each other, but only distinct. They are simply in opposition to each other.”35
 Consequently, following Wheeler’s argument, the antagonistic and dualist understanding 
of a sign presupposes humans to be the lonely constructor of meanings independently 
of bodies, materialities and sounds. In other words, that what we find meaningful is 
29 “We shall call it semiology (from the Greek se¯ meîon, ‘sign’). It would investigate the nature of signs and the 
laws governing them. Since it does not yet exist, one cannot say for certain that it will exist. But it has a right 
to exist, a place ready for it in advance. Linguistics is only one branch of this general science. The laws which 
semiology will discover will be laws applicable in linguistics, and linguistics will thus be assigned to a clearly 
defined place in the field of human knowledge.” Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, (New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 18.
30 Wendy Wheeler, The Whole Creature: Complexity, Biosemiotics and the Evolution of Culture (London: Lawrence 
And Wishart Ltd, 2006), 18.
31 Ibid., 17–18.





autonomous from multiple materialities, bodies and their environment. All that makes 
sense is thus understood and communicated according to the simple rule of opposition: 
nature/culture, woman/man, human/animal, etc. Such statements on human’s linguistic 
ability, isolation and autonomy when constructing meanings is, however, just a small part of 
what can be considered as a sign. As Deely argues, alongside semiology, Peirce constructed 
his notion of semiotique in which “semiosis [is] a broader and much more fundamental 
process.”36
 In contrast to De Saussure, the semiotics of Peirce constructs the pragmatic, or as I 
will call it, existential notion of meaning,37 which allows us to study the action of signs. 
This existential notion of meaning demands “learning by experience” in contrast to 
“abstractive observation.”38 Such a pragmatic approach to meaning reveals that signs are 
not independent from materiality. Signs do not stand for something that is not, they are 
not a construction in the negative understanding of relation. Instead, Peirce argues: “a sign, 
or representament, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect 
or capacity.”39 Sign addresses somebody – an interpretant – and it stands for something 
– its object – “in reference to a sort of idea, which I have […] called the ground of the 
representament,”40 which is detached and disinterested.
 For Peirce, in order for the sign to be realised, there must be a spatio-temporal 
action. A sign must be “materially embodied” and only then can it pertain to the general 
understanding of an “active mode of being.”41 This is why Deely, following Peirce’s notion 
of semiosis, characterizes semiotics in a broad sense, including “natural phenomena as well 
as purely cultural and literary texts.”42 As Deely further writes: “at the heart of semiotics is 
the realization that the whole of human experience, without exception, is an interpretive 
structure mediated and sustained by signs.”43
 Peirce’s presupposition of a pragmatic understanding of signs allows us to understand 
meaning in a non-analytical and non-linguistic way. It opens up a more processual and 
existential approach to what we take as meaning. The existential nature of Peirce’s semiotics, 
where the science of signs is purely a process of experience and learning, provides a 
particular sense of the materiality of meaning.
36 Deely, Basics of Semiotics. Advances in Semiotics, 6.
37 João Queiroz and Floyd Merrell, “Semiosis and Pragmatism: Toward a Dynamic Concept of Meaning,” Sign 
Systems Studies, no. 1 (2006): 39.
38 Charles Sanders Peirce, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed. Justus Buchler (Courier Corporation, 1940), 98.
39 Ibid., 99.
40 Ibid..
41 Queiroz and Merrell, “Semiosis and Pragmatism,” 41
42 Deely, Basics of Semiotics. Advances in Semiotics, 2.
43 Ibid., 5.
Tasting Meaning 103
3.5 The Point of View of Taste
Understanding signs through processes of experience and learning becomes a condition 
of practicing affect. Moreover, as a condition of practice, the existential notion of signs 
implies a particular method of practice. This method of practicing signs must have an 
equally dynamic, relational nature, and thus, it must betray the very characteristic of a 
method itself. The existential notion of signs demands a method without fixed rules or 
protocols, yet it does require some kind of recipe. For Deely, such a method without a 
method would mean taking a point of view rather than applying a given rule. According 
to Deely, modern philosophy has been obsessed with finding a method, with finding an 
ultimate and fixed protocol that would allow the truth to be established, and which would 
help formulate valid statements. This obsession with method, however, he argues, has 
led to particularization and a lack of adaptability of a theory for a variety of phenomena. 
Method as a systemic implementation has a narrow capacity. Because of its fixed nature, 
method allows us to grasp identities, define given states of things and find regularities; 
yet, anything that is dynamic and changing escapes its scope. For Deely, therefore, it is 
“semiotics [that] provides not a method first of all but a point of view.”44 Taking a point 
of view as a starting point presupposes two major implications. Firstly, it acknowledges 
the already ideological position of the semiotician in some way, yet it does not make this 
ideology an intrinsic part of semiotics. Thus, a point of view is not universal, it does not 
pertain to the quality of objectivity. Secondly, point of view presupposes partiality. It does 
not refer to universality, but rather to a multiplicity of connections and possibilities. As with 
the practice of experimentation, to ensure the practice of signs, not only must the subject 
of the practice acknowledge her lack of total control and capacity to be affected by other 
subjects in the relations, but also the method must be partial – it must avoid the tendency of 
fixation and the universalization of encounters. In this respect, partiality means that which 
characterizes the partial observer, as discussed in the notion of experimentation in Chapter 
2. Consequently, Deely indicates the existential nature of semiotics that acknowledges the 
processual and relational nature of how our existence and its understanding is constructed 
and how it is inseparable from our constant reflective relations on how these meanings are 
formed.45
 One can now ask whether the way we practice meaning is an affirmation of the point of 
view. If partiality sets the course of how the search happens, then what is the point of view? 
How should we sustain a point of view that is not a fixed method? Some indications may be 
found in the practices of CGG. Indeed, the name of the artistic duo already provides a clue. 
 “Genomic” in The Center for Genomic Gastronomy refers to the scientific discipline of 
genomics, which, although is a part of genetics that is strictly occupied with the study of 




and environments. Genomics, then, is not focused on the particular sequences of genes, but 
on the mapping of gene expressions across different species and their environment. While 
looking at the emerging biotechnologies related to food, the artists take rather a relational 
approach. 
 The artists of CGG explain that, in their work, they are not necessarily interested 
in genes per se, but rather “how an organism relates to the larger world and how all the 
parts of the organism work together.”46  In order to understand bodies in genomics they 
do not study fixed bodies, but the relations that generate those bodies. In this way, they 
take a perspective on relations that somehow determines what becomes important. Hence, 
for example, a relational approach results in their rather open and wide understanding 
of biotechnologies in food production and food sustainability. However, their relational 
approach remains partial. As they argue, a great deal of economic and media attention 
goes to “hi-tech solution, such as GM food and in vitro meat,”47 an area in which there are 
already simple and sustainable solutions widely available. Take, for example, beans. Despite 
their seemingly old and “natural” place in our cuisine, beans, CGG argues, are the result 
of a long process of agriculture, breeding and selection. Beans are already manipulated 
bodies that carry a solution for food sustainability. In their work, CGG thus reimagines and 
de-familiarizes what we take for granted, by introducing a point of view into their method 
of relationality, with beans as a starting point for change.
 CGG practices biotechnology as a point of view of the relationality of bodies; that is, 
of their constant change and mutability, which can generate new meanings and determine 
what is important. The artists are not interested in a universal answer to all the problems 
that biotechnology may cause. Instead, they are searching for practices that resist 
universalization. Here, partiality is understood as being outside the authority of institutions, 
yet within the relationality of already present habits and practices. Their practice of the 
point of view can also be seen in the “tools” they use in their investigations.
 CGG are not focused on the particular methods of “doing science”, dressed in white coats 
and in the sterile environment of biotechnological labs. For some bioarts, this fascination 
with the methods of science and its attributes has been the main, if not the only, goal. 
Instead, CGG artists wear the chef ’s whites of a fellow experimenter in a kitchen [Figure 
19]. They approach the manipulation of living bodies as an act of brewing, seed saving, 
cheese making, mutagenesis and transgenesis, i.e. as ways of conducting the search, an 
apprenticeship in how bodies mutate.48 Their mission is not only to imagine but to engage 
with the senses while thinking about our food habits through the wide practice of body 
manipulation. 
46 “Test_Lab: Art Meat Flesh,” Event, V2_Institute for the Unstable Media, http://v2.nl/events/test_lab-art_meat_
flesh, accessed 11 April 2016.
47 The Center for Genomic Gastronomy, Eat Less, Live More & Pray for Beans, http://genomicgastronomy.com/
work/2012-2/beans-book/, accessed 11 April 2016.
48 “Test_Lab: Art Meat Flesh.”
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Taste’s point of view, in CGG’s practice, occurs as the capacity to relate, to be involved 
with all the possible relations that might become important. Taste becomes an encounter 
in-the-middle, where meanings and the understanding of “what is in your food” can be 
only grasped by engaging with the embodied relation. This engaged and attentive relation 
responds to the question: “do you really want to know how your sausage is made?”49 
Here, the act of eating becomes inseparable from the act of becoming with food. Their 
performance investigations are a transparent exploration of encounters with the flavours 
and smells of ingredients – nothing is hidden. They bring all the uncomfortable bodies 
to the table, exploring complex and dynamic connotations. “Ingredients rot and release 
aromatics when they are heated. They call attention to themselves through multiple human 
senses […] The flavours and smells of food are a direct and immediate language for artists 
to communicate with.”50 In their work, the point of view of taste is an encounter with living 
bodies. As they stipulate, taste becomes the creation of an opportunity “to interact with 
data,”51 and to become with that data.
Figure 19. Zack Denfeld (left) and Catherine Kramer (Right), http://genomicgastronomy.com/about/, 
accessed 17 March 2017.
In this way, I argue that, as a mutually tailored encounter, taste fosters not only a different 
understanding of meaning, but also meaning’s different practice and generation. It 
creates meaning that is not only material, or only discursive, but that somehow combines 
ingredients and what happens in-between them. We are not only interested in how bodies 
produce relations, often simultaneously, but also how these relations can be prolonged. 




Especially in art’s practice and experience, meaning becomes something that is integral 
to, rather than exterior to life and living bodies. Through the work of CGG, we can not 
only grasp how meaning unfolds within the practice of art, in this case in the actual taste 
of smog, but mostly it reveals how meaning is something living; that is, we can understand 
what it means to taste while tasting.
3.6 A Life of Meaning
The semiosphere is a sphere just like the 
atmosphere, the hydrosphere, and the biosphere.
 It penetrates to every corner of these other spheres, 
incorporating all forms of communication: sounds, 
smells, movements, colors, shapes, electrical fields, 
thermal radiation, waves of all kinds, chemical signals, 
touching, and so on. In short, signs of life.52
The contaminants of the CGG investigations explore subtle calls, anxieties and intensities 
that are produced by living bodies and their multiple encounters and they cannot be 
quickly defined and categorized according to given norms, whatever they might be. In 
these artistic encounters, there are meanings generated that evade exclusively artistic and 
representational interest. But if we hold on to a stubborn belief in the notion of meaning as 
solely human, due to a logocentric capacity, then we perpetuate the same vicious cycle: of 
wanting change but not changing.
 CGG invites us to encounter sensitivities that are different from what we – humans 
– know; encounters that escape our given understanding and foster questions, new 
approaches and thinking. CGG initiates its investigations based on this new sensitivity. 
Their experimental eating performances, an investigation into the relational happening of 
food, are made possible through the existential understanding of meaning, where meaning 
generation is a characteristic of all living systems, giving us clues and signs about how to 
practice contaminating matters of affect.
 While considering meaning to be intrinsic to living bodies may seem unusual within 
the interests and focus of the humanities, it is not a novel concept. The initial ideas about 
constructing a discipline that would focus on relations between life and language already 
emerged with the discovery of the genetic code in the early 1960s.53 Importantly, however, 
this practice of ascribing meaning and information to living systems was a long way from a 
dynamic and relational understanding. The belief among scientists that you can map genes 
and thus possess all the necessary information about a living body reached its apogee in the 
52 Jesper Hoffmeyer, Signs of Meaning in the Universe (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997), vii.
53 See Marcello Barbieri, “What Is Biosemiotics?,” Biosemiotics 1, no. 1 (13 February 2008): 1–3.
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Human Genome Project (HGP) in the 1990s. Scientist working on the HGP presupposed 
an essentialist vision of what life and communication might be by propagating a belief 
in a hidden truth, that it is possible to encode the essence of humans and store it on a 
single storage device.54 The consequences of such molecularization and digitalization of 
living bodies led to the easy commodification and manipulation of bodies that we see today. 
When living bodies are treated as bits of information that can be owned by companies, 
the questions of what a living body is and how we can practice its materiality become 
inseparable. The commodification of data about the body, consequently commodifies 
the body itself. Each medical and research practice, test, access to working with the body 
becomes an issue of law and rights, starkly illustrated by the cases of gene patents discussed 
in Chapter 1 of this book (Contaminant P).
 However, parallel to an essentialist understanding of how meaning might be part of 
what we understand as life, a more relational approach has emerged within the biological 
study of animal communication. Rather than study the molecular level, biological scientists 
became focused on the vast relations between species and their environment, which 
presuppose the material notion of meaning that pervades the artistic practices of CGG. In 
order to understand the relevance that affect has for the materiality of meaning, I need to 
examine more closely the study of meaning within biology.
 Thomas Sebeok has been the most influential scholar in shaping an interdisciplinary 
and relational understanding of what now is formulated under the name of biosemiotics. He 
outlined the main understanding of semiotics as 
the sign process – the fundamental process that carries meaning and in which 
meaning is created. It is the process – not at all simple – that mediates purpose 
and causality, living and dead aspects of nature, and makes it possible to see 
how to overcome a crude dualism of mind and matter, as well as how the 
dynamics of the actions of signs provides a better approach to living systems 
than our dichotomies of mental versus physical properties.55
The idea that semiosis is an integral part of all living systems challenges not only the 
independent position of an interpreter of meaning generation, it also presupposes that 
the living body is already a dynamic interpreter of the many relations it is entangled 
with. In other words, such an understanding of semiosis breaks with the notion of the 
transcendental production of meaning. Meaning is not a result of post-reflection, which 
always presupposes a holistic view of the interpreted object; instead, within biosemiotics, 
meaning becomes an embedded and dynamic element of being, of life itself.
54 Hilary Rose and Steven Rose, Genes, Cells, and Brains: The Promethean Promises of the New Biology, (London/
New York: Verso, 2014), 25.
55 Kalevi Kull, Claus Emmeche and Jesper Hoffmeyer, “Why Biosemiotics? An Introduction to Our View on the 
Biology of Life Itself,” in Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life Is the Action of Signs, (eds) Claus Emmeche and Kalevi 
Kull, 1st edition (London/Singapore/Hackensack, NJ: Imperial College Press, 2011), 2.
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As many scholars noticed, and as Sebeok stipulates, the foundations of biosemiotics were laid 
by Jakob von Uexküll, “the brilliant neo-Kantian theoretical and experimental biologist.”56 
While the association of Uexküll with Kant might not be so useful in the light of our previous 
analysis of taste, a closer look at Uexküll’s theory of meaning will demonstrate how unique 
his thought was and how relevant it has become for our understanding of the materiality of 
meaning. After all, it is Uexküll’s notion of affect that was used by Deleuze and Guattari in 
A Thousand Plateaus.57 Despite this influence, Uexküll’s theory of meaning, which is deeply 
material and relational in nature, is still undeveloped within humanistic study, remaining 
just another anecdote about the influence of biology on humanistic thought. 
 Uexküll builds his understanding of meaning by taking the consequential position 
of a biologist who, in order to understand a particular living body, instead of looking at 
that body’s properties, believes it is crucial to first search for the body’s relations within 
its environment. He is interested in how the organism behaves and relates with its 
environment. Mostly, he focuses on how particular relations within the environment of the 
living organism are constitutive of its existence. He looks at how a living being depends on 
particular conditions. He argues that only by mapping all these relations can we actually 
understand the body in question. In his description of a tick (the famous “tick story” 
borrowed later by Deleuze and Guattari58), he elaborates how this small, eyeless animal, 
which lives on tree branches, waiting to feed on a warm-blooded organism, depends on 
just three stimuli: “a general sensitivity to light in the skin,”59 a sense of smell and a sense 
of temperature. All three stimuli, which Deleuze and Guattari call affects,60 determine what 
it means to live as and be a tick. By mapping the relations that occur between the living 
creature and its environment, we can understand the life of a tick.
 Importantly, the process of mapping relations starts from the presupposition that what 
we map is the subject with its environment. Uexküll calls this environment a bubble, an 
Umwelt, and in A Theory of Meaning, he explains that: “every animal, no matter how free in 
its movements, is bound to a certain dwelling-world, and it is one task of ecologist to research 
its limits.”61 Brett Buchannan argues that Uexküll reveals his ethology as a “dimension of 
framing the being and becoming of the animal. The animal body is interrelated with its 
environment through the process of behaviours, so it becomes a question of how to engage 
56 Thomas Sebeok, Signs: An Introduction to Semiotics, 2nd edition (Toronto/Buffalo, NY: University of Toronto 
Press, Scholarly Publishing Division, 2001), 92.
57 See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (London [etc.]: 
Continuum, 2004).
58 Ibid., 283.
59 Jakob von Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans: With a Theory of Meaning, trans. Joseph D. 
O’Neil (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 45.
60 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 283.
61 Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, 139
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the ontological dimension of this relation.”62 Since organisms, rather than being seen as 
machines or objects, are subjects or agents that actively create what is significant within 
their environment, Buchannan argues that this assumes an “interpretative account on the 
part of the organism.”63 What is created and what we eventually map in order to understand 
the organism, is the semiotic relations, meaningful relations that already are emerging 
between the organism and its environment. What we understand to be a tick is thus the 
significant relations between a particular body and its environment.
 For Uexküll, meaning is not given and it is not a product of reflection, but rather meaning 
is a product of action: “every action impresses its meaning on a meaningless object and 
makes it thereby into subject-related carrier of meaning in each respective environment.”64 
In a sense, it is a phenomenological and correlationist understanding. Meaning seems to be 
dependent on the action of a subject that impresses itself on the object. Meaning, here, is 
thus something that does not emerge from matter, but is passed on to it. However, Uexküll 
seems to break with such intentionality of meaning through a particular understanding 
of a subject. For Uexküll, a subject is not a centred one, the subject does not construct 
meaning through her act of intention. It is an action that happens between encountering 
objects, which, in turn, become meaning generating subjects. In other words, meaning is 
not subject-centred or object-centred. The distinction between subject and object loses its 
relevance when faced with meaning that is action-centred; or, to put it differently, relation-
centred. 
 Uexküll understands action as a relation that produces perception and which, in turn, 
gives the impression of an effect that generates meaning. He calls it “a functional cycle […] 
which connects the carrier of meaning [action] with the subject.”65 From this, it follows that 
it is not the subject that constitutes action and meaning, but the action; that is, a relation – 
what Peirce would call a sign and what I call affect – that constitutes subject and meaning. 
Action becomes “a vital functioning of animal subjects”;66 it generates and conditions them 
while revealing their equally creative and meaning-forming capacities. In other words, 
action is a relation, an affect that has epistemological and ontological dimensions for how 
the meaning of bodies is generated. 
 Uexküll further argues that “meaning bridges the gap between physical and nonphysical 
process, just as it did between the sheet music and the melody.”67 Importantly, his notion 
of action does not have the characteristic of an interaction, a kind of causal chain of action 
and response. For him, the linear notion of causality is merely a mechanical description, 
62 Brett Buchanan, Onto-Ethologies: The Animal Environments of Uexknll, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze 
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something that is more characteristic of a physiologist than a biologist. Why such an 
emphasis on the non-mechanical and non-linear understanding of action when thinking 
about the meaning? Although Uexküll did not draw this conclusion, I argue that the 
mechanical understanding of bodies that is intrinsic to lineal causality perpetuates dualism 
and renders it impossible to grasp the relational, material meaning. 
 As Jesper Hoffmeyer, a philosopher and biosemiotician, explains, the mechanistic vision 
of the body and a dualistic division between biology and psychology remains an ongoing 
practice in science today. In the face of the relational interdependence between one’s 
thought and the reaction of a body’s organs, contemporary medicine postulates explaining 
psychology according to biology, i.e. as a mechanical occurrence: 
Because biology, like all other sciences, is based on Descartes’ old dualism, 
which does not allow any inner link between the spiritual and the physical 
sides. So when medicine and biology decide to take psychological phenomena 
seriously, this can only be done by reducing said psychological phenomena to 
mechanical occurrences.68
Significantly, the mechanical interdependence explanation of the relation between one’s 
thoughts and bodily reaction presupposes a dualistic view of the mind and body, i.e. that 
meaning is something added after the body has a reaction. As Hoffmeyer argues, within 
the body there are also semiotic processes. In other words, the materiality of the body 
already generates and produces the field of meaningful relationality: “inside the body, too, 
processes are in fact occurring which can best be understood semiotically, processes which 
make it possible to understand how the body can become “minded” and how the mind 
can become physical.”69 The acknowledgment of the non-linguistic generation of meaning 
implies a realization that meaning happens not only in a body as a result of an action by 
another body, but in encounters between and within bodies as an integral and constitutive 
element of living systems. It thus only makes sense to consider taste as an encounter in 
relationality when affirming that meaning is generated by the encountering bodies and 
their capacities as signs. In the case of the works by CGG, for the taste to be an encounter 
in relations, the body’s materiality must already have a semiotic character – it must already 
produce and be produced by signs.
 This material and relational character of meaning belongs not only to what, as a result 
of a dualistic division, is taken as conscious minds, but also to what is understood as passive 
matter. A material, relational notion of meaning allows us to think about the materiality of 
the body not as a passive mechanistic chunk, but as generative agency, rendering the body/
mind dualism not only politically, socially and culturally obsolete, but simply logically 
contradictory. To understand such a notion of materiality, it is not enough to count bodies’ 
68 Hoffmeyer, Signs of Meaning in the Universe, 69.
69 Ibid., 69.
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internal and external relations. Similarly, to understand bodies’ function, it is not enough to 
track linear causal relations and interdependences between those bodies. We need to have 
some insights into “the practical principle” or “inner logic” of how it works; that is, how these 
bodies are shaped at the semiotic level.70 As in Uexküll’s description of a tick, we need to 
know what stimuli are actually important for a tick’s life. Uexküll described this importance 
of stimuli as the “vital functioning” of a living being.71 This vital functioning is what later 
behaviourists called significance and what I argue becomes a particular understanding of 
materiality of meaning as a condition of practicing bodies within affect.
3.7 Relations of Significance
When Uexküll mapped three stimuli that drive a tick’s life, he is not querying the tick’s 
causal relations, which depend on a purely mechanistic view of action and response 
(a particular actor-network scheme). He does not determine his understanding of the tick 
based on the relations of causes, as if he had clear and given knowledge about why a tick 
waits, smells and drinks – why it simply does what it does. Instead, Uexküll focuses on the 
relations of significance, on how important particular stimuli are for the living body. In 
his study of a tick, Uexküll asks what is important for the creature to be able to function 
and regenerate. This existential notion of meaning is quite different from mechanistic and 
semiological understanding. Such an existential approach demands a direct connection of 
meaning with value and life and with what is important for a body to continue to live. Here, 
rather than working on the level of logical denotation and correlation, meaning works on 
the level of what becomes important for a body to live. In this way, the material notion of 
meaning that affect implies demands another condition for its practice, namely the search 
for significance and not signification. 
 Interestingly, such an existential approach to meaning is nothing new or limited to 
biological endeavour. Charles Morris, a semiotician, noticed that the two levels of functioning 
of the word meaning, logical and existential – the level of signification and the level of what 
is significant – are present in many languages: “Thus if we ask, what is the meaning of life, 
we may be asking a question about the signification of the term ‘life’, or asking a question 
about the value or significance of living – or both.”72 Morris calls the existential notion of 
meaning expressive. This expressiveness involves the signification of an object not only 
referring to the object’s properties, but, equally, it is inseparable from the interpreter’s 
70 Ibid., 80.
71 Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, 201.
72 Charles Morris, Signification and Significance: A Study of the Relations of Signs and Values, 3rd edition 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968), vii. Recently, the same differentiation of the word meaning was mentioned 
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2014 on Vimeo,” https://vimeo.com/107274730, accessed 7 April 2016.
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dispositions. Meaning concerns values; however, these values are understood in a relational 
and dynamic, rather than a universal and fixed, way. As he stipulates, “value situation […] 
is inherently relational, involving an action of (positive or negative) preferential behaviour 
by some agent to something or other.”73 Moreover, he argues for the values to be objectively 
relative. This means that the value of something, i.e. what one believes is important, does 
not belong solely to the property of an object or to its interpreter’s preferences. Rather, 
what becomes significant is a contingent composition of relations between an object and its 
interpreter that does not exhaust the number of possible relations. In other words, you can 
find a meaning of life once you set a particular goal, but it does not mean that you cannot 
find a new meaning of life, once the goal is fulfilled or changed.
 Meaning as significance, as value or that which is important, is not an abstract idea. It 
is not something fixed or given, but rather it is a relation that happens within a particular 
situation. Although sign carries many characteristics of living beings, Morris nevertheless 
argues that it cannot be equivalent with it. Sign is an action, but always directed at a 
particular goal.74 Since Morris believes that life extends sign’s capacity, within contemporary 
biosemiotics this means that sign and life are considered equal, and thus the notion of 
meaning acquires profound consequences.
 Hoffmeyer explains this material understanding of meaning using an analogy between a 
city and a living cell. Imagine that cars driving in a city are DNA in a cell. A full mechanical 
description of a car does not provide an explanation and understanding of the car’s 
movements through the city or the logic behind it. Equally, detailed knowledge about the 
structure of DNA is not very useful. You need to have an understanding of all of the traffic, 
how people use it and how the city works in order to be able to come close to understanding 
what drives particular movements, what is important for each element of traffic and its 
flows and relationality,75 or what each sequence of DNA does and how it is important for 
other parts of the whole chain and for their expressions. 
 We can view the food encounters that CGG practice in a similar vein. It is not enough to 
know what the ingredients of a particular dish are, or what their history, biological structure 
or social use is. It is also not enough to simply cook those ingredients and eat them in 
order to understand them. You need to create a space of encounter to enter their internal 
logic, to enter their relationality in order to generate the meaning of food. In the process 
of encounter, all the relations that the bodies are entangled with start to work, exercising 
what for the bodies becomes significant. This means that the system of significance actually 
emerges during the process of decision-making and interpretation. The interpretation here, 
however, has the character of a search that works as an encounter and is not a post-action 
presupposing the transcendental interpreter and a holistic vision of an object. Interpretation 
73 Morris, Signification and Significance, 9.
74 See Susan Petrilli, “Charles Morris’s Biosemiotics,” Semiotica 127 (1999): 67,72.
75 Hoffmeyer, Signs of Meaning in the Universe, 85.
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happens while eating, who or what interprets in the moment of encounter is blurred here. 
As Deleuze explains, 
Interpreting has no other unity than a transversal one; interpreting alone is 
the divinity of which each thing is a fragment, but its ‘divine form’ neither 
collects nor unites the fragments, it carries them on the contrary to the 
highest, most acute state, preventing them from forming a whole.76
A consequence of the relational character of a sign is that once the search of meaning 
is fulfilled, and the sign producing meaning disappears as a sign, it can again become 
meaningless, depending on a new relation. As such, sign has no fixed state or goal, its 
existential nature renders it dynamic and constantly desiring new relations. This chaos 
of relations is organized by the relations of importance and signification. Thus, it is not 
the eater or food alone that does the thinking, but the processual, temporal and spatial 
relationality between and within bodies.
 Moreover, thinking in terms of the relations of significance that construct our bodies 
within affect, in addition to biological and behavioural theories, is particularly vivid in art 
philosophical analysis. John Dewey’s study of aesthetic experience in Art as Experience, for 
example, allows us to grasp what actually happens between bodies in an encounter. Dewey’s 
understanding of experience has served a rather humanistic revitalization of the human 
body as a valid tool for the phenomenological grasp on knowledge.77
 However, his relational understanding of experience has rather more crucial implications 
for our study of material notion of meaning as significance. Dewey’s notion of experience, 
when viewed through affect, gains new importance – Dewey has shaped how can we 
understand not only why art is important, but primarily how art generates importance.78
76 Hoffmeyer, Signs of Meaning in the Universe, 85.
77 Richard Shusterman actualizes Dewey’s notion of experience in his Somaesthetics (see, for instance, Richard 
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For Dewey, relations within experience are risky as they produce tension and resistance 
between bodies in an encounter. Like Spinoza, he argues that relations happen in a rhythmic 
movement, which, in order for it to lead to change and alteration, cannot be an uninterrupted 
interaction. The clash of bodies in an encounter does not happen in a dialectical manner, 
where the production of the new happens at the expense of one’s destruction. In a Spinozian 
spirit, Dewey writes about the intensity that is discharged at a moment of encounter. This 
intensity is “the power to move and stir, to calm and tranquillize.”79 This can be compared to 
what the philosopher and literary scholar Hans Urlich Gumbrecht described as “moments 
of intensity.” In terms of experience, meaning materializes before any cognition takes place. 
This event of encounter has a dynamic pre-reflexive character, which Gumbrecht separates 
from any form of preconscious needs and desires.80 Thus, the existential character of 
meaning generating in such an understanding of encounter should not be regarded as a 
psychological category, but rather should be viewed in terms of the ontological drives of 
bodies, of how something becomes important for bodies’ existence. 
 According to Dewey, meaning unfolds and emerges within experience. I would frame 
it that meaning occurs within the happening of affect. For Dewey, the experience is an 
encounter that is an “interpenetration” of bodies, of self and the environments, of objects 
and events.81 Such a notion of a dynamic and relational sense of experience is possible 
for Dewey, since every experience happens through impulsions. Impulsions are drives and 
forces, reminiscent of what Spinoza described as conatus. They are not simple, automatic 
body impulses, but rather existential desires that move bodies towards others. Their purpose 
is to sustain the body, to fulfil its needs. Unlike the mechanic movement of a tongue and 
swallowing when eating, for instance, impulsion is the craving for food, it is “a movement 
outward and forward of the whole organism to which special impulses are auxiliary.”82 
Most importantly, since it is a movement that is by no means automatic, it expresses the 
significance of the dependency with the environment: “The need that is manifest in the 
urgent impulsions that demand completion through what the environment – and it alone – 
can supply, is a dynamic acknowledgment of this dependence of the self for wholeness upon 
its surroundings.”83 In this way, for Dewey, impulsions not only initiate an experience, they 
also make it “[…] clothed with meaning.”84
 Dewey’s notion of meaning, similarly as in biosemiotics, is that of significance. Meaning 
is what is important, what drives the body and makes it co-related with the environment. 
79 John Dewey, Art as Experience, 191.
80 Hans Gumbrecht, Production of Presence: What Meaning Cannot Convey, 1st edition (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), 99–100; Agnieszka Anna Wołodźko, “Materiality of Affect: How Art Can Reveal the More 
Subtle Realities of an Encounter,” in This Deleuzian Century: Art, Activism, Life, (eds) Rick Dolphijn and Rosi 
Braidotti (Leiden/Boston, MA: Brill, 2015), 175–176.





The question of significance or importance thus opens up the possibility of thinking in a 
relational way. It introduces the way that affect foregrounds the relational or expressive 
nature of an object. The urgent question now is: how are we to transform the level of 
signification, which even this book relies upon, into affective, relational knowledge of 
significance? In other words, how can we avoid the hypocrisy of criticizing the dominion of 
the systems of signification through the signification of these very words? 
 Considering again The Smog Tasting, highlights a particular dilemma. The assumptions 
and design of the smog performance investigation seem to presuppose given database 
containing pollution statistics. After all, they first had to collect data that signified pollution 
in order to translate them into a specific dish. How can such a reliance on signification be 
considered as practicing material semiotics? How can such a transfer of data create new 
material experiences?
 When we enter the online database of the European Environment Agency,85 where we 
can read about smog data, we will find exact numbers, measures, statistics, graphs and 
definitions of individual chemicals, according to the area. We are able to study statistics 
regarding casualties of pollution, usual side effects of particular substances and their 
impact with regard to the exact degree of exposure. Finally, we will read about the newest 
regulations, policy measures and interventions. What we will not find there, however, is 
how to live with the smog, what our daily encounters with the smog are, or how are bodies 
co-relate with their environment in order to live within the smog.
 I argue that the two meanings that Morris distinguished, namely signification and 
significance, although different, do not oppose each other, they do not perpetuate the 
dialectic logic of De Saussure’s semiology. Instead, they complement each other. In this 
way, signification and significance seem to be at work in CGG’s performances. The relation 
of signification and significance reveal the dynamic dimension of meaning. Rather than 
focusing on what is there, solely on what is already given, CGG’s investigations teach us 
how to inquire about what might be significant once we multiply, shift or change the scale 
of relations with contaminants. 
 Stacy Alaimo, a literature and environmental scholar, would describe CGG’s approach in 
terms of “material significations”; that is, a metonymic slide where body and environment 
construct a “trans-corporeal space.” As she explains: “Such a body (or mind) cannot be 
distinguished from that which surrounds it, since various substances may provoke 
pain, illness, disability, confusion, and fatigue.”86 In trans-corporeal spaces, a body and 
environment are already interchangeable, are already continuous in their permeability – 
they are within affect. “Bodies are not self-contained,”87 she argues. In order to grasp their 
85 “European Environment Agency’s Home Page — European Environment Agency,” Folder, 2017, https://www.
eea.europa.eu, accessed 3 June 2017.




meaning, to understand them, in addition to asking questions about data – who, how many 
and what – we must recognize the importance and necessity of the question “how does this 
person manage to live?”88
 In this way, CGG not only invites speculation on how life might be once the smog 
becomes part of us, within us, as intimately as food in our mouths, but it also generates the 
importance of that investigation. Thinking and practicing significance becomes a condition 
and implication of affect – of the relation of transformation that we live in. Moreover, as 
CGG argues: “As artists, we don’t claim to discover Truth. We see value in speculating 
widely, creating novel experiences and teasing out assumptions we have about the world.”89 
Using this speculative approach, transforming what is given by multiplying relations of 
what is possible, they signal what is at stake when we practice the relations of significance, 
namely, the search for truth. 
3.8 The Truth of Significance
Meaning is wider in scope as well as more 
precious in value than is truth, and philosophy is 
occupied with meaning rather that with truth.90
The urge for meaning rather than truth seems to be a necessary consequence of affect that 
constructs living bodies. If not obvious for philosophical endeavours, the search for meaning, 
for that what becomes significant, is much more vivid in artistic ones. In art’s practice, 
the encounters between bodies are continuously re-created, exercising the necessities that 
drive encounters. Through art, we can grasp the existential dimension of meaning, yet this 
meaning holds much darker implications than we are used to when thinking about the 
truth. When bodies’ meanings are driven by dynamic and changing relations of importance, 
how can we understand them? If there are no given rules for practicing the materiality 
of meaning, how can we share and further practice that knowledge in respect of bodies? 
Does knowledge accumulation within affect make sense, or are we prone to a never-ending 
investigation of what bodies can do and mean?
 In the quotation that opens this section, Dewey is not suggesting that the truth is 
irrelevant, rather, he indicates that only the judgements regarding what is true or false 
are not significant. These judgments may be of great importance, yet they occupy a tiny 
fraction of the scope of what we understand as meaning. “Meanings are generated and in 
88 Ibid., 120.
89 The Center for Genomic Gastronomy, “Eat Less, Live More & Pray for Beans.”
90 The Center for Genomic Gastronomy, “Eat Less, Live More & Pray for Beans.”
Tasting Meaning 117
some degree sustained by existence. Hence they cannot be wholly irrelevant to the world of 
existence.”91
 The quotation from Deleuze’s “Proust and Signs” that initiates this chapter seems to 
directly follow Dewey’s thought: “A work of art is worth more than a philosophical work; for 
what is enveloped in the sign is more profound than all the implicit signification.”92 Deleuze 
signals not only the profound inspiration he finds in art, which allows him to engage in 
his pursuit to overcome the priority of signification. He also indicates that the notion of 
significance is simply more important than the search for truth. By writing that “art is 
worth more,” he suggests a different line of thinking that prioritizes values and importance 
before any aspiration for truth.
 Deleuze approaches signs as things that do not signify, that do not refer to something 
else, but as things that materialize when generating what matters. He analyses such a notion 
of signs with regard to learning process: “Learning is essentially concerned with signs. 
Signs are the object of temporal apprenticeship, not of an abstract knowledge.”93 Deleuze 
thus understands signs in terms of processual and careful learning about all the relations 
involved. It is a process of apprenticeship, in which there is no given point or method of 
observation. One must first build up the sensitivity, appreciation and attachment for the 
sign to be able to decipher and interpret it. As Deleuze explains, “one becomes a carpenter 
only by becoming sensitive to the signs of wood, a physician by becoming sensitive to the 
signs of disease […] Everything that teaches us something emits signs; every act of learning 
is an interpretation of signs or hieroglyphs.”94
 In his book on Proust, written before his study on Spinoza, Deleuze outlines an 
understanding of signs as being existential. Later, in his “Spinoza and the Three ‘Ethics’” 
text, he will explicitly equalize sign and affect, characterizing them as vectorial, i.e. they 
“are passages, becomings, rises and falls, continuous variations of power.”95 However, there 
are already many indicators in Deleuze’s earlier writings that he sees signs as affect. By 
understanding signs in this way, Deleuze strengthens the radical shift in thinking, namely, 
that meaning and what we take as knowledge within humanities has not only a linguistic 
structure, but also a material one. Deleuze transforms the notion of signs, extracting them 
from analytical philosophy and endowing them with an existential function.96 However, 
91 Ibid., 82.
92 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 20–21.
93 Ibid., 4.
94 Ibid.
95 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco, (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 139.
96As noticed by Christopher M. Drohan, this existential understanding of signs shares some similarities with 
Heideggers’s understanding of epistemology through ontology; see Christopher M. Drohan, Deleuze and the Sign, 
(New York: Atropos Press, 2009), 9–10. For Heidegger, to know “what is” can be fulfilled only by relating to it, by 
becoming with it: “We shall never learn what “is called” swimming, for example, or what it “calls for” by reading 
a treatise on swimming. Only the leap into the river tells us what is called swimming,” in Martin Heidegger, What 
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what is important for our discussion on materiality of meaning is the question of how to 
practice such material, existential knowledge. What does materiality mean here, next to 
relationality? What does this material notion of meaning actually entail once we establish 
how to practice it? 
 Deleuze already gives us some clues in his way of thinking about signs, which is rooted 
in Peirce’s theory of signs analysed briefly earlier in this chapter. Firstly, Deleuze borrows 
Peirce’s understanding of signs as a search that insists on an engaged relation where “One 
does not think and one does not act, but one makes signs.”97 Secondly, the engagement 
of making signs is expressed by a demand for a trained sensitivity, as we have already 
discussed: “One becomes a carpenter only by becoming sensitive to the signs of wood, a 
physician by becoming sensitive to the signs of disease. Vocation is always predestination 
with regard to signs.”98 Deleuze then argues that signs generate the search for knowledge 
in this engaged relation. Since, for Peirce, “a sign is something by knowing which we know 
something more,”99 Deleuze argues that the search “is in fact a search for truth.”100 
 Deleuze’s understanding of truth is not then based, as we may already predict, on the 
classical definition of correspondence of reality with judgements about this reality. Such a 
notion of truth would only be a product of logic and the result of arbitrariness. As such, 
the truth presupposes no risk and no novelty in the encounter, demanding a given number 
of already known results: “They [the philosophers of analytical truth] remain gratuitous 
because they are born of the intelligence that accords them only a possibility and not of 
violence or of an encounter that would guarantee their authenticity.”101 Similarly, like Deely, 
Deleuze sees a presupposition of and pursuit of a method in such a philosophical approach 
to truth. The image of thought, characteristic of philosophy, that is concentrated on the 
corresponding notion of truth presupposes the intrinsic love for truth. In your first year 
studying philosophy, you will learn: that the love for truth is the most “natural” and specific 
point of departure for all thought – philosophy, from the Greek ϕιλοσοϕία: phileo denotes 
to love, sophia denotes wisdom.102 The love for truth, for wisdom, constitutes a friendship 
inscribed in philosophy – and it is exactly this idea of philosopher as friend that Deleuze 
distrusts.
as “becoming with” into knowledge formation in Deleuze’s thought through Dewey’s influence.  She positions 
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The notion of a friend in the mindset of philosophers relies on the universalization of 
communication, on reaching an agreement and confirming one’s position: 
Friends are, in relation to one another, like minds of goodwill who are in 
agreement as to the signification of things and words; they communicate 
under the effect of a mutual goodwill. Philosophy is like the expression of a 
Universal Mind that is in agreement with itself in order to determine explicit 
and communicable significations.103
 
However, exposing philosophy in this way does not lead Deleuze to an abandonment of 
truth. Rather, with Guattari, he sets a different course, a “different than a friend” persona 
for philosophy. He argues that it is not what is true, but what is important that continuously 
inspires new, genuine thought:
 
Philosophy does not consist in knowing and is not inspired by truth. Rather, 
it is categories like Interesting, Remarkable, or Important that determine 
success or failure. Now, this cannot be known before being constructed. We 
will not say of many books of philosophy that they are false, for that is to say 
nothing, but rather that they lack importance or interest, precisely because 
they do not create any concept or contribute an image of thought or beget a 
persona worth the effort.104
Deleuze adopts the position of one who is uncomfortable and problematic, who has 
been neither a friend, nor an enemy of philosophy, yet is someone who shadows all new 
thoughts. One that is driven not by the need for acceptance and confirmation, but by a need 
and necessity, by that what is important. Such a persona is prone to violence. However, 
this violence is not based on a negation of the one who disagrees, since, here, a notion 
such as agreement has no meaning. Rather, the violence is fed by multiplication, by a 
continuous adding rather than rejecting of what is significant. The driving force of what 
can generate truth is thus violent encounters of different necessities and importance. This 
comes close to what Deleuze described as Nature, namely a force that “is not attributive, 
but rather conjunctive: it expresses itself through “and,” and not through “is.” This and that 
– alternations and entwinings, resemblances and differences, attractions and distractions, 
nuance and abruptness.”105
 How, then, should we communicate when there are no friends of signification? How is 
communication possible when there is “too much difference,” as Deleuze puts it?106 How 
103 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 60.
104 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy? (London: Verso, 1994), 82–83.
105 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, (London, New York: Continuum, 2004), 304.
106 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 119.
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does the violence of many trigger the need for search? If, in this multiplicity, the truth 
is born from the dissensus, “the dark regions in which are elaborated the effective forces 
that act on thought, the determinations that force us to think,”107 how can this be done 
without falling into the dialectic negation. In other words, how can we maintain the forces 
of multiplication?
 Deleuze points to a condition, a persona that replaces the friend. It is “an invisible, 
imperceptible dark precursor.”108 It bears a resemblance to a larval subject that is still in 
an embryonic state – it is a force of movement that guarantees communication between 
that which cannot communicate without falling into negation.109 “The dark precursor 
is not a friend”110 since it does not just carry meanings that ensure confirmation and 
communication.111 It rather transforms and metamorphoses while communicating. It is 
not a transcendent but an immanent pre-subjective force of search for contamination. 
 The dark precursor as a persona of search leads to novelty and creativity. The dissensus 
emerges in the accident of encounter, when we are forced to search for more relations of 
transformations: “We search for truth only when we are determined to do so in terms of a 
concrete situation, when we undergo a kind of violence that impels us to such a search.”112 
In this way, truth, according to Deleuze, is not grounded in affinity, correspondence and 
signification. The kind of truth Deleuze is writing about is not based on communication 
or comparison to some “objective content.” Deleuze’s truth is of entering the relation of 
signs that he understands in a very pragmatic way – as learning by “doing with someone” 
and not as “doing like someone.” Once again this is reminiscent of Peirce’s definition of 
signs as “learning by experience.” Yet, Deleuze points out the necessity of experience and 
encounter when searching for truth. The pursuit of a non-corresponding understanding of 
truth implies that Deleuze is arguing for a quest for novelty, and primarily, for an inquiry 
into how new knowledge emerges. 
 Meanings emerge from an encounter that disrupts, poses questions and demands further 
search. This is a dark precursor indeed, something never fulfilled, constantly demanding 
and mapping new relations and conditions of significance. As a result of the material notion 
of meaning, that is, through the focus on relations of significance, we must continuously 
practice the search – the investigation of mutations. This search, unlike any logocentric 
107 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 2008, 61.
108 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 119.
109 Ibid., 118.
110 Ibid., 145.
111 “Philosophy, like friendship, is ignorant of the dark regions in which are elaborated the effective forces that act 
on thought, the determinations that force us to think; a friend is not enough for us to approach the truth. Minds 
communicate to each other only the conventional; the mind engenders only the possible. The truths of philosophy 
are lacking in necessity and the mark of necessity. As a matter of fact, the truth is not revealed, it is betrayed; it is 
not communicated, it is interpreted; it is not willed, it is involuntary.” Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 61.
112 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 11.
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path that focuses on discovering what is there, is grounded in material semiotics and, as 
such, concerns what becomes important, what demands to be the truth of significance.
 However, the final acknowledgment of the equally generating sense of what is significant 
for a being to exist within its environment creates a new set of problems that call to be tackled 
in a new kind of way. Significance, after all, is not something that is universally given, in the 
same way that a moral law or value is. For Uexküll, significance is what belongs to a being 
in its own Umwelt. In order to learn, to know, you have to map all the relations that become 
important for the being to exist. This means that what the body finds significant, actually 
constructs this body and therefore has material implications for body’s becoming.
 Uexküll’s study of a tick seems ethically unchallenged – in order to know what a tick 
does to live, you just have to map its affects. However, if the notion of significance, that 
what is important for a body, is a driving and generating force, how can we responsibly 
co-construct meanings? If meaning is not added, is not something that might be transferred 
unnoticed, and instead is something changeable and open, yet leaves the actual imprint 
of change on a body, how can we make any cultural and legal decisions? As a result of 
the constant alterations we cannot know what will be relevant, what will be significant 
for a body. It thus seems that we must change our attitudes and lose the given criteria of 
judgement in order to encounter what is yet unknown but remains significant. As Shaviro 
argues:
Genetics and biotechnology are even more perplexing, since they are less 
about understanding the external world than they are about experimenting 
on – and thereby altering – ourselves. We are on the verge of developing 
the ability to clone ourselves, to tweak our genetic makeup, to hybridize 
ourselves through gene splicing, to incorporate silicon chips into our 
brains, to interface machinery directly with our nervous systems, and to 
reset our neurotransmitter and hormone levels at will. Such practices are 
inherently risky and unpredictable. How can we come to terms with forms of 
“knowledge” whose very effect is to change who “we” are? How do we judge 
these disciplines, when they undermine, or render irrelevant, the very norms 
and criteria that we use to ground our judgments? What will we do when 
advances in these practices force us to redefine, ever more radically, what 
we mean by such basic notions as self, life, humanity, and nature? The new 
biology, as much as any new work of art, requires us to abandon everything we 
think we know, and make singular judgments that cannot be subsumed under 
preexisting criteria. Aesthetics precedes cognition in such cases, because we 
are dealing with practices that can only be comprehended through the new 
categories that they themselves create. The question we should be asking, 
therefore, is not: How can we establish valid criteria and critical standards? 
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but rather: How can we get away from such criteria and standards, which 
work only to block innovation and change?113
We must lose those criteria that have worked for what we believe to be known, and instead 
start to imagine methods of practice without them. How can we search for that which is 
unknown yet which might be significant? It is a pragmatic approach indeed, one that focuses 
on what is important, and primarily, what might be important. Paradoxically, we already 
have all the knowledge to do this – we have already developed an understanding of how the 
relations of significance work, how existential meanings emerge and why these relations are 
important. We have an experience with art’s constant re-shifting of criteria, we are used to 
experiences without judgements. All that remains is to learn how to use this knowledge.
3.9 Contaminant M like a Meat Lab
In the work Eat Less, Live More – and Pray for Beans, which won Zack Denfeld and Catherine 
Kramer the “Designers and Artists 4 Genomics Award” in 2012, the artists visualize future 
scenarios of Dutch food culture and what might be relevant as the climate and global trade 
changes. In the animated video, Community Meat Lab Amsterdam [Figure 20], which 
formed part of the project, the artists narrate a story of what food culture will be like when 
mutagen meat becomes an everyday reality. 
 Community Meat Lab is a sort of future collective of DIY biologists, scientists, and meat 
lovers, but also those in search of company in their life. All these different people gathered 
in the Lab to share what their love of eating meant to them and to practice the growing of 
meat, and cooking and eating it together. In this short animation, CGG exposes how our 
eating habits might change once we start to think in terms of different configurations of 
what sustainable food might be. Within this project, the artists imagined how the habits 
of production and consumption of meat might be, once we stop thinking in industrial 
terms and chasing profits and start to speculate on new ways of living with innovative 
biotechnological possibilities and the environmental restrictions these possibilities enable. 
This is a speculative approach that, like the practice of a biologist, puts the actions of 
relations that may generate new scenarios central, new relations that are driven by what 
might turn out to be significant. 
113 Shaviro, Without Criteria, 15–16.
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Figure 20. The Center for 
Genomic Gastronomy, Community 
Meat Lab Amsterdam, Vimeo, 
https://vimeo.com/50204650, 
accessed 6 April 2016.
Community Meat Lab Amsterdam (video transcript)
Mrs. de Wolff is a retired nurse and a proud member of the Community Meat 
Lab, Amsterdam (CMLA). After her husband died she was quite lonely for 
a while, but now she gets a visit from a member of Community Meat Lab 
almost every day. Today it’s Sophie’s turn to donate blood. Having grown up 
after animal-meat was outlawed in the Netherlands, she has only ever tasted 
lab meat. Sophie loves food and she joined the CMLA so at least she knows 
where her meat comes from. After the blood letting is over, they enjoy tea and 
cake while discussing what to bring for this week’s feast. 
Joris is in his cleanroom, starting a new batch of cells. Last week he tried 
using a line of porcupine cells he got from Manchester, but those didn’t turn 
out so well. This week he is sticking to the tried-and-tested goldfish cell line 
provided to him by his friends in the Community Meat Lab, Houston.
On Sunday everyone is gathered in Joost’s living room for supper. Sophie 
brought a potato salad, and Mrs. de Wolff brought a cake, but nobody will 
start eating before Julia brings out the meat dish. Finally she enters from the 
kitchen holding a large platter of Spaghetti Bolognese and says: “Sorry I’m 
running a little late. The meat was a little tricky to cook this week.” Joost 
nervously pipes in: “Yeah, sorry guys. The power cuts on Friday were killing 
me! I had to get out the bicycle generator to make sure the gold fish cells got 
enough exercise!”
Mrs de Wolff is not worried and adds: “Well, thankfully Julia is a marvellous 
cook. I’m sure it will be delicious as always.” 
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Once everyone is served and people start eating, a content silence spreads 
across the table, save for the banging of cutlery on plates and the sound of 
chewing.114
In the above transcript of a 2.5-minute animation, CGG imagines, in a humorous and light 
hearted, yet honest way, what it might be like when animal meat will be banned as a result 
of easy access to growing meat from cells. Perhaps this ban on animal meat will be for 
environmental reasons and a result of animal rights laws. The video does not elaborate 
on this, yet what the artists suggest is a scenario in which our fixed desires induce new 
habits once the relations of significance change. Driven by the dark precursor of dissensus, 
of the commons that do not fit into today’s reality, CGG touches these new relations of 
significance. What new relations, habits and practices might be created if our love for meat 
generates new communities of self-eaters? Once we cannot eat animals, shall we start to eat 
ourselves? 
 CGG feeds on what is given and yet the artists twist it to unravel what is not yet 
there, what might be, and what does not fit. Can a non-anthropocentrism only start with 
cannibalism? Can a human become a posthuman, egalitarian only when sharing an equal 
place on the plate? The thought of bodies being sustained through the consumption of our 
own bodies, albeit on a singular, non-massive production scale, gives philosophical tickles. 
It opens up weirding spaces and the sense of what bodies and communities might be like. 
CGG works between the plateaus of meanings, but, unlike Uexküll’s bridges, they do not 
try to connect the various logocentric and material meanings into a single story. Rather, 
they explore the tensions between them, making them more alive and vibrant as a result of 
initiating new relations of significance.
3.10 An Affect Apprenticeship
While CGG’s contaminants narrate curious tastes and ways of eating from challenging 
recipes, they also prepare their audience and invite them to embrace discourses and 
materialities of what food is today, but also what it might be. They not only work as 
apprentices themselves, but they induct the audience into an apprenticeship too. CGG’s 
apprenticeship requires learning about the food first, about each singular history of the 
body before the act of eating. Ultimately, the ‘apprentices’ are invited to experiment, to 
follow and cook the recipes.
 Dolphijn stipulates that such an apprenticeship in food tasting has nothing to do 
with any kind of universality, as ascribed to the notion of taste, and that only the actual 
114 The Center for Genomic Gastronomy, “Community Meat Lab Amsterdam,” Vimeo, https://vimeo.
com/50204650, accessed 6 April 2016.
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encounter causes all the relations to happen.115 He further argues: “what matters is in what 
way the connection take place.”116 In other words, what is important is focussing on how 
the relations happen and how they generate meanings. We are not interested in defining 
what food is and what the actual ingredients of what we are about to eat are, but rather 
we are concentrating on taste in terms of entering the multiple relationality that is about 
to happen. To define what food is, is the most politically absolute and hierarchical act, “It 
brutally splits up the world into what consumes and what is consumed, construction and 
destruction.”117 In terms of CGG’s practice, determining what becomes food happens in the 
encounter, it is produced in the taste event in the form of a sign, as a risky search for novelty.
 An important question arises when we acknowledge the materiality of meaning and 
start to induce it in our practice: if art already practices the relations of significance, 
revealing materiality of meaning as equally valid as the signification of truth, what, then, 
is left for philosophy, for the theoretical and critical thinking about meaning that goes 
beyond post-experience reflection? How can theory, the words that fill this book, become 
something material, something living? How should we act within thought to implement 
such an understanding of meaning? For many who have come before me, the answer lay 
in overcoming the disciplinary and methodological lacuna between metaphysics and 
epistemology – something that, philosophy in particular, has failed to do: “in so far as 
metaphysics is the domain of philosophy, it is largely a failure of philosophy that is has not 
done more to provide the natural sciences with more adequate conceptual framework with 
which to study life.”118
 Speculation, however, as explored through the contaminants featured in this book, 
might generate new encounters that lead to production of new meanings regarding what 
might be important once the configuration of relations changes or new bodies emerge. 
The understanding that the knowledge about bodies is generated by the way we deal with 
and practice those bodies is vividly present in art’s practice. Nevertheless, while we can 
experience how such material understanding works through the long-neglected methods of 
speculation, this does not mean that philosophy has been in the dark all along. As we have 
analysed with respect to the notion of affect, the consideration of the onto-epistemological 
nature of our bodies developed long before any of the hard sciences emerged. Today is no 
different. All the projects that revitalize Spinozian understanding of affectus when thinking 
about and understanding living bodies are still marginalized because they do not fit into 
the status quo. It is too easy to blame philosophy, as if there is something essentially wrong 
and fixed in it. Bodies within affect force us to think in terms of relations of significance 
where meanings are acknowledged as not only being a product of signification, but also 
115 Dolphijn, Foodscapes, 13.
116 Ibid., 15.
117 Ibid., 17.
118 Adam C. Scarfe, “Introduction. On a Life-Blind Spot in Neo-Darwinism’s Mechanistic Metaphysical Lens,” 
in Beyond Mechanism: Putting Life Back into Biology, (eds) Brian Henning and Adam Scarfe, (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2015), 41.
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of significance. Affect implies that it is a matter of what happen to be important and 
how we practice this that has actual productive potential. Speculation becomes a way of 
experimenting with the production of affect. Through speculation in art and philosophy, 
we create a dynamic relation, also between each other, allowing for relations of significance 
to be shaped. Through investigation of and search for relations of transformation, we create 
and are created by the relations of significance.
 Importantly, significance works in both ways. As an ethological concept that is present, 
for instance, in biology, it shows the inscribed relationality and material forms of the 
generation of living bodies; but it is also as axiological – it allows us to acknowledge views 
already set according to hierarchical evaluation. It now becomes evident that significance, 
like the sphere of semiotics, is not only an existential field, but also political – it concerns 
and implies the organization of relations according to a particular state of bodies, however 
fluid and temporal they might be. 
 Meaning formation is not just an epistemological, reflexive activity detached from living 
bodies. It is a generative, ontological and speculative event. Such comprehension of meaning 
as significance not only has the capacity to change the internal organization of what we take 
as knowledge, it primarily reshapes the very ways we produce knowledge and its role. Since 
meaning is something that not only emerges between bodies, but also changes those bodies, 
it has much more power than we would like to think. The materiality of meaning may 
generate new ideas and concepts, helping to acknowledge equally important speculative 
capacities of thought as already creative and generative. Thus, philosophy and art become 
intertwined in their material practice of speculation. Nevertheless, the existential meaning 
that affect generates implies that, depending on what becomes significant, relations can 
equally destroy, stiffen and fix those bodies – living within affect demands a different way 
of organizing the practice of the relations of contamination.
 Significance within affect opens up the existential character of signs, where meaning 
is a dynamic and violent result of an encounter. Within affect, relations multiply rather 
than negate each other. This leads to a different notion of what we think that the agency 
of that relation is. As Hoffmeyer argues, the embeddedness within semiotics of every 
living system, forces us to reconsider what we think agency is. As he defines it, agency is 
“a capacity of a unit system to generate end-directed behaviours.”119 Agency, for him, is a 
capacity that is oriented internally and externally towards directed behaviours. It belongs 
to the various human and non-human entities such as cells, or bacteria. Defined as “end-
directed behaviour,” Hoffmeyer presupposes a prior embeddedness in the semiotic field. 
Agency is thus a capacity “to interpret (whether consciously or unconsciously) events or 
states as referring to something other than themselves, or in other words, the capacity 
to interpret signs,”120 and now we would say, to interpret affects. To practice relations of 
119 Jesper Hoffmeyer, “Why Do We Need a Semiotic Understanding of Life,” in Beyond Mechanism: Putting Life 
Back into Biology, 148.
120 Ibid., 152.
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significance demands a new understanding of agency. What kind of sense of agency can we 
practice while maintaining the multiplication of relations? How can we think about agency 
in a way that does not work on the relations of oppositions and that instead organizes 
bodies according to a dynamic affect event? These are the urgent questions that relations of 




Living Within a Multibody
Each multiplicity is symbiotic; its
becoming ties together animals, plants, 
microorganisms, mad particles, a
whole galaxy.1
4.1 Contaminant O like Organs of Multibody
And who is alive? The one is alive whose 
existentially indispensable organs are living. 
 The place where those organs live has no significance. 
Here or there – this has for us no difference – the fact 
that they are alive. And if they are, so does the insured 
– in the corresponding percentage proportion, to be sure.2
It all starts with laughter, more silly and goofy than hysterical or scary. It sounds a bit like 
someone choking, and one cannot really be sure whether the laughter belongs to a woman 
or a man. It is non-human, creature-like and yet human, and the voice, while laughing, 
screams: “bunch of weirdos.” The short movie Layer Cake (1968, 35 min.) directed by 
Andrzej Wajda, with a script by Stanisław Lem, is the grotesque story of Richard Fox, a rally 
driver, who undergoes multiple organ transplantations after numerous car accidents [Figre 
21]. With each accident, he gets a new body part that becomes with him, imperceptibly for 
Richard himself, yet uncannily expressed within his body movements and style of talking. 
Man, woman, dog – he becomes all of them. Any attempt to distinguish where one body 
ends and another starts becomes meaningless – s/he/it becomes multiple.
1 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (London [etc.]: Continuum, 
2004), 275.
2 Quote from the movie Layer Cake (in Polish Przekładaniec) 1968, directed by Andrzej Wajda [all quotes from the 
movie are translated from Polish by A. A. Wołodźko from the script of the movie: Stanisław Lem, Przekładaniec 
(Warszawa: Agora, e-book, 2012)].
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Figure 21. Layer Cake, 1968, film frame; Richard 
Fox after the first transplantation.
However, because each organ is donated from an already “dead” body, Fox is subjected 
continuously to increasingly complicated insurance claims. The families of the victims, 
whose body parts Fox now has, can only receive the compensation for parts that were 
actually buried and were not subsequently “used.” The families demand maintenance 
payments from Fox, who is now the owner of the organs. Fox seeks help from a lawyer. 
Unfortunately, as long as medical science “sees” it simply as a matter of “humanitarian help,” 
the juridical and insurance law cannot be adjusted. As the doctor conducting the transplants 
explains to the lawyer looking after Richard Fox’s case: “In the face of an unusual number of 
patients we cannot simply waste these surplus [of body parts]. I guess you understand that? 
Humanitarianism commands sharing. It is one of those complicated situations that comes 
with progress.” 
 How can the rules belonging to fixed identities be applied to multiple and dynamic 
subjectivities? The lawyer struggles helplessly to solve the multiple claims directed towards 
Fox. There is a widow of the brother whose body parts Fox has received demanding money 
for her children; there is a fiancé asking for the return of the gold and platinum transplanted 
into Fox’s mouth. Finally, there is a claim demanding Fox take responsibility for the children 
of a woman whose legs he now has. Confused, the lawyer asks for some advice from the 
doctor who conducts these transplants. Yet the doctor, pressed by urgent medical matters, 
just states that there are much more complicated cases:
In the last week, Doctor Gregg from Ciminati got eighteen patients 
simultaneously. The bus transporting those people, fell from a bridge. 
Eighteen people stepped into the bus, but after the operation it appeared 
that there are nineteen of them. And now, please imagine the problem of the 
identity of that nineteenth person! The papers for her.3 Where is her father? 
Her mother?
3 In Polish, the pronoun for a noun ‘person’ has a female form.
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From this conversation, it is clear that, for the doctor, bodies are plastic, mutable and 
in a state of possible transformation. Such matters as personhood and legal identity are 
secondary and hinder rather than help his work. The lawyer is thus forced to turn to the 
spiritual point of view held by Fox’s psychoanalyst. This seemingly dualistic approach in the 
story, between physical and material, body and spirit, becomes permanently blurred. As the 
story unfolds, what is material and spiritual cannot be distinguished, since both levels seem 
to express each other simultaneously in Fox’s multiplicity. 
 The psychoanalyst demonstrates a discrepancy in his method of loose associations 
practiced on Fox. Before the accident, “the whole Freud symbolism came down to a vehicle 
for Fox,” the psychoanalyst explains. He would relate darkness with fuse, blood with a red 
traffic light, the trinity with second gear. However, after the accident, the symbols have 
changed into flowers, rings and weddings. Yet, as the psychoanalyst assures the lawyer, Fox 
is not a woman, only partially – like a layer cake. Nevertheless, for the lawyer it becomes 
gradually incomprehensible who Fox is as he cannot represent the layer cake in court. The 
psychoanalyst retorts: “Why not? New times – new customs. You will adapt!” The lawyer 
insists that there must be some leading agency, one that is at the top of the multiple layers 
of Fox. The psychoanalyst reminds himself that, in the last session, Fox had been slightly 
aggressive; indeed, he had even bitten him. Therefore, when the lawyer reveals that a dog 
had been found at the location of the recent car crash, the psychoanalyst calmly decides that 
he should get a vaccination: “You think that Fox may have rabies?” – the lawyer asks. “Not 
Fox, the dog,” the psychoanalyst replies. 
 Neither the medical doctor who specializes in the carnality of the body, nor the 
psychoanalyst who is focused on what is considered as spirit can give a satisfactory answer 
to the lawyer. Both the doctor and the psychoanalyst approach their patient united by their 
function multiplicity. It is difficult for the lawyer to analyse Fox’s case according to the law, 
since each layer of Fox never stays on top long enough to take absolute control over the 
others. The multiple layers of Fox mingle, mutate and grow according to what becomes 
important for each part. The relations of significance drive them and control the generated 
agency of Richard Fox, whoever s/he/it might be. In the script, Lem seems to emphasize 
that there is no logical split between her/his/its spirit and body and, moreover, exactly what 
is the body stopped being an issue a long time ago. Now, the major problem is how to act 
as multiple within the old criteria of law and custom that the lawyer personalizes. Can we 
change the old criteria in a way that responds to the material realities of multiplicity? 
 The movie ends in the lawyer’s office with another visit from a multiple body of Fox. 
The advocate is glad to see Fox as he has been waiting for him for some time now. Yet, Fox 
expresses surprise, since he was not even sure if he will choose this lawyer that morning. 
From the conversation, it becomes obvious that Fox is not Fox, but rather Arie Stevens, 
Fox’s co-pilot. Stevens’ laugh, however, coming out of the mouth with golden teeth, is a 
goofy, slightly hysterical, almost non-human one, screaming: “bunch of weirdos!”
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4.2 The Laughter of Multiplicity
So what if this new nomadic subject looks, 
feels, and sounds unusual? S/he is monstrous, 
mixed, hybrid, beautiful, and, guess what . . .? 
S/he is laughing!4
Lem begins and ends his speculation on multiplicity with a particular kind of laughter. This 
laughter is not laughing about something or at something. It is not a clear, resonant sound, 
one that is easily recognized as belonging to someone or something. Rather, the laughter 
becomes an expression of the intensity of its becoming. Fox’s laughter, contaminated by 
multiple encounters with bodies, signals transformation, continuous change and further 
mutations. Through the laughter, we can sense the movement of the changing Fox, who, 
paradoxically, is not Fox, but Fox becoming another. It is as if, through laughter, we enter 
the ongoing multiplication and transformation of Fox’s body into something both human 
and non-human. In Lem’s story, laughter creates tension, a vibration of intensities that 
allows us to encounter equally intensive and multiple in their mutations body. 
 The multibody, or as Deleuze calls it – multiplicity – is an assemblage, a temporary 
composition of bodies (carnal bodies, thoughts, particles, bacteria, plants, animals, 
chemicals) in their relationality. Although the multibody, the multiplicity, is a composition 
of elements, it is not driven by them separately. What constitutes the multibody is the 
relations in alliance, continuously mingling and changing and driving the multiplicity. 
Importantly, as Deleuze argues, 
The multiple is no longer an adjective which is still subordinate to the One 
which divides or the Being which encompasses it. It has become noun, a 
multiplicity which constantly inhabits each thing. A multiplicity is never in 
terms, however many there are, nor in their set or totality. A multiplicity is 
only in the AND, which does not have the same nature as the elements, the 
sets or even their relations.5
In that sense, there is no unity of the multibody, as Deleuze with Guattari would argue,6 but 
only relations of transformations, relations of AND that disrupt unity, any hint of totality 
and identification. Each added relation, each AND, already mutates and sets a new flow 
4 Braidotti, Nomadic Theory: The Portable Rosi Braidotti (New York: Columbia University Press E-book, 2011), 
chapter 1.1. "Transposing Differences."
5 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues II, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, revised edition 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 57.
6 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 2004, 9.
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of change and transformations – each AND becomes a new affectus that creates a new 
multibody.
 How are we to encounter a continuously changing multiple that does not have a fixed 
identity? Does it make sense to recognize it? Is each moment of identification prone to 
failure? In other words, how should we live within a multibody? How can we practice 
multibodies within affect? As Deleuze writes: “In a multiplicity what counts are not the 
terms or the elements, but what there is “between”, the between, as set of relations which are 
not separable from each other.”7 In Layer Cake, the laughter is a method to signal how elusive 
and dismantling the encounter with multiple is. And yet, it is through laughter that we sense 
the multibody of Fox. The laughter becomes the conduit for the multibody to enter in the 
middle of the multibody’s transformations – movements that cannot be grasped, identified, 
but only sensed. Deleuze saw the expression of difference in this kind of laughter; that is, 
of that which cannot be subsumed into a given, fixed identity. In order to understand how 
we can express the multiple through laugher and, how, in turn, the multibody emerges and 
functions, we must linger a little longer on how Deleuze conceptualized laughter. Lem’s 
“bunch of weirdos” is the ongoing differentiating multiplicity that we now have to learn to 
encounter. 
 For Deleuze, laughter is a movement of the intensity of those relations that generate 
bodies. As such, laughter expresses affect – an encounter that is both dynamic and tense 
in character. Importantly, laughter understood as affect neither belongs to irony, nor to 
humour.8 It rather remains between them, as a movement that produces them. Laughter is 
“This play of levels of intensity controls the peaks of irony and the valleys of humour.”9 As 
Deleuze further explains, “You cannot help but laugh when you mix up the codes. If you 
put thought in relation to the outside, Dionysian moments of laughter will erupt, and this 
is thinking in the clear air.”10
 Laughter becomes an expression of intensity, of difference emerged from the experience 
of the multiplicity. Interestingly, in his book on Foucault, Deleuze writes that laughter 
becomes not only an experience of multiplicity, but also a way to resist or even destroy what 
endangers this multiplicity: 
The Divine Comedy of punishment means we can retain the basic right to 
collapse in fits of laughter in the face of a dazzling array of perverse inventions, 
cynical discourses and meticulous horrors. A whole chain of phenomena, 
from anti-masturbation machines for children to the mechanics of prison 
7 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, viii.
8 See Claire Colebrook’s historical analysis of irony within philosophy, where when analysing the notion irony in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, she argues that they prioritize humour over irony: Claire Colebrook, Irony, 1st 
edition (London/ New York: Routledge, 2005), 129–49.
9 Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands: And Other Texts, 1953-1974, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Mike Taormina (Los 
Angeles, CA/Cambridge, MA: Semiotext, 2004), 258.
10 Ibid., 258.
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for adults, sets off an unexpected laughter which shame, suffering or death 
cannot silence. The torturers rarely laugh, at least not in the same way [...] 
Provided the hatred is strong enough something can be salvaged, a great joy 
which is not the ambivalent joy of hatred, but the joy of wanting to destroy 
whatever mutilates life.11
Laughter is what bypasses mutilation in favour of mutation. Mutilation presupposes 
the sense of a closed, perfect whole from which a part is removed, deconstructed or 
castrated.12 Laughter becomes rather a mutation and waste – something that has been cut 
and become waste in the process of mutilation. However, we should not understand waste, 
here, as something that is at odds with the status quo, what we can manage, arrange and 
manipulate without consequences. For Deleuze, laughter as waste is not what contradicts, 
what has failed, what demonstrates lack, since to define waste as such would demand 
memory. When, in turn, memory fuels laughter, it transforms it into that what is lacking. 
For instance, when Fox’s multibody laughs, s/he/it does not refer to what they are not, to 
the lack of something. S/he/it – the multiple of Fox – laughs, bringing about yet another 
dimension. S/he/it multiplies while laughing, laughs while multiplying. Instead of lingering 
on what is missing, trapped within the dialectical logic of creation through exclusion and 
lack, laughter becomes a path of affirmation. It emerges and embraces the waste of the cut 
bodies as “active forgetting.”13 The laughter of waste is negation of negation by affirmation. 
 Moreover, unlike memory, which works by means of recognition and representation, 
the active forgetting of laughter does not signify. It is through waste that these bodies 
transform into multiplicity allowing us, in turn, to think differently from within this 
multiplicity. Multiplicity forces us to think in terms of affirmation of the unrecognized, 
unactualized, non-representable and non-communicable. For Deleuze, this embracing of 
waste operates as the eternal return of that which is cut. What returns in laughter is “neither 
the default, nor the equal, only the excessive returns.”14 Laughter of waste is not a friendly, 
agreeing, white-men-patting-themselves-on-the-back laughter. It is rather a laughter of a 
dark precursor, of convulsions and rolling – the multiple Fox laughing at the “bunch of 
weirdos” while multiplying.
 Lem’s imagination of the implications of organ transplantation, although grotesque, 
exercise the dilemma of the multiple subjectivities of today. He actualizes thinking about 
bodies, their becoming and generation in terms of relationality, which leads to questioning 
of the old, fixed concept of identity. He creates situations of tensions expressed in laughter 
where multiple bodies demand new thinking about dynamic subjectivity. In that sense, in 
11 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans. Sean Hand, 1st edition (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 
23.
12 “Mutilation, N.,” OED Online (Oxford University Press), http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/view/
Entry/124329, accessed 31 May 2016.
13 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) 55.
14 Ibid., 299.
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order to practice the multiple, not only the acknowledgment of multiple must occur, but 
most importantly, a different logic of thinking. 
 In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze argues how thinking of the multiple, which would 
force a new practice of self, cannot start with the dominant dialectical negation – logic 
driven by opposition. The multiplication itself follows a different logic. It is not a simple 
copying ad infinitum of what is there, for instance, numerically multiply what is given. As 
Deleuze argues, “multiplicity must not designate a combination of the many and the one, 
but rather an organisation belonging to the many as such, which has no need whatsoever of 
unity in order to form a system.”15 The organization of such an understanding of multiplicity 
is an open system of possibilities that may be actualized, and which may mutate, like genes, 
Deleuze argues. 
 Before the widespread acknowledgment of the field of epigenetics, which overcomes 
the nature-nurture opposition by considering genes and environment both crucial and 
inseparable in the processes of development,16 Deleuze describes genes as a relational 
rather than essentialist fixed given. He explains that, depending on the environment and 
on multiple relations, genes may or may not be actualized in the incarnation of a particular 
body. His notion of multiplicity takes shape in the continuous relations, intensities and 
determination that occur at the level of genes, and the level of species and their environment. 
In these multilayers, the organization of multiplicity actualizes its transformations:
the double aspect of genes involves commanding several characteristics 
at once, and acting only in relation to other genes; the whole constitutes a 
virtuality, a potentiality; and this structure is incarnated in actual organisms, 
as much from the point of view of the determination of their species as 
from that of the differenciation of their parts, according to rhythms that are 
precisely called ‘differential’, according to comparative speeds or slownesses 
which measure the movement of actualisation.17
15 Ibid., 182.
16 “Epigenetics is a term that Conrad H. Waddington (1942) coined to refer quite generally to developmental 
processes (i.e. how we get from genotype to phenotype), and we have known for a long time that such processes 
involve far more than DNA. In this sense of the term, epigenetics is not a new field. Also not new is the 
recognition that the various factors involved in development—nucleic acids (DNA and RNA), metabolites, and 
proteins; nuclear and cytoplasmic factors; genetics and environment—are so deeply intertwined, so profoundly 
interdependent, as to make any attempt to partition their causal influence simply meaningless [...] What is new 
today involves an altogether different reference of the term epigenetic. The ‘field of research called epigenetics’ in 
the NIH newsletter refers primarily to the discovery that not only are changes in various extra- (or epi-) genetic 
factors affecting phenotype routinely passed on in cell division, but also such changes can often be transmitted 
through the generations, despite the fact that they do not involve changes in DNA sequence. Examples of epigenetic 
inheritance might involve changes in methylation patterns on DNA, or changes in chromatin structure, metabolic 
requirements, feeding patterns, or even modes of symbolic communication. These alternative ‘‘systems of 
inheritance’ are of immense importance to development; they radically change our understanding of inheritance; 
and they can also have a profound effect on evolution.” Evelyn Fox Keller, The Mirage of a Space between Nature 
and Nurture (Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2010), 4–5.
17 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 185.
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The laughter expresses nothing but itself, a sheer affirmation of its transformation, of the 
bunch of weirdos, mutating and growing. In order to laugh, one first must dismantle the 
priority of identity. Rather than negating identity, we must simply multiply it to the point 
where we cannot trace back who/what one was/is, as in the case of Fox’s multiplicity. It is 
not about focusing on identities of the bodies whose parts were transplanted into Fox, but 
encountering what cannot be traced back. It is about touching the simulacra, which results 
from an ongoing repetition of the multiplication process itself:
All identities are only simulated, produced as an optical ‘effect’ by the more 
profound game of difference and repetition. We propose to think difference 
in itself independently of the forms of representation which reduce it to the 
Same, and the relation of different to different independently of those forms 
which make them pass through the negative.18
The laughter that expresses multiplicity thus follows the logic of what Deleuze described 
as pure difference. In the prevailing understanding, the notion of difference is immediately 
subordinated to the sense and presupposition of identity – we think about that what is 
different already with relation to something that it differs from. This false understanding 
regards difference as already in a relation with resemblance, where the perspective of the 
viewer, the one who judges, must be present. As Deleuze puts it, “In other words, we do not 
think difference in itself.”19
 In this way, the way to think difference for its own sake, independent of the logic of 
identity, of the Same, becomes through relation itself – through what we now call laughter, 
but which carries the characteristic of affect understood as affectus. In Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze does not yet use the word affectus, he rather defines this phenomenon 
as intensity. Intensity becomes the relation without relata, the movement of itself that 
oscillates between the horizons. It does not mean that intensity presupposes horizons, the 
relata, but rather it is a pure movement, it produces those relata:
Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which 
the given is given, that by which the given is given as diverse. Difference 
is not phenomenon but the noumenon closest to the phenomenon. […] 
Every phenomenon refers to an inequality by which it is conditioned. Every 
diversity and every change refer to a difference which is its sufficient reason. 
Everything which happens and everything which appears is correlated with 
orders of differences: differences of level, temperature, pressure, tension, 
potential, difference of intensity.20
18 Ibid., xix.
19 Ibid., xv.
20 Ibid., 222 (original emphasis).
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In the waste of mutilation, the expression of laughter is the flow of intensities. Here 
difference escapes identity, here, Deleuze finds the logic that drives the multiplicity – 
the logic of change. Significantly, difference must be thought of as a value in itself and 
without any teleological ressentiment of returning to what is or was – to habits of identity. 
Moreover, the abandonment of the logic of identity does not lead us into the non-semiotic 
realm. The phenomenon of difference is the phenomenon of emergence and production 
of significance. We are in a different logic now, one that, rather than being governed by 
agreement and confirmation according to what is given, such as the logic of signification, is 
induced by tension. This logic of multiplicity is driven by the tension of an encounter with 
what is different, rather than its identity, i.e. it is driven by what escapes identification. As 
seen in Layer Cake, laughter becomes an encounter with darkness, with that which does 
not signify and what cannot be grasped. It is the dimension of the body where drives (for 
Deleuze intensities, affects) have no fixed foundation and, as such, the body interprets itself 
as the enigma of plurality: “The body is a multiform process and is therefore obscure to the 
conscious spirit, which does not oversee its continual plurality.”21 The body is the darkness 
understood not as invisible or impossible to see, but as multilayered multiplicity that cannot 
be universally grasped. 
 How, then, can thought be possible in such a space of impossibility of sense and 
cognitive capture? How can “the logic of intensities” that moves multiplicity reshape the 
understanding of self, of subjectivity or agency? How, in the dissensus, the waste that drives 
the movement of differentiations, can we practice this new sense of multiplicity? These are 
the questions that resist signification through the practice of the politics of differentiations 
of significance. Mind you, subjectivities of multiplicity are not the solution to the problem 
of significance, of identities. 
 When writing about multiplicities and their agencies, I am not interested in the 
metaphysics of subjectivity, i.e. what the subjectivity is. As I argued earlier, the question of 
subjectivity is already a question of relationality, encounters within material and discursive 
entanglement as discussed in the previous chapters. When thinking about multiplicity, 
once the logic of laughter has been established as the affirmation of difference, which drives 
this multiplicity, what becomes crucial is how to act as multiple? Following the question 
that pervades Layer Cake, I am focused on how, through laughter, pervading the dark path 
into difference from which multiplicity emerges, we can function politically and socially? 
This is a pragmatic question about the possibility and shape of multiplicities’ politics within 
affect. It is a question posed by Fox’s lawyer, willing to find a way out of the categorical 
mess our bodies found themselves in. Unlike the lawyer, however, we are not to overcome 
this categorical messiness of bodies by searching for a perfect law that would subsume 
and govern them all. Instead, we are to change the categories themselves, so that they can 
respond to the dynamic and processual character of multibodies.
21 Eric Blondel, Nietzsche: The Body and Culture: Philosophy as a Philological Genealogy, 1st edition (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1991), 211.
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In the next section, then, I will discuss what happens when we try to implement the logic 
of difference, of dissensus, in politics. In other words, how can we actually create the spaces 
of laughter, of tension through which bodies, in their multiplicity, can emerge? How can we 
practice laughter as the politics of multibodies?
4.3 The Impersonal Within Affect 
In Layer Cake, the body, its partiality and mutability, is directly juxtaposed with the law and 
customs. Confronted with the dynamism of the body, and the growing acknowledgment of 
its multiplicity, the law, based on a presupposition about fixed and autonomous identities, 
becomes insufficient, unable to exhaust all the realities of this multibody. In the “eyes of 
law,” the body is something to be managed and categorized according to the given rules. 
Therefore, under no condition can these rules of law be changed, even if the concept of what 
the body is has changed. In the story, Lem captures the tension not only between the body 
and the law, but primarily between the body and its practice, its politics. When thinking 
about Layer Cake, our questions gain a sharpness: how should we move from the politics 
of rights, which is dominated by signification, to the politics of the relation of significance? 
In other words, how can we maintain the continuous state of laughter? How should we 
practice bodies within affect? And finally, how should we practice the affirmation of waste 
that is a feature of multibodies? 
 For scholars such as Roberto Esposito and John Protevi, who are occupied, implicitly 
and explicitly, with the political and biopolitical understanding of affect, the strategic point 
of thinking about politics differently, one that can respond to a collective and dynamic 
comprehension of subjectivities, is rethinking the notion of personhood.22 After all, it is the 
idea of personhood within politics that helped to manage and control bodies throughout 
the history. 
Whether a life is declared to be personal from the act of conception, at a 
certain stage of embryonic development, or from the moment of birth, its 
entrance into the regime of personhood is what lends it unquestionable 
value. It hardly matters whether one becomes a person by divine decree, 
through natural means, all at once, or in a series of stages: what counts is the 
threshold beyond which something generically living takes on a significance 
that radically changes its legal status […] Only a life that can provide the 
credentials of personhood can be considered sacred or qualitatively significant 
[…] Personhood is seen as the only semantic field that can possibly overlap 
22 Roberto Esposito, Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy, trans. Timothy Campbell (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2008); Roberto Esposito, Immunitas: The Protection and Negation of Life, 1st edition (Cambridge/
Malden, MA: Polity, 2011); Roberto Esposito, The Third Person, 1st edition (Cambridge: Polity, 2012); John Protevi, 
Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).
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the two spheres of law and humanity, separated as they are by the national 
ideology of citizenship. This means that a concept like that of human rights is 
only conceivable and viable through the lexicon of personhood.23
The notion of personhood has been a political and juridical determinant of who has 
rights and who does not. For this reason, the Fox’s lawyer in Layer Cake is in a struggle to 
establish his client’s identity in order to determine the borders of s/he/it’s personhood. Only 
by establishing borders, can the lawyer legally resolve Fox’s case. As the movie explores, 
however, multiplicity escapes legal categories, it functions according to different norms, 
if any at all. Hence, in order to form a politics of multiplicity, one that is able to capture 
and live with Fox’s multibody, the possibility of thinking beyond the logic of personhood 
becomes crucial.
 In order to be able to think otherwise than according to the demands of personhood, 
it becomes imperative to consider what enforces the idea of a person. Giorgio Agamben’s 
distinction between bios and zoë can be considered as the entry point for grasping the vast 
implications of what the notion of personhood entails. Agamben argues that since Ancient 
Greek thought, these two terms have shaped our understanding of what is considered as 
life: zoë, which denoted a simple “fact of living common to all living beings” and bios, 
which stands for a “way of living proper to an individual or a group.”24 In this distinction, 
bios is the sphere of polis, the domain of logos and language and, as such, it was used to 
describe human life, its agency and subjectivity. Only in the sphere of bios can the notion 
of personhood be developed and practiced. Zoë, on the other hand, denoted the sphere of 
non-human, bodily nature. This implied that, even if humans share zoë with other beings, 
zoë must still must be excluded from the sphere of social bios.25 Within zoë, in other words, 
there was no possibility of becoming a person and practicing personhood.
 Within the sphere of bios, carnality and law can be united through the concept of 
personhood, life and logos. This distinction between bios and zoë thus had an influence 
on the performative character of the notion of personhood, shaping the management of 
bodies. As Esposito argues, the understanding and practice of this bios/zoë schism “is based 
on the assumed, continuously recurring separation between person as an artificial entity 
and the human as a natural being, whom the status of person may or may not benefit.”26 
The notion of person was thus not inherent to all human beings, but only to those endowed 
with political and social rights. Importantly, Esposito explains that those rights belong to 
23 Esposito, The Third Person, 2–3.
24 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), 1.
25 See Agnieszka Anna Wołodźko, “Between Bio(s) and Art – Intensities of Matter in Bioart,” in Innen - Außen 
- Anders: Körper im Werk von Gilles Deleuze und Michel Foucault, (eds) Ann-Cathrin Drews and Katharina D. 
Martin, (Edition Moderne Postmoderne. Publisher, Transcript Verlag, 2017), 221-236; in my article, I develop 
this differentiation between zoë and bios in the context of bioart’s practice and Braidotti’s understanding of bio-
egalitarian thinking.
26 Esposito, The Third Person, 9
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the idea of personhood and have been given with regard to the demonstration of possession 
of rational capacities and spirituality.27
 Through the notion of personhood, human beings can exercise the power over their 
“animal being”. This involves that, when deprived of personhood, one is not the owner of 
one’s body. At the same time, in order to own your body, the body itself must be deprived 
of the personhood. In that sense, personhood becomes something beyond carnality and, 
moreover, it is something shaped by the possibility of control over the body.
 On the grounds of this fundamental exclusion of non-human zoë from the sphere of 
human bios, Western thought and politics is said to construct its relation to the non-human 
– to the body – as a simple biological life, “disposable matter in the hands of the despotic 
force of unchecked power,”28 as Braidotti warns. Zoë has been considered to be a threshold 
of moral, social and cultural values, shaping the politics and practices of how subjectivities are 
constructed and managed. Zoë is a reminder of the bodily possibility of humans to become 
dehumanized and de-personalized. Furthermore, deprived of bios as a linguistic, social 
and moral realm of human existence, zoë marks the “human body’s capacity to be reduced 
to non-human.”29 Thus, when any form of egalitarian approach to zoë and bios emerged, 
implementing the dynamic and collective understanding of multibody, for some, it was a 
sign of a reductive phase.30 According to Agamben, for instance, bios/zoë egalitarianism is 
characterized as a time of decadence, revealing “the abyss of totalitarianism that constructs 
conditions of human passivity.”31 In other words, when the separation between bios and 
zoë has been abandoned, it is considered to cause humans’ continuous regression to the 
non-human. 
 However, as Rosi Braidotti argues, instead of treating the sphere of zoë in terms of 
negative dialectics about what threatens de-personalization and regression, exactly the 
sphere of non-person zoë promises a new kind of politics concerned with multibodies.32 
Since the problem that the notion of person promised to manage – that is, the formulation 
and guard of rights and dignity – is continuously blurred and broken, the notion of person 
should be dismantled as it induces inequality and divisions. On the grounds of sustaining the 
logic of rights and dignity, the notion of personhood gives premises to decisions about who 
has rights and who does not. Furthermore, contemporary discourses around personhood 
and ownership of the body, regardless of the politics, end up treating and presupposing the 
body to be a thing, focusing on who deserves life and who does not.33 As Esposito argues, 
27 Ibid., 11.
28 Braidotti, The Posthuman, (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), 120.
29 Ibid., 39.
30 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 4.
31 See Braidotti writing on Agamben’s radical opposition between zoë and bios in Rosi Braidotti, Transpositions: 
On Nomadic Ethics (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), 39.
32 Braidotti, The Posthuman, 60.
33 Esposito, The Third Person, 92.
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“personalization and depersonalization are nothing but different flows of the same process, 
one that is ancient in origin but whose effects are far from being exhausted.”34 Either the 
notion of the person or the pursuit of going against personhood as de-personalization 
channels the same logic of relation of exclusion governed by separation and subordination 
not only between humans, but also between humans and other species’ bodies and lives.
 Multibodies demand a different politics, one not based on the dialectical relation of 
negation, but rather on affirmative co-dependence. In the specific relation between bios 
and zoë, rather than focusing on the dialectics of exclusion that marks the commodifying 
practices over the bodies, the politics of multibodies can be shaped in a more affirmative 
way. Esposito’s analysis is crucial here, since, as he argues, what is shared by bios and zoë is 
not mutual opposition, but rather the shared dimension of impersonality. I argue that this 
notion of the impersonal, when acknowledged as an affirmative phenomenon generating 
rather than excluding bodies, can have a transformative impact on the politics of multibodies 
within affect. In order to grasp the scope of this impact, Lem’s notion of the multiple as a 
dynamic collective of Fox, which contaminates the habits of the logic of identity is crucial 
in this regard. 
 Fox is a temporary assemblage. The multiples of Fox are the mutating elements and 
materials that “uproot” their specificity within the encounter in favour of becoming-one-
with.35 Fox’s multiplicity does not aspire to culminate in or reach some desired form or 
identity.36 If they – the collective of Fox – have a goal, it is to continue the movement of 
laughing: “bunch of weirdos” the laughter laughs. Laughter as a movement that escapes 
containment and being pushed into a fixed state, is chaotic and contingent. The laughter 
of a mutating multibody is a nomadic movement that is about “blurring boundaries 
without burning bridges,” as Braidotti argues.37 In this way, the collective is produced and 
producing. To establish when one part begins or ends is impossible. The multiple slips in 
the very moment when one tries to point to or measure it. In the moment of measurement, 
the apparatus and what is being measured mingle into “complex agential intra-actions of 
multiple material-discursive practices”38 – into an intra-action movement of laughter, to 
use Karen Barad’s words.
 In thinking about an already multiple body, the notion of the collective is transformed 
from a sense of property into dynamic and relational phenomena. The agency of that 
collective is not something given or something that belongs to the nature of the body. 
Rather, it is a practice and an event of a continuous material and discursive encounter. 
In that sense, multiplicity is not a metaphor, but an actual, material socio-geographical 
34 Ibid., 99.
35 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 285.
36 Ibid., 24.
37 Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 4.
38 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2007), 140.
142 Chapter 4
happening.39 The multiplicity that we already are demands a rethinking of agency in terms 
of what we discussed in the first chapter along with Barad’s intra-action: 
the primary ontological units are not “things” but phenomena – dynamic 
topological reconfigurings I entanglements I relationalities I (re)articulations 
of the world. And the primary semantic units are not “words” but material-
discursive practices through which (ontic and semantic) boundaries are 
constituted. This dynamism is agency. Agency is not an attribute but the 
ongoing reconfigurings of the world. The universe is agential intra-activity 
in its becoming.40
Lem’s creation of the multiplicity of Fox, played by the actor Bogumił Kobiela, generates the 
imperceptibility of the continuously mutating layers using gestures, voices and the body’s 
movements [Figure 22]. In this way, the movie generates the dynamic play of mutation 
within multiplicity that is not linear and singular – it is not simply a matter of the problem 
of transplantation itself. It is not only the surgical cut that causes Fox’s body to become 
multiple, but also its multiple discursive and physical enactments, which play a role in 
generating this multiplicity. In other words, multiplicity as the event of intra-action happens 
on many layers, in the many folds of the impersonal – s/he/it.
 The impersonal, what I shall now call s/he/it (in subsequent sections I will reveal the 
importance of the sound of its pronunciation) is already situated in the personal, rather 
than outside of it. It is neither de-personal, it does not oppose the person, nor should it be 
presumed in terms of a personal pronoun such as “we,” which implies, after all, generalization 
and appropriation according to a given identity. The point is rather to change the logic that 
dominates the understanding of personhood – a logic and language that cannot actually 
talk about the body without presupposing the opposition between animal and vegetal 
dimensions and spiritual, rational ones. Multiplicity, rather than species and amounts, 
regards the dynamism of phenomena.
 Esposito proposes that the impersonal ought to be thought of in terms of the third 
person, which “means creating an opening to a set of forces that push it beyond its logical 
and even grammatical boundaries.”41 Notably, he stipulates that the third person should 
not be understood as another person. Unlike phenomenology, which, despite its claim 
to overcome the hierarchy between relating agents, thinking is driven by the logic of a 
39 “A figuration is a living map, a transformative account of the self—it’s no metaphor. It fulfils the purpose of 
finding suitable situated locations to make the difference between different locations. Being nomadic, homeless, 
a migrant, an exile, a refugee, a tourist, a rape-in-war victim, an itinerant migrant, an illegal immigrant, an 
expatriate, a mail-order bride, a foreign caretaker of the young or the elderly of the economically developed world, 
a global venture financial expert, a humanitarian relief worker in the UN global system, a citizen of a country that 
no longer exists (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union)—these are no metaphors, but social locations.” 
Braidotti, Nomadic Theory, chapter: "Introduction."
40 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 141.
41 Esposito, The Third Person, 14.
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constant opposition and reference between the first and second person, the third person 
initiates a different perspective. For Esposito, the third person “extends out of the logic of 
the person in favour of the different regime of meaning.”42 The impersonal is thought of in 
terms of the singular that, rather than operating within the system of rights, calls for a sense 
of responsibility and obligation.
Figure 22. Layer Cake, 1968, film frame; the lawyer is on the left, the multiple Richard Fox “is/are” on the 
right, http://www.iluzjon.fn.org.pl/filmy/info/1200/przekladaniec.html, accessed 17 March, 2017.
The new logic of the impersonal requires us “not to think the neutral […] but rather to think 
in the neutral.”43 However, while providing ways to think differently about the concept that 
can change politics, Esposito does not really explain how this different logic would work 
in practice. How would responsibility and obligation work differently from the system of 
rights? In other words, how, considering the changed logic and non-dialectical sense of 
relationality, would the notion of the impersonal work? What kind of implications would 
the impersonhood paradigm have for biopolitics, politics concerned with living bodies?
 John Protevi seems to go further than Esposito, suggesting that implementing affect in 
the politics of political physiology will allow us to break with the tradition of the radical split 
based on hierarchy and relation of exclusion between what is carnal and what is political. 
By implementing affect in political practice, we can find new strategies that, rather than 




“the ability of bodies to form assemblages with other bodies”44 where one body becomes 
a co-constitutive part of other body, affect allows us to think about the body in a political 
way, outside the regimes of personhood. Protevi described affect as being already political, 
giving a particular ethical shape to politics that is organized according to questions such 
as: “Does the encounter produce active joyous affect? Does it increase the puissance of the 
bodies, that is, does it enable them to form new and mutually empowering encounters 
outside the original encounter?”45
 I argue, therefore, that, through affect as the onto-epistemological understanding 
of bodies coupled with the impersonhood logic of thinking about their agency, we can 
construct, as Protevi signals, not only a new shape of politics, but also new practices. My 
approach responds thus to the multiple character of bodies, where it is not comparison 
and application as a means of treatment that is practiced, but the mapping of relations 
of significance according to what stimulates the power of multibodies to multiply. In this 
way, what is important for the body to continue its conatus is the measure of politics. 
As Braidotti argues, such politics would focus on the increase in bodies’ power (here 
understood as potentia), rather than exercising the law and rights over them (power as 
potestas). It is thus politics that sustains relations, by keeping the processes of change and 
transformation floating. As such, affective politics is not about maintaining the status quo, 
but about “feeding” the multiplicity with more relations that accelerate s/he/it’s capacity to 
have more relations.46
 Overcoming the bios/zoë dichotomy requires creating strategies for multibody politics 
and practice. For Braidotti, the bios/zoë egalitarianism of co-construction has deep ethico-
political consequences. It gives way to a non-anthropocentric shift in thinking, which she 
calls “bio-centred egalitarianism.”47 However, this egalitarianism should not be understood 
as a lack of difference that subsumes all into the one category of “we”. What the concept of 
multibodies forces us to encounter goes beyond the notion of belonging to something. Its 
relational, impersonal dimension hints rather at the notion of belonging-with that is beyond 
species division. Moreover, as Braidotti argues, such bio-centred egalitarianism would lead 
directly to a new relationship with the non-human through the multiplicity of the body; 
and, as she further argues, this capacity seems to be already embedded in the practices and 
discoveries of the life sciences: “Contemporary scientific practices have forced us to touch 
44 John Protevi, Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2009), 49.
45 Ibid., 51.
46 Affective politics “[…] has to do with the capacity to endure, to “sustain” the process of change or transformation. 
Duration and endurance are also ethical categories to do with sustainability, not just aesthetics one. Sustainability 
emerges (again) as the guiding principle of these intensive methods of analysis.” Braidotti, Nomadic Theory, 
chapter 8: "Complexity Against Methodological Nationalism."   
47 Rosi Braidotti, Transpositions, 37.
Living Within a Multibody 145
the bottom of some inhumanity that connects to the human precisely in the immanence of 
its bodily materialism.”48
 In the next section, I will discuss how the scientific findings in life science already expose 
the fact that multiplicity is not only discursive and conceptual, but, rather awkwardly, a 
physical phenomenon that we still need to confront. In order to grasp the challenges and 
possibilities of practicing multibodies, we will look at today’s biotechnological multibodies. 
Even Lem could not predict the physical dimension of multiplicity that is the multiplicity of 
the microbiome that we already are. 
4.4 Contaminant S like S/H(e)/It
In February 2016, Leiden University Medical Centrum opened the Netherlands’ first 
faecal bank, Nederlandse Donor Faeces Bank (NDFB).49 Since 2012, when the first stool 
bank OpenBiome, The Microbiome Health Research Institute, was launched in Medford, 
Massachusetts (United States), faeces banks had only opened in France and the United 
Kingdom.50 Although institutionally in its infancy, the first documented faecal 
transplantation, used to treat food poisoning and severe diarrhoea, took place over 1700 
years ago, in China, and was performed by someone called Ge Hong.51 Known in the 
sixteenth century as yellow soup, a euphemism designed to distract from the origin of 
the medicine, faecal transplantation was employed to treat abdominal diseases, fever and 
vomiting.52
 However, despite the reach and long medical history of the treatment, the procedure 
has only recently been standardized in Western medical practice, resulting in the growing 
presence of donor banking and commodification of the “healthy” stool.53 Known today 
as faecal microbiota transplantation [FMT], it is the transplantation of filtered stool 
from a healthy donor into the gut of the patient with a particular disease, for instance, 
48 Rosi Braidotti, “Locating Deleuze’s Eco-Philosophy between Bio/Zoe-Power and Necro-Politics,” in Deleuze and 
Law, (eds) Rosi Braidotti, Claire Colebrook et al. (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2009), 96–116.
49 ‘Nederlands Eerste Feces-Transplantatiebank Geopend in Het LUMC | LUMC’ [First Netherland's Faecal 
Transplantation Bank opened in the LUMC - Leiden University Medical Center], https://www.lumc.nl/over-het-
lumc/nieuws/2016/februari/Nederlands-eerste-feces-transplantatiebank-geopend-in-het-LUMC/, accessed 18 
June 2016.
50 Tina Amirtha, “Banking on Stool despite an Uncertain Future,” Science 352, no. 6291 (June 9, 2016): 1261, doi.
org/10.1126/science.352.6291.1261.
51 Faming Zhang et al., “Should We Standardize the 1,700-Year-Old Faecal Microbiota Transplantation?,” The 
American Journal of Gastroenterology 107, no. 11 (November 2012): 1755, doi:10.1038/ajg.2012.251.
52 Ibid., 1755.
53 If you live in the US, provided that you are healthy, not obese and under 50, your faeces can be worth 40 dollars 
per sample. In the Netherlands, payment for any organ donation is banned, but the faecal bank charges the patient 
145 euros per faecal dose. See Amirtha, “Banking on Stool despite an Uncertain Future,” 1261–62.
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Clostridium difficile infection.54 The procedure, which aims to restore the balance of the 
gut microbiome can be carried out using a nasogastric or nasoduodenal tube (insertion 
through nose), a colonoscope or enema (insertion through the rectum), or by ingestion of 
capsule (insertion through mouth).55 Since its standardization, it has proved successful in 
treating the Clostridium difficile infection, and is considered to be a promising option for 
treating other diseases. However, the indecisiveness of the results and the vagueness of the 
policies relating to this method is simply due to the fact that studies of the microbiome have 
only recently adopted a non-pathogenic focus, revealing a more symbiotic understanding 
of its role.
 Most importantly, the procedure of faecal transplantation reveals not only the multiple 
character of our bodies, that we are already multiple, but also that, within our practices and 
ways of living, we are highly dependent on the multiple that we are. The multiple does not 
only occur through the transplantation of bodies as in Layer Cake; indeed, the multiple is 
a way of our being. This shift in approach has not only started to change medical practice, 
but also our thinking about who we are, and how our bodies may live within multiple socio-
cultural spheres. 
 Since 90 per cent of our cells are said to belong to these microbes,56 which are basically 
bacteria, archaea, fungi, viruses, protists, and microscopic animals,57 the researchers now 
induce a new image of the body, suggesting that we have always been multiple. Their 
early findings raise serious questions regarding the bio/zoë politics of exclusion. While 
destroying the old autonomous and hierarchical image of bodies and the idea of health, 
the researchers also consider the gut microbiota to influence and shape our emotion and 
thought,58 blurring comfortable boundaries between reason and emotion, between mind 
and body. 
 The “newly” discovered lack of distinction between our faculties and organs, between 
human and non-human, which grant microbiota a great influence on our way of thinking, 
renders Lem’s speculation to “come true.” With each transplantation, we not only get new 
microbiota, but, as some researchers argue, we become that microbiota59 – we appear 
54 Faith Rohlke and Neil Stollman, “Fecal Microbiota Transplantation in Relapsing Clostridium Difficile Infection,” 
Therapeutic Advances in Gastroenterology 5, no. 6 (November 2012): 403 20, doi.org/10.1177/1756283X12453637.
55 Hyun Ho Choi and Young-Seok Cho, “Faecal Microbiota Transplantation: Current Applications, Effectiveness, 
and Future Perspectives,” Clinical Endoscopy 49, no. 3 (2016): 257, doi:10.5946/ce.2015.117.
56 Janice Dietert and Rodney Dietert, “The Sum of Our Parts | The Scientist Magazine®,” The Scientist, http://www.
the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/43379/title/The-Sum-of-Our-Parts/, accessed 23 May 2016.
57 Vanessa Rivera Amill, “The Human Microbiome and the Immune System: An Ever Evolving Understanding,” 
Journal of Clinical & Cellular Immunology 5, no. 6 (2014): 1.
58 There is “growing realization that the gut–brain axis, the bidirectional communication between the digestive 
tract and the brain, plays a key role in maintaining brain health and the stress response.” Timothy G. Dinan and 
John F. Cryan, “Mood by Microbe: Towards Clinical Translation,” Genome Medicine 8, no. 36 (2016): 1.
59 Rosamond Rhodes, Nada Gligorov, and Abraham Paul Schwab, (eds) The Human Microbiome: Ethical, Legal and 
Social Concerns, 1st edition (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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to have much in common with the multibody of Fox, always in a state of becoming and 
transformation.
 Nevertheless, when closely considered, there is a tint of old presupposition in the new 
discoveries of our multiple microbiomes. As if we were enacting the Layer Care ourselves, 
the old categories of identity, ownership and personhood continue to be applied, despite 
their inability to grasp the multiplicity and collectiveness of microbiome. The transformative 
capacities of multibodies that we are, seem to be wasted. In order to understand how the 
practice of multibodies is possible, we must critically analyse the present medical discourses 
on microbiome, which seem unable to grasp the radical political and cultural shifts caused 
by their findings.
4.5 Facing Superorganization
The research on microbiome beyond antiseptic aims has its grand beginning in the Human 
Microbiome Project (HMP) founded in 2008. Similar to the Human Genome Project 
(HGP), a previous project on this kind of extensive and interdisciplinary scale, the HMP 
aims at “comprehensive examination of microbial communities” in human bodies and 
“analysis of its role in human health and disease.”60 Since its establishment, the awareness 
of the vast implications, not only for medical, but also environmental, social and simply 
humanistic (ontological) understanding of the human and self, has been thus expanding. 
The first major conclusion of such an awareness is the propagation of a new image of a 
body. Analogous to the revelation of the HGP, whose researchers proudly announced that 
we can put the information about humans on one CD, scientists are now talking about 
human bodies as “superorganisms.” 
 The conceptualization of our bodies within the frame of a “superorganization” seems 
to reflect an understanding that bodies not only construct parasitic relationships, but also 
non-pathogenic, mutually symbiotic alliances.61 The necessary entanglements of microbes 
with the immune system has been recognized as making microbes not only as other bodies 
residing in our body, but rather an “essential part of ourselves.”62 Such mutually symbiotic 
60 “Human Microbiome Project DACC - About the HMP,” http://hmpdacc.org/overview/about.php, accessed 23 
May 2016.
61 The symbiotic nature of microbes has been researched by Lynn Margulis since the late 1960s. However, her work 
on endosymbiosis, which shows that all organisms derive from symbiosis with bacteria, blurring the established 
boundaries not only between species but also disciplines, has not been without contestation, and was often declared 
to be “the botanical myth;” see Antonio Lazcano and Juli Peretó, “On the Origin of Mitosing Cells: A Historical 
Appraisal of Lynn Margulis Endosymbiotic Theory,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, The origin of mitosing cells: 
50th anniversary of a classic paper by Lynn Sagan (Margulis), 434, no. Supplement C (December 7, 2017): 80–87, 
doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.06.036. See also Lynn Margulis, Symbiotic Planet: A New Look At Evolution, revised 
edition (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
62 Richard L. Gallo, Thomas Hultsch, and Lauge Farnaes, “Recognizing That the Microbiome Is Part of the Human 
Immune System Will Advance Treatment of Both Cancer and Infections,” Journal of the American Academy of 
Dermatology 74, no. 4 (April 2016): 772.
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relations between our bodies and microbes leads to the conclusion that “microbiome not 
only affects us but is in fact ‘us’.”63
 Regardless, however, of the conceptual potential to unsettle the given human 
boundaries, from which we can deduce that we have actually never been human, many 
scholars continue to follow the old logic. The potential of contaminating multiplicity for 
transformation seems to go unnoticed, since contamination is seen according to the logic 
of purity. In their persistence in writing about our bodies as forms of a super organization 
between different species, they call for the necessity to rethink the sense of personhood and 
self with regard to the criteria of personal medicine. Rather than focusing on a dynamic 
approach to health, there is a tendency to look for individualization of treatments that 
would be better equipped for treating such a complex “super” organization. As a result, in 
28 mostly medical publications on microbiome ethics, funded by HMP, the authors point 
out the “dramatic implications for how we think of ourselves because it [the microbiome] 
challenges the view of ourselves as atomistic individual organisms.”64 As they notice, the 
growth of bacteria is dynamic and highly interactive with the surroundings, which render 
our bodies equally dynamic and interconnected with them. 
Human evolution is not just human history, but the story of our interaction 
with the viruses, fungi, and bacteria that inhabit us. Learning more about the 
microbiome is likely to change the way medicine is practiced. It may also have 
implications for our social and legal systems.65
 
With such a strong co-relation and co-existence, there are problems of personhood and 
identity, property and privacy that need to be rethought.66
 Indeed, these problems, which result from the newly discovered and hypothesized 
roles of microbiomes, may appear even more profound than the implications of biobanks, 
biopiracy, life commodification and gene patenting combined. Although the understanding 
of microbiome is still in its infancy, it has already been indicated that the microbiome of, 
for instance, our faeces, “may tell the story of where I have been and with whom I have 
associated.”67 Such findings pose a challenge to the growing demand for stool banking 
and faecal transplantation, which renders the stool yet another commodity. After all, 
your own stool holds much more information on and have an actual material influence in 
shaping who you are than a DNA sample. Moreover, since microbiome is inheritable, it also 
carries information about our parents, families and previous generations. Such a relational 
understanding of microbiome should radically change our focus from an essentialist and 
63 Ibid.
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identity inquiry into what the body is, to the Spinozian question of what it does and how 
we should practice bodies. From our Spinozian perspective, the urgent question is thus 
how may politics and habits radically change their relevancy in the face of such ongoing 
mutating and relating multiplicity?
 In recent decades, we have concentrated on preventing the manipulation of the 
genome. Any attempt to transform the body on the genetic level has been fiercely debated 
and monitored. The fear of an irreversible mutation has been heightened following the 
invention of “cheap, quick and easy” CRISPR technology for gene editing.68 CRISPR has 
reinvigorated not only the discussion on designer babies and human enhancement,69 but 
also the fear of heritable changes in the genome that this technology implies.70 However, 
with the new findings on the role and function of microbiome we are already susceptible to 
cross-generation modulations. Focused on the “bio-technological,” we have neglected the 
everyday contamination and generation of our bodies by such factors as our lifestyles, what 
and how we eat, our hygiene and even with whom, human and non-human, we associate. 
Each encounter renders material modulations and structural changes. Contaminations 
happen already imperceptibly, without a surgical intervention, a dose of medicine or gene 
therapy. We are already multiple, mutating and transforming without the scalpel. The HMP 
scientists raise the spectre of losing what, after all, was never there, namely the fixed and 
autonomous body. Does this mean further restriction of not only biotechnological practice, 
but also our everyday socio-cultural life?
 Imagine how life might be if we insist on applying the old categories of identity and 
autonomy as our standard of ethics and understanding of law and politics? We might wake 
up one day in a world where there are obligatory microbioscans before you are allowed 
to enter a building, or before you are accepted to some institution, granted insurance or 
simply served in a shop. However, it can be otherwise. The multibody that we are may foster 
different ways of thinking and practicing multibodies. We could live in a culture where each 
house has an in-built pet microbiome garden as standard, as common as a running water or 
having a bathroom in Western societies. Future generations of pupils may take animal care 
classes and have obligatory lessons not just in maths and languages, but in gardening. The 
entire system of education might be designed in a way that could implement knowledge of 
how to practice and generate new microbiome relations and alliances, rather than fostering 
neoliberal self-care and autonomous self-improvement. 
68 CRISPR (clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats) technology allows for the quickly editing 
and modelling of the DNA of any organism in accordance with a desired aim. It is particularly appropriate for use 
in gene therapy. See Heidi Ledford, “CRISPR, the Disruptor,” Nature News 522, no. 7554 (June 4, 2015): 23, https://
doi.org/10.1038/522020a.
69 With CRISPR, the implications of gene editing may be close to those depicted, for instance, in the movie Gattaca 
(1997), where social inequalities are enforced by the economic and cultural demand for human enhancement. 
See, for instance, Antonio Regalado “Engineering the Perfect Baby,” MIT Technology Review, https://www.
technologyreview.com/s/535661/engineering-the-perfect-baby/, accessed 22 June 2016.
70 Ledford, “CRISPR, the Disruptor.
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However, the scholars of HMP, instead of initiating new conceptual thinking that would 
allow for relational scenarios and habits, seem to want to examine whether the multiple 
relationality with microbes “will influence our conception of who we are.”71 Their worry 
regarding the influence of microbes on the concept of self reveals the actual power of 
existing categories. To put it differently, their concern is how to adapt the multiplicity of our 
bodies to the given categories of identity and law. Instead of asking how we can change those 
categories, which have proven insufficient for grasping the complexity and plasticity of the 
impersonality of multiplicity, the trend is now to come up with new policies of control and 
management. In the face of their findings, the HMP researchers are unable to think other 
than within the laws of personhood and identity. In other words, they prefer to expand what 
Agamben distinguished as bios on what is left of zoë. 
 The quest to adjust the multiple, rhizomathic, non-hierarchical way of life of microbes 
into the logic of identity upholds the existing opposition and hierarchies of bios. By 
strengthening given identity schemes, the patterns of practices are also strengthened and 
enforced. The ideas that urges us to take responsibility for maintaining the health of the 
super-other that is the microbiome is just one example.72
 Heather Paxson described the practice of a continuation of the status quo within 
biopolitics regardless of the new findings a “pasteurian practice.” As she argues, “pasteurian 
practices configure microbes as elements to be eliminated so that human politics might be 
cultivated.”73 Today’s calls for the care of your microbes as the care of self is inscribed in 
antiseptic societies driven by the presupposition of autonomy, demanding protection on 
the basis of clear identification of the excluded other. Paxson thus signals a post-pasteurian 
move, particularly in the dairy industry, that goes “beyond an antiseptic attitude to embrace 
mould and bacteria as allies.”74 The creation of new alliances, rather than protection of 
the old autonomies, is thus a growing trend in the way of thinking about bacteria. What is 
more, such practice of an open relationality with the microbiome will not only change the 
food industry, but, as Paxson argues, has deep ontological consequences for the way how we 
think and act as humans. The final acknowledgment of multiple alliances of bacteria may 
change our already distorted view of humans and the social world:
Pasteurianism is a biopolitics predicated on the indirect control of human 
bodies through direct control overmicrobial bodies. It contributes to the 
production of rational risk-minimizing subjects and to a governmentality 
devoted to managing public risk.75
71 Rhodes, Gligorov, and Schwab, The Human Microbiome, 55.
72 Ibid., 70.
73 Heather Paxson, “Post-Pasteurian Cultures: The Microbiopolitics of Raw-Milk Cheese in the United States,” 
Cultural Anthropology 23, no. 1 (2008): 17.
74 Ibid., 18.
75 Ibid., 36.
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Post-pasteurian practices urge working with the microbes rather than against them. Yet, 
as Paxson warns, the post-pasteurian emphasis on working with bacteria may become a 
new trend in terms of industries driven by profit, which, rather than changing politics, will 
only strengthen the neoliberal belief in the right to individual autonomy. The discovery of 
the crucial role of microbes for our existence, regardless of the intensity of the relation that 
actually makes what it means to be human, may ultimately lead to even more self-centred 
biopolitics of governance. If the care of the self is to care for microbes, the economic and 
industrial applications of obligatory microbiome scanning may be just the start in the era 
hyper-biopolitics. 
 The future of omnipresent scanning, under the premise of care of self, may not only deny 
the relational character of bodies, it may also control and govern those very relations in the 
shape of “superbiopolitics” for our “superorganisms”. These futuristic visions might not be 
as dystopian as they seem considering recent findings about the inheritability of microbes. 
We inherit microbes’ deficiencies and diversities just like we inherit our genotypes.76 It is 
also said that we release a particular microbial cloud that is distinct for each “individual.” For 
some scientists, these findings lead to such disturbingly short-sighted conclusions as easy 
invigilation: “individual personal microbial clouds clearly suggest a forensic application 
for indoor bioaerosols, for example to detect the past presence of a person in an indoor 
space.”77 
 Microbiome researchers tend to be unable to grasp the potential of their findings for the 
philosophical conceptualization of bodies, which may actually change legal and political 
practices and, consequently, our lives. The radical gap between philosophy and life science 
is compounded by the need and demand for ready-made applicability of new scientific 
findings onto existing practices. The inability to understand the dynamism of both thought 
and the materiality of bodies leads to a continuously expanding gap between those two 
spheres of multibodies. How can we not only practice, but construct ways of practicing 
multibodies that would allow for the open spaces that enable the further growth, mutation 
and flourishing of multibodies? In other words, how can we construct the conditions for 
practicing bodies within affect – practicing relations of contaminations for the multibodies 
that we are? We need to consider methods of actions that would be applicable and 
understandable not only for philosophical discourse, but also for a scientific one. In the 
next section, I will discuss the mechanism that drives multibodies and which itself can be 
considered to condition the unconditioned – the immunity of the multibody.
76 Eric C. Martens, “Microbiome: Fibre for the Future,” Nature 529, no. 7585 (14 January 2016): 158–59.
77 James F. Meadow et al., “Humans Differ in Their Personal Microbial Cloud,” PeerJ 3 (2015): 17.
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4.6 The Immunity of the Multibody
While medical researchers are focused on personalized medicine for the superorganism, 
in our concern with bodies, the body’s dynamic and its multiple character, the microbial 
relationality triggers a new spark in terms of thinking beyond personhood and the 
mechanism of biopolitics that drives it. Having considered a different logic, mapped by 
Deleuze as difference or Karen Barad’s understanding of methodologies of diffraction, we 
already have the tools to conceptualize the politics of multibodies. From the dissensus, 
understood by Ranciére as “not a confrontation between interests or opinions […] [but as] 
the demonstration (manifestation) of a gap in the sensible itself,”78 we can think beyond the 
polarized politics of exclusion. The question is whether we dare to think with rather than 
against the microbiome?
 Haraway has long claimed that understanding dissensus as a dynamic gap that is 
a performative feature of multibodies evokes the character of the immune system. 
Her writings became almost prophetic with the discovery that our immune system is a 
microbiome: “the immune system is an elaborate icon for principal system of symbolic and 
material “difference” in late capitalism.”79 She argues that there is a powerful and dynamic 
language of biomedicine that is never stable and yet it can shape the socio-politics of bodies 
and selves. The dynamism of biomedical language has the power to generate multiple 
understandings rather than representations of particular ideas and imagination:
The immune system is a historically specific terrain, where global and local 
politics; Nobel Prize-winning research; heteroglossic cultural productions, 
from popular dietary practices, feminist science fiction, religious imagery, 
and children’s games, to photographic techniques and military strategic 
theory; clinical medical practice; venture capital investment strategies; 
world-changing developments in business and technology; and the deepest 
personal and collective experiences of embodiment, vulnerability, power, and 
mortality interact with an intensity matched perhaps only in the biopolitics 
of sex and reproduction.80
 
Such a wide and relational understanding of immunity, which crosses disciplines, bodies and 
times, has a material grounding in the complexity and relationality of the carnal body. “The 
immune system is everywhere and nowhere,”81 Haraway notes. Its physical characteristics 
are that of an open system, which, although dynamic and mutable, functions in order 
78 Jacques Rancière, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, trans. Steven Corcoran, (London/New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2010), 38.
79 Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, (New York: Routledge, 1990), 204.
80 Ibid., 204–5.
81 Ibid., 218.
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to maintain coherence in the necessary ongoing relationality. As Haraway concludes, 
immunity is, in that sense, “shared specificity.” It is: 
semi-permeable self able to engage with others (human and non-human, 
inner and outer), but always with finite consequences; of situated possibilities 
and impossibilities of individuation and identification; and of partial fusions 
and dangers. The problematic multiplicities of postmodern selves, so 
potently figured and repressed in the lumpy discourses of immunology, must 
be brought into other emerging Western and multi-cultural discourses on 
health, sickness, individuality, humanity, and death.82
Esposito, although inspired by Haraway’s argument that, through looking at immunity as 
a relational open system, we can change our understanding of self, signals the historical 
contradiction of that pursuit. Immunity, after all, carries a highly dialectical understanding 
of bodies. Common conceptualization of immunity system is based on the exclusion 
of the other, which it is necessary to be immune from. The relationship with the other 
that immunity is about is not based on distance, but rather on reciprocal determination 
and condition. It has “the dialectical figure […] of exclusionary inclusion or exclusion 
by inclusion.”83 Such a relation, inscribed in the understanding of immunity, is based on 
negation; it is driven by negation and succeeded by it. 
 How, then, would a relation that is not based on exclusion actually work? Esposito finds 
an answer by comparing the socio-political function of community with the biological 
understanding of immunity of a living body as discussed by Haraway. He asks, how can 
we adopt Haraway’s biological understanding of immunity into biopolitics while avoiding 
the most violent and military symbolism that immunity carries? How can we understand 
immunity that does not work for the centre, identity or community that it is designed to 
protect, but rather works for the non-personhood of the multibody? As Esposito points 
out, the biological understanding of immunity that emerged with the discovery of 
vaccines and medical bacteriology between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries 
is characterized by the sense of reaction. Immunity does not exist as its own force, but 
rather it presupposes “the ills” that it is about to fight or respond to.84 Can we think about 
immunity in a non-dialectical way? Can we re-shift its negative management in a way that 
would remain political? As he argues: “The route to be taken can only pas through the same 
object that it intends to deconstruct; not by negating it, but rather by deepening the internal 
contradiction.”85
82 Ibid., 225.




Esposito sees the change in our understanding of the immune system not in the relation 
of negating the negation, but rather in affirming the negation, similar to Deleuze’s 
understanding of waste, which affirms the forgetting. The difference, negation, and 
heterogeneity is what drives the immune system: 
the immune system must be interpreted as an internal resonance chamber, 
like the diaphragm through which difference, as such, engages and traverses 
us. As we were saying: once its negative power has been removed, the immune 
is not the enemy of the common, but rather something more complex that 
implicates and stimulates the common.86
In other words, once we overcome the view of the body and self as a closed system, the notion 
of immunity changes its function. While within a biopolitical understanding of bodies 
everything accumulated within the boundaries of closed systems, the understanding of a 
much more relational and open character of bodies addresses the process of “technicization 
of life.”87
 The body is no longer a philosophically given concept or a biologically given 
phenomenon. To reiterate Spinoza, we literally do not know what the body can do. The 
polarization of biopolitics, grounded in an immunity-community dialectical understanding, 
cannot be the method for grasping the explosive and dynamic character of the multibody. 
As Esposito argues, the old polarization of outside-inside, in which understanding the 
human and self required protecting it from outside, has shifted. Now, with research on 
the non-pathogenic role of microbiome, we have realised how the outside penetrates the 
inside at the ontological level, rendering the inside-outside distinction meaningless. The 
multispecies bodies establish a multi-layered, bio-socio-historical ecosystem within which 
the constant encounter and contamination with each other guarantees the formation of 
‘self ’. The immunity of the body that is already multiple thus becomes its relationality 
and capacity for transformation. In other words, we can now say that affect is the body’s 
immunity: “this is an interaction between species, or even between the organic world and 
the artificial world, implying a veritable interruption of biological evolution by natural 
selection and its inscription into a different system of meaning.”88
  The actual methods of practicing the multibodies include creating relational spaces that 
have a particular character – they must allow the collective assemblage of the multibody to 
continue to mutate, to continue to grow and to transform – and that continue to contaminate. 
In practice, the approach that results from affect combined with the logic of impersonhood 
would mean implementing the logic of immunity. The immunity of the multibody requires 




Living Within a Multibody 155
It is a difficult and brave method. It would involve, for instance, caring for the health of the 
body by multiplying s/he/it’s many relationalities, rather than protecting it by any antiseptic 
means. Understanding how the immunity of the multibody may be practiced can be seen by 
examining how this tension between multiplicity and identity is present within the works of 
bioart.
 Today, many bioartists directly tap into the layered materialities of microbiome. The 
imagination of that which is invisible to the naked eye became the most intriguing aspect 
of multispecies alliances for many artists. Often, however, in an affirmative approach 
that celebrates the admiration for our multiplicity, the works with bacteria exercise the 
radical processual openness and mutability of bodies. Julia Lohmann and her Co-existence, 
2009 [Figure 23 a, b], which systematizes and classifies the bacteria of our body in Petri 
dishes, forming a complete portrait of the human body, seems to be a representation of 
multiplicity, an affirmation of its discovery, rather than its exercise. Although important 
for raising awareness about the multiple character of the body, the illustrative nature of the 
work cannot initiate the multibodies’ practice. It seems insufficient to only represent the 
multiplicity, one should also think and create with the multiplicity.
 Sonja Bäumel’s work with bacteria, for example, is an ongoing practice of finding the 
new possibility of relationality with that which is imperceptible, but which constitutes our 
way of being. She persistently searches for new conditions of relations by securing spaces 
of bacterial growth, mutation and the appearance of multiplicity. In her work, she creates 
the space not only for the visualization of the bacteria, but for their growth. By securing 
the space for transformations, she makes tangible the encounter with the tension between 
the habits of self and the experience of multiplicity. Her Expanded Self II, 2015 [Figure 24], 
a project to grow your own bodily microbiome self – basically a huge petri dish filled with 
agar, onto which the artist imprinted her whole body – becomes a way of encountering the 
struggle to confront and live within multiplicity. 
Figure 23 a, b. Julia Lohmann, Co-existence, 2009, http://www.julialohmann.co.uk/work/gallery/co-
existence-wellcome-trust/, accessed 17 March 2017.
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Figure 24. Sonja Bäumel, Expanded Self II, 2015, http://www.sonjabaeumel.at/work/bacteria/expanded-
self-2, accessed 17 March 2017.
The fascination with the newly discovered symbiotic nature of bacteria and the relational 
character of our bodies has exploded into numerous artistic projects and designs for 
textiles, clothing, tools and furniture made from and with bacteria. A number of bioartists 
and biodesigners have produced a disturbing confirmation of the commodification of the 
premature readiness to apply newly discovered materialities. Some seem to perpetuate the 
old ideas and categories regarding life matter, i.e. that in order to be encountered, life must 
be commodified, turned into a sphere of understandable bios. 
 Projects such as Biocouture by Suzanne Lee [Figure 25] and Aniela Hoitink’s Mycelium 
Textile [Figure 26], which use bacteria to literally grow garments, or Jalila Essaïdi’s Mestic 
that transforms manure into materials such as plastic, textile and paper89 showcase a new 
generation of artists and designers that are already working with an understanding of the 
relational character of bodies, of how bodies’ sustainability is grounded in an ongoing 
need for new alliances and transformations. Nevertheless, while expanding and generating 
new material relations in their approach to bodies, such projects might also prompt a new 
industry of commodified species. Rather than becoming our companions, microbiome may 
be granted the status of low-cost labourers. 
 Multibodies demand the creation of relations of tensions and of an open system of 
stimulations. Importantly, following the method of non-dialectical immunity, those 
relations must be of a particular kind. They cannot destroy the s/he/it multiplicity, but 
rather, through multiplication and openness to new relations, they must enable further 
multiplication, transformation and mutation. The creations of spaces of tension, while 
enabling further transformations, is the immunity method of multibodies politics – 
microbiopolitics.
89 Jalila Essaidi, Mestic®, http://jalilaessaidi.com/cowmanure/, accessed 10 July 2017.
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Figure 25. Suzanne Lee, Biocouture, 2012-, https://www.dezeen.com/2014/02/12/movie-biocouture-
microbes-clothing-wearable-futures/, accessed 17 March 2017. 
Figure 26. Aniela Hoitink, Mycelium Textile, 2016-, http://neffa.nl/portfolio/mycotex/, accessed 17 March 
2017.
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4.7 Contaminant A like the Agency of Microbiome Security 
This is not a project about dystopian tomorrow. 
The MSA is interested creating options in the world.90
Figure 27. The Microbiome Security Agency, 2015, http://welcometothemsa.com/, accessed 17 March 
2017.
Instead of following the logic of exclusion, which fosters the fear of losing the autonomy, 
control and mastery of the body with the conviction that, without biopolitics we will enter 
a total chaos of dehumanization, the Microbiome Security Agency (MSA), 2015 [Figure 
27] project affirms the multiplicity by multiplying the encounters. “We’re interested in a 
proactive approach to creating a future we want to inhabit by creating options to work with 
in a complex world filled with unknowns and promise.”91 MSA formulates its practice in 
the context of ongoing research on microbiome, such as that of HMP, where the extent of 
the mutually symbolic nature of microbiome and “our” body is such that it is impossible to 
distinguish or separate them. MSA’s work is thus a direct response to the scientific findings, 
albeit in a unique, non-dialectical way. They do not negate or criticize, but rather expose the 
multiplicity by multiplication and transformation itself.
 The MSA imagines ways of creating paths of responsibilities with regard to the 
multiplicities that we find ourselves embedded with. Although the name of the group might 
indicate some form of security action that has a military and dialectical character, the actual 
90 Emma Dorothy Conley, Bio Art & Design Awards, http://www.badaward.nl/tag/emma-dorothy-conley/, 
accessed 19 May 2016.
91 Ibid. 
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practice is quite different. Rather than keeping laws and old categories that express the 
historical role of immunity, MSA creates ways of acting within an open system. They use 
methods driven by the non-dialectic logic of immunity. They explore three possibilities 
that might be applied when working with the microbiome, but one method seems to be 
the most appealing. Imagine that instead of the antiseptic trends that have dominated our 
biopolitically governed cultures, we obscured the convenient borders with an omnipresent 
multiplication.
 MSA’s experiments involve three ways of investigating microbiome: 
1. TRACKING the changes of the skin microbiome over time.
2. DESTROYING the DNA of bacteria in faecal samples using household products.
3. OBSCURING the skin microbiome by creating an “Obscuration Solution” from a 
diverse selection of bacteria.92 
The first, tracking experiment works on the presupposition of identity. The consideration 
that once you know what to look for, you can point it out, distinguish it and extract it. The 
second experiment is about the most effective ways to destroy particular bodies. In the 
catalogue that accompanies the project, the group provides diagrams detailing the amounts 
and intensities of treatments for each body and the results of each destruction. Nevertheless, 
only the third experiment, “obscuring”, seems to respond to the actual character of the 
multiplicity of microbiome and our mutual relationality. 
 Rather than struggling to identify bacteria in order to destroy them using the most 
common antiseptic products, such as acetone or alcohol, we can work with them. Thus, the 
MSA proposes a process of anonymization:
The bacteria in and on our bodies is useful and necessary for many health 
reasons. Therefore, it is better to obscure it than to destroy it. In addition, we 
found that DIY destruction of bacteria in faecal samples proved less effective 
than we predicted. In this experiment we aimed to create an “obscuration 
solution” that would anonymize the bacteria on your skin by essentially 
adding noise.93
The process to obscure the data involved collecting bodies known to be rich in bacteria, 
such as faeces, kefir, époisses cheese, kombucha, and soil. All these bodies were then blended 
together and, from this multibody, the DNA mixture was “extracted, amplified, and then 
added to mediums to be applied to the skin.”94 Whether such an obscuration works when 
applied to the skin is still being researched. Yet, as the MSA argues, the more bodies in 
92 MSA, exhibition catalogue, Bio Art & Design Awards, 2015, 42.
93 MSA exhibition catalogue, 52
94 Ibid.
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the mixture, the more likely the effect of obscuration. Instead of destroying and keeping 
clean what is given, conforming with what Paxson described as a “pasteurian culture” that 
is dominated by antiseptic politics,95 MSA introduces noise. They multiply according to 
anonymity, or better, non-personhood. We are not disappearing, but only multiplying our 
non-personhood, our s/he/it, rendering the very sense of identity meaningless [Figure 28 
a, b].
 The scattering of self to the point of anonymity, the protection of anonymity to the 
point of obscuration and scattering, proposed by the MSA project, becomes a method of 
resistance. This resistance is not a dialectic that makes one “stand opposed to the order of 
things, but simultaneously avoids the risk involved with trying to overturn that order,”96 
as Ranciére describes it. Rather, MSA’s notion of resistance actualizes Braidotti’s nomad – 
resistance generated from within the system. MSA performs an obscuration for the sake of 
protecting difference, sustaining the messiness and noisiness of multibodies: 
In ecosystems, there are always winners and losers. There are always 
negotiations and exchanges of power. As we understand our human bodies as 
a multi-species, yes we will need to adapt our human politics to encompass our 
multi-species selves, and not just our individual selves. But more importantly, 
I hope the 21st century marks a paradigm shift in the way we consider “the 
self ”: I hope we start to understand that we, as humans, are part of (and not 
somehow outside of) the ecosystems that we contribute to and that support 
and sustain our lives.97
In this way, MSA creates ways of practicing microbiopolitics for multibodies. Without 
dialectical negation and within the system of multiple relations, they create spaces of 
continuous tension.
95 Heather Paxson, “Microbiopolitics,” in The Multispecies Salon, ed. Eben Kirksey, (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press Books, 2014), 115-121.
96 Rancière, Dissensus, 177.
97 Personal communication with the MSA artist Emma Dorothy Conley, 13 July 2016.
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Figure 28 a, b. The Microbiome Security Agency, AOMS - Automated Obscuration Machines, 2015, http://
welcometothemsa.com/, accessed 17 March 2017.
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4.8 Agonistic Microbiopolitics
In order to exercise the lack of given boundaries, in order to resist the logic of negation, but 
also to simply affirm the negation of negation, a different logic of practice of multibodies 
is necessary. Rather than operating within dialectic and binary structures, we can simply 
make the multibody excessive. It requires the affirmation of differentiation itself, the 
multiplication of differentiation and intensities it produces. Simple, yet dynamic and 
continuous multiplication might be the new model of immunity that affect implies. 
Immunity as the multiplication of encounters, where we add, not in order to destroy what 
is there, but rather continuing adding to the point of creating a strength by alliance with 
difference. This is the logic of acceleration that Deleuze and Guattari introduced when 
thinking beyond advanced capitalism.98 The acceleration of difference, which rather than 
producing new identities, transforms them into anonymity. In this way, such an acceleration 
would sustain transformation by inducing change and creating a resistance to the logics of 
identity.
 The multibody of us, of multispecies alliances that generate our bodies, prove to foster 
not only conceptual imagination and ethical and political urgency, but a reality that is 
gradually proliferating new bodies and discourses. Through MSA’s production of affects, 
the artists generate new relations and encounters in a way that, rather than adjusting to 
old categories, modulate and transform these categories. The MSA induces and sustains 
contaminations to the point that what was, can no longer be traced. In this way, through 
their problematization, situating the multibody in actual material practices, we can now 
outline what living with multiple might be – what the conceptual premises and material 
realities of the microbiopolitics of multibodies living within affect are.
 The character of this microbiopolitics, exercised in the work of MSA, has the dynamic 
and open character of relationality that affect implies. It is reminiscent of the politics 
described by Chantal Mouffe as agonistic spaces. For Mouffe, affect can be used to 
overcome politics based on a dialectical sense of relation, on identity and rationalism as 
the only means of constructing society. Like Protevi, she calls for embedding the relation 
and encounter in politics. I argue, however, that her affective understanding of how politics 
should function is even more consequent for the understanding of affect when taking into 
account the MSA’s practice of microbiopolitics.
 Like Esposito, Mouffe’s understanding of community goes against the logic of consensus 
that works on a belief in a rational agreement between seemingly opposing parties. The 
politics of consensus, which for her constitutes a threat to democracy, privileges a reason 
98 “But which is the revolutionary path? Is there one? – To withdraw from the world market, as Samir Amin advises 
Third World countries to do, in a curious revival of the fascist “economic solution”? Or might it be to go in the 
opposite direction? To go still further, that is, in the movement of the market, of decoding and deterritorialization? 
For perhaps the flows are not yet deterritorialized enough, not decoded enough, from the viewpoint of a theory and 
a practice of a highly schizophrenic character. Not to withdraw from the process, but to go further, to “accelerate 
the process,” as Nietzsche put it: in this matter, the truth is that we haven’t seen anything yet.” Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 1st edition (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 275–76.
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and priority of agreement based on a sense of identity. It simultaneously strengthens the 
non-rationalistic, emotional and ressentiment values that drive the need for given identity. 
As such, politics based on consensus fosters movements based on affections, which 
disregard everything that does not fit into the logic of “we,” into that which is already 
given. Similar to Braidotti’s nomadic theory, which pleads for a relocation of the centre in 
order to diminish the unitary vision,99 Mouffe describes the act of prioritizing the centre as 
extremism. The privilege of centre that drives consensus politics, where rational subjects 
blur any antagonisms, becomes the perfect feed for the politics of ressentiment. Instead 
of actively mobilizing by shaping new identities, these movements of affections (based on 
affection alone) actually strengthen those that are old and given: 
 By limiting themselves to calls for reason, moderation and consensus, many democratic 
parties are showing their lack of understanding of the functioning of political logic. They 
do not understand the need to counter their adversaries by mobilizing affects and passions 
in a progressive direction. What they do not realize is that a democratic politics needs to 
have a real purchase on people’s desires and fantasies and that, instead of opposing interests 
to sentiments and reason to passions, it should offer principles of identification which 
represent a real challenge to the ones promoted by the right.100
 By diminishing any role for passion – affects that originate outside of our bodies – in the 
political process, we construct a false understanding of politics based on a singular, unified 
image. By implementing the mechanism of affect as “moving forces of human conduct”101 
in politics, we implement the multiplicity of encounters. This understanding of the politics 
of affect is based on dynamism and temporary alliances (rather than on consensus) that 
would sustain transformations. 
 Depending on how affect is implemented, politics can take the shape of democratic 
pluralism. Rather than seeking to falsely diminish the hostility and tension that affect 
embodies, by subsuming everything into the “we”, democratic pluralism works based on 
the inscribed dynamic relationality. In such democratic pluralism, or what Braidotti calls 
bios/zoë egalitarianism, the existence of “we” depends on continuous encounters with the 
“outside”. In other words, the aim is not to overcome the antagonism and differences of 
affect with universalization and identification, but to transform it into what Mouffe calls 
agonism, and what we can now see as close to an open understanding of immunity as 
described by Haraway and Esposito.
 Importantly, like the open sense of immunity, agonism should not be understood in 
the dialectical way, as the practices directed towards overcoming that which is opposite. 
99 “Having rejected the model of liberal individualism, in the form of a nonunitary and vitalist vision of the 
subject, nomadic theory does not enhance multiculturalism, which positions “others” as minorities to be tolerated 
at best. The emphasis falls instead on the necessity to relocate the center—the dominant subject position—in a 
process of becoming-minoritarian that also repositions the center-margin rela-tionship. A becoming-minor of 
Europe.” Braidotti, Nomadic Theory, chapter 9: “Nomadic European Citizenship.”
100 Chantal Mouffe, “Politics and Passions: The Stakes of Democracy,” Ethical Perspectives 7, no. 2–3 (2000): 148.
101 Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political, revised edition (London/New York: Verso, 2006), 140.
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Rather, Moffue calls for maintaining the state of tension without pursuing its resolution. 
Each overcoming of tension is, for her, the construction of hegemony, which, despite its 
claim for priority on the basis of rational consensus, is always temporary and unstable. 
What is thus stable, what becomes the same, appears to be the constant flow of difference as 
tension, the flow of intensity as encounters – of affects.
 For this reason, namely the necessity of affective politics, for Mouffe, art’s practice already 
becomes a possibility for realizing the agonistic spaces of her pluralistic democracy. In step 
with Deleuze and Guattari, she defines art as producing affects and percepts that make 
art immediately political.102 Art can, of course, fall into a capitalist machine, the possible 
effects of which we have seen in the previous section when discussing the representational 
approach to multibodies of the microbiome. A way out of the neutralization by capitalism is 
art’s affective power; that, rather than perpetuating the ideas of the present hegemony, that 
is the present practice of sustaining the habits of identification, transforms and speculates 
on the new one, thus introducing spaces of tension and contaminations within encounters. 
 Mouffe sees a total resistance to capitalism in art’s initiations of encounters, or what 
she calls, agonistics spaces. Such resistance, rather than taking the form of a more radical 
critique, that would, after all, only perpetuate the dialectic mechanism already embedded in 
the capitalist machine, works on the level of multiplication of intervention: “What is needed 
is widening the field of artistic intervention, by intervening directly in a multiplicity of 
social spaces in order to oppose the program of total social mobilization of capitalism.”103 
Importantly, such multiplication of spaces is not driven by the logic of looking for the 
common. As exercised in the work of MSA, multiplication is rather about initiating the 
chaos of encounters, to multiply that which can never be subsumed within the logic of 
identity. 
 In this way, as Mouffe argues: “the prime task of democratic politics is not to eliminate 
passions or to relegate them to the private sphere in order to establish a rational consensus 
in the public sphere. Rather, it is to `tame’ those passions by mobilizing them towards 
democratic designs.”104 Although she uses the word “tame” when writing about the role 
of passion, evocative of Descartes’ understanding of the necessity to control and govern 
passion, her explanation reveals the dynamism of her project. Mouffe wants to embed the 
dynamic and risky relationality that passions embody in politics. Rather than establishing 
consensus, in other words, rather than aiming at harmonious agreement, which, despite 
its claims, still works on the basis of exclusion, she calls for maintaining the very sense of 
encounter: “In a democratic polity, conflicts and confrontations, far from being signs of 
imperfection, are the guarantee that democracy is alive and inhabited by pluralism.”105
102 See Chantal Mouffe’s lecture gave at Staging Democracy, De Balie, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 3 June 2016, 
http://www.debalie.nl/agenda/podium/staging-democracy/e_9782252/p_11766021/, accessed 27 June 2016.
103 Chantal Mouffe, “Artistic Activism and Agonistic Spaces,” ART&RESEARCH A Journal of Ideas, Contexts and 
Methods 1, no. 2 (2007): 1.
104 Chantal Mouffe, “Politics and Passions: The Stakes of Democracy,” 149.
105 Ibid., 149.
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Yet, considering the work of MSA, which embed its practice of multiplication of encounters 
as a means to resist the hegemony of our Pasteurian, antiseptic society, it seems that 
such microbiopolitics is only possible through art’s practice. Can we think and practice 
the microbiopolitics of our multibodies outside art? Is art the only space where agonistic 
encounters are still possible?
 What the contaminants of Layer Cake and of MSA have taught us is the necessity of 
constructing spaces of tension, of combining affect with impersonal logic, if we want to 
come close to the understanding and practice of multibodies that affect implies. Most 
crucially, however, what the discussed artistic contaminants of multibodies have been 
practicing is not only the need to change the practice, but also to change the logic behind 
that practice. What these two contaminants share and what is crucial in our analysis is their 
ways of practicing bodies within affect – through speculation, fabulation and the creation 
of spaces of tension driven by the logic of immunity. 
 Speculation is not a futurism of the impossible, but rather a multiplication, an acceleration 
of the possible, of connecting that which has not yet been connected and what might be. 
Such a speculative approach presupposes the porosity of bodies and their readiness to be 
affected, to encounter at any point, in any way, purely for the purpose of experimentation: 
to find what the body can do in a way that does not destroy s/he/it. Such a speculative 




The Ethics of Contamination
Whether or not art is allowed to play with life it’s
 been a big question in my art, and I think I am 
trying to bring it into some other level of experience 
than just what can I learn from this - that’s repeatable, 
that is one piece of a puzzle that proves the elegance of the 
universe. And instead, I might prove that chaos exists and 
feelings are important and life is strange, you know, permanently.1
5.1 Contaminant V like a Vastal2
My first encounter with the work of Adam Zaretsky was at Leiden University in 2011, when 
he gave a lecture during a course on “Ecocriticism and Bioart” led by Robert Zwijnenberg and 
Isabel Hoving. I was expecting yet another artist’s portfolio presentation with undoubtedly 
inspiring concepts and approaches. “It will be a nice, relaxing lecture, just listen and enjoy,” 
I recall thinking. Only those readers who have met Adam will know how wrong I was. It 
was a regular class, with over twenty students staring at the teacher’s desk, behind which 
the Dionysian persona of Zaretsky is talking about “Appropriate Pervert Technology” 
and “Post-sustainable Orgy, as Our Only Hope.” While demonstrating the naivety of the 
transhumanist belief in enhancement and arguing for the introduction of biotechnology 
into what he described as “radical difference,” on the board behind him, Zaretsky was 
screening images of human and non-human pornography, fetishisms, mutations and 
technological bio-transgressions. I remember that my thoughts were exploding with ideas 
during his lecture. I was agitated, excited that, finally, someone was touching upon the weird, 
uncomfortable, moving, contaminating and messy materiality. Undoubtedly, Zaretsky’s 
shock therapy, designed to wake up the senses, had worked on me. It was trashy and noisy 
– everything you would not expect from an academic lecture. I discovered a similar logic, 
1 Fragment transcript from Adam Zaretsky, DIY Embryology, 2012, https://vimeo.com/51410231, accessed 16 
March 2017
2 Vastal stands for The VivoArts School for Transgenic Aesthetics Ltd., it was formed in 2009 by Adam Zaretsky. 
For further description and details see Zaretsky, “VASTAL: The Vivoarts School for Transgenic Aesthetics, Ltd.” 
(ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2012), http://search.proquest.com/docview/1220674667/, accessed 17 March 
2017.
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driven by the “messy, trashy and noisy”, in 2013, in the exhibition “Yes Naturally” in The 
Hague, the Netherlands, where Zaretsky presented his work Errorarium [Figure 29].
Figure 29. Adam Zaretsky, Errorarium, 2012, exhibited at “Yes Naturally”, The Hague, The Netherlands, 
2013, http://ja-natuurlijk.com/site2/category/kunstenaars-en/, accessed 17 March 2017.
The work Errorarium was a part of the research “BioSolar Cells” in the Netherlands1 – a 
program that focuses on establishing a sustainable source of energy by extracting chlorophyl2 
from organisms, such as plants, algae and some bacteria, which are capable of photosynthesis 
(the process of converting solar energy into chemical energy3) and implanting it into other 
organisms, such as zebrafish embryos. Errorarium was a machine that was built in order 
to contain and further stimulate the new solar organisms that Zaretsky called – “biosollar 
mutants.”4 Since the activity of these new organisms depends on environmental conditions, 
such as the availability of water, nutrients, temperature and light, the idea behind the work 
was that by manipulating the conditions in which the plants live, the visitor could influence 
the expression of the plant’s genes, hands-on. By playing with the knobs of the machine, the 
1 “Home – BiosolarCells,” http://www.biosolarcells.nl/en/home.html, accessed 9 February 2017.
2 “The green pigment in plants that functions in photosynthesis by absorbing radiant energy from the Sun” 
“Chlorophyll - Oxford Reference,” http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199600571.001.0001/
acref-9780199600571-e-1406, accessed 23 June 2017.
3 “Photosynthesis – BiosolarCells,” http://www.biosolarcells.nl/en/zonne-energie/fotosynthese.html, accessed 23 
June 2017.
4 Adam Zaretsky, “From the Desk of Adam Zaretsky, Ph.D.,” http://docplayer.nl/663342-From-the-desk-of-adam-
zaretsky-ph-d.html, accessed 9 November 2016.
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visitor could change light and sound, altering the environment of the growing organism 
inside the machine [Figure 30]. In this way, unlike a scientific experiment, which, in order 
to be epistemologically valid, must be conducted under strict protocols and precision, 
the way of engagement proposed by Zaretsky was affectively singular, unrepeatable and 
contingent: 
By changing the variables on the Errorarium, you are making the experiment 
non-repeatable and hard to utilize. At the same time, you are finding 
variables that are beyond the scope of known research. Therefore, the 
Errorarium produces a wide range of chaotic artificial light and sound results 
by maximizing jazz variability within the artistic growth chamber.5
Figure 30. Adam Zaretsky with his Errorarium, 2013, http://ja-natuurlijk.com/site2/adam-zaretsky/, 
accessed 9 February 2017.
From Latin, the word ‘error’ denotes “the action of roaming or wandering; hence a devious 
or winding course, a roving, winding.”6 As a deviation from accuracy, it also means a 
mistake, transgression, trespass, fault and wrong-doing.7 The explicitness of Zaretsky’s use 
5 Ibid.
6 “Error, N.,” OED Online (Oxford University Press), http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/view/
Entry/64126?, accessed 9 November 2016.
7 Ibid. 
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of that word to name a tool of mutation is strengthened by the Latin suffix -arium, which 
denotes “thing connected with or employed in, place for.”8 Through this etymological 
analysis, Errorarium can be understood as a location, a space of wandering deviations. 
However, not only the name of the work evokes a space of tension and contamination.
 The machine is reminiscent of an old, coin-operated game machine, with the same 
kinds of sounds and flashing lights as those from the 80s and 90s. Through the style of the 
past, Zaretsky lures spectators into a seemingly innocent experience of the future present. 
Any moral concern that might be raised by the manipulation of actual living organisms 
rather than inorganic matter is diminished by the policies of the gallery space where you 
are invited to touch and play. In this way, Zaretsky creates a space where our sensitivity and 
responsibility are literally tested and confronted with the desire and curiosity to encounter, 
to engage in play. In his work, the question of ethics is inseparable from the question of 
creativity and production, but also the desire to control and manipulate. He asks: “Do you 
think you are enriching or stressing the organism in the Errorarium with your mediated 
entertainment? Why do you believe this?”9 
 However, I will argue that the playfulness of manipulation, under the cover of 
sustainability and scientific innovation, raises a much more profound question. In his work, 
Zaretsky produces a new shape for ethics, a new understanding of how to live within the 
encounters of contamination. The “BioSolar Cells”10 research belief in a better future, due to 
improved and sustainable energy consumption, where mutating bodies are to be governed 
for profit and human benefit, is questioned by the artist. This distortion in the trust in 
sustainability can be noticed in the design of the arcade machine itself. The side walls of the 
machine feature images of cosmonauts in the space [Figure 31], uncannily reminiscent of 
Stanley Kubrick’s 2001:A Space Odyssey, a movie in which a human invention of a sentient 
algorithm in a spaceship, designed to serve people, ends up killing humans in order to 
protect itself. Is this a cautionary tale? Zaretsky seems to asks: Are we ready for these 
mutants and have we truly thought through all the implications of living with mutants? As 
he writes: 
Do the organisms we are tweaking have an advantage that might make them 
capable of major disruption of imperilled habitats? Are these mega sun 
energy harvesters capable of more disruption of the dynamic equilibrium 
8 “Arium, Suffix,” OED Online (Oxford University Press), http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/view/
Entry/10794, accessed 9 November 2016.
9 Adam Zaretsky, BioSolar Cells: Making a Field for Interpretation Two Year Report and Proposal for Future 
Research, ‘From the Desk of Adam Zaretsky, Ph.D.’, http://docplayer.nl/663342-From-the-desk-of-adam-zaretsky-
ph-d.html, accessed 9 November 2016.
10 “The world population is growing and increasing numbers of people aspire to higher standards of living: we 
need more and more energy and food. We can only do this by producing energy and food in a sustainable way, 
which means creating less waste and lowering CO2 emissions. The sun is a source of energy that fulfils these 
conditions.” See more on http://www.biosolarcells.nl/en/zonne-energie/waarom-is-duurzame-zonne-energie-
nodig/, accessed 9 November 2017.
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of planetary diversity than the energy benefits that they may provide? Are 
we making monsters for short-term competitive excellence or is the offset of 
carbon credits shoring up travesty and more anthropogenic alienation in the 
form of life itself?11 
Figure 31. Errorarium presented at the The Hortus 
botanicus Leiden, 2012,  
https://plantenolympiade2012.wordpress.com/, 
accessed 17 March 2017. 
Through Errorarium, Zaretsky created spaces of tension as a tool for asking these questions, 
as a way of encountering these multiple concerns, ways of life and desires. When we do 
not need to reach an agreement according to a given telos of what it means to improve, to 
sustain and to make decision about who deserves to live, we can focus on a different set 
of questions and problems. Instead of inquiring about what is, we can experiment with 
what bodies that are, may become. We can focus on processes of experimentation that 
might be disagreeable, which may destroy you or change you. The radically contingent 
meetings that are not preceded by the given categories and values become Zaretsky’s ethics 
of contaminations, ways of being with the future present mutants. 
11 Zaretsky, “From the Desk of Adam Zaretsky, Ph.D.”
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5.2 The Time of Matters of Affect
Zaretsky’s works and performances are embedded within the reciprocal entanglement of 
aesthetics, ontology and ethics. In his practice, he seems to enact Guattari’s “new aesthetic 
paradigm,” that actualizes “ethico-political implications.”12 As Guattari writes, “to speak 
of creation is to speak of responsibility of the creative instance with regards to the thing 
created.”13 This new aesthetic paradigm, which Zaretsky calls “transgenicaesthetics,” 
involves acknowledging and sustaining the lack of any given logic of appropriateness, and 
the correspondence of practice with the presupposed model or imperative. His workshops, 
experiments and practices in the lab do not follow strict rules, scientific protocols, or that 
which can be considered social habits, norms and power relations. Instead, Zaretsky seems 
to create, to use Guattari’s words, a “new taste for life,”14 which emanates from the processual 
transformations of new bodies, their new subjectivities and ways of living. Zaretsky brings 
the future into the present in his work. He actualizes the impossible, exposing not matters 
of fact, but rather, what I call, contaminating matters of affect.
 These matters of affect are thus not a utopian pursuit for omnipresent relationality, 
an uncritical embracing of emotions, contented feelings of agreements and consensus. 
As discussed in the previous chapters, these are difficult encounters, risky relations and 
collective transformations. Donna Haraway calls such matters of affect “staying with the 
trouble.”15 Matters of affect are contaminations that call for the production and sustenance 
of tension, rather than urging for its antiseptic resolution. We need to formulate the 
problems that must be considered, the tensions that need to be cared for rather than 
taken care of. However, it seems that, particularly through art, we can encounter, test and 
actively generate those encounters of transformations. In other words, scholars still have 
to learn what, for art, is a “natural” habitual way of becoming. This is what Deleuze and 
Guattari called the production of affects and percepts, the preservation of encounters of 
transformation that are unique and unrepeatable by other bodies.
 We need new ways of thinking about relations of contamination, where the creation of 
new relational concepts and practices is not only allowed, but prompted. Affect, as I have 
been arguing in this book, may become such a condition of relational practice. Importantly, 
as a condition, in order to work-with rather than work-against, it cannot work according to 
any fixed method and closed system of rules. As I have demonstrated, affect has significant 
implications for the way we think and practice our bodies, how we understand how the 
meaning of bodies is produced and what the political consequences of such a relational 
and material understanding of bodies are. None of the implications of contaminating 
12 Felix Guattari, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm, trans. Julian Pefanis (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1995), 107.
13 Ibid., 107.
14 Ibid., 92.
15 Donna J. Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press Books, 2016).
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matters of affect are stable and intrinsic. The logic of contamination that affect implies is 
driven by tension and transformation. When this transformation is applied to traditional 
categorization and systematization, affect may become fixed into affection, constituting a 
powerful tool for the logic of signification. In the previous chapters, I discussed Mouffe’s 
warning that passions, when driven by the logic of emotions (affection), only strengthen 
and empower the regimes of identity – affect, rather than being affectus, becomes a fixed 
state of affection.16 Hence, affect becomes a powerful phenomenon. It can create bodies 
and multiply their relations, but, because of its relational and transformative character, 
it can also serve as a tool of management, control and destruction through fixation and 
universalization.
 This different logic of affect is not a simple application of relation based on tension. 
Rather, it requires an experimental and relational thinking driven by the acknowledgment 
of the material notion of meaning and understanding of the collective and open agency that 
directly influences body politics. In other words, affect as a condition of thinking practice 
and practicing thought forces and allows us to shape onto-epistemological parallelism. 
Affect ‘shows’ that gathering knowledge about bodies is inseparable from the way these 
bodies are and how we practice them. 
 Inevitably, ethical questions arise as a result of contamination and the dynamic character 
of knowledge-making practices and the becoming of our bodies within these practices. 
If not only the way I practice the body’s affects, bodies’ relationality, but also the way I 
understand them changes those very bodies, should I be held responsible for them? If I, 
as a multibody, am not autonomous from the onto-epistemological processes of bodies, 
but rather become a participant and co-agent of those processes, who is responsible for a 
multibody’s actions or lack of them? 
 These are highly ethical and pragmatic questions that have been raised in each previous 
chapter. In this way, I have indicated the parallelism of ontology, epistemology and ethics 
– that the knowledge about bodies, their practice and becomings are inseparable. Affect 
as a condition of relational thinking and practice thus demands a rethinking of the ethics 
that are equally dynamic, relational and processual as our bodies are. Such ethics will have 
to respond to the agonistic spaces within which bodies are produced, and to relations of 
tensions that affect implies. Finally, ethics will have to parallel the microbiopolitics of the 
multibodies that we are. Reminiscent of Haraway’s infectious ethics, I call this the ethics of 
contamination.
 Ethics based on sustaining tension means creating agonistic contaminating spaces 
without the necessity for consensus, but also, without the trauma of encounter as an abuse 
of power. This is a tension that produces and disrupts, not in order to destroy what is, but 
rather to create what is not yet – that which is yet to come. 
16 See Chapter 2 of this book.
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5.3 Responsibility in Times of Affect
Haraway’s famous call for practicing “response-ability” grows more urgent every day. 
Response-ability, she explains, should not, however, be understood as a call for a simple act 
of response to what is there: 
Response-ability is not something that you just respond to, as if it’s there 
already. Rather, it’s the cultivation of the capacity of response in the context 
of living and dying in worlds for which one is for, with others. So I think of 
response-ability as irreducibly collective and to-be-made. In some really deep 
ways, that which is not yet, but may yet be. It is a kind of luring, desiring, 
making-with.17
In this way, I argue that Haraway indicates what practicing bodies within affect may imply. 
Although we are all already response-able, our bodies are full of multiple capacities and 
our understanding of bodies is generated by these capacities; the problem is that we do 
not know in advance what these capacities do. The challenge and urgency is thus to create 
spaces where the implications of these capacities may be encountered. In this way, I will 
argue that response-ability must be confronted with responsibility – the implications and 
consequences of our actions. 
 Making-with, production and creation can be easily consumed by the machine of 
consensus fuelled by capitalism, as Philippe Pignarre and Isabelle Stengers argue. Simple 
acceleration of production, collective making that does not involve any encounters with their 
consequences and verification, can only fuel and strengthen existing categories, division 
and hierarchical structures. Creation that transforms rather than neutralizes involves 
encountering and learning the consequences in the onto-epistemo-ethical dimension: 
Not to ‘interpret’ but to transform doesn’t signify that everything is good 
from the moment that it activates transformation, but that the truth of an idea 
or of a definition or of a hypothesis is nothing other than their verification, 
that is to say, the way in which they can produce consequences that orientate 
action.18
Importantly, this responsibility enables new encounters and, therefore, have a different 
dynamic than any moral imperative.
17 Donna Haraway in conversation with Martha Kenney, “Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Chthulhocene,” in Art in 
the Anthropocene: Encounters Among Aesthetics, Politics, Environments and Epistemologies, (eds)  Heather Davis 
and Etienne Turpin, (London: Open Humanites Press, 2014), 257.
18 Philippe Pignarre and Isabelle Stengers, Capitalist Sorcery: Breaking the Spell, trans. Andrew Goffey (Houndmills/ 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 17.
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In What is Philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari emphasized a way of thinking about 
responsibility that shifts the relations of power that the concept of responsibility itself 
implies. The word “responsibility” denotes “Capability of fulfilling an obligation or duty; 
the quality of being reliable or trustworthy,” but also “The state or fact of being accountable; 
liability, accountability for something.”19 As such, responsibility is inscribed in the moral 
structures and values designating the systems of laws and rights. Instead of talking in terms 
of “responsibility for something”, which immediately attributes selected bodies with power 
and others with less power, Deleuze and Guattari introduce an idea of thinking in terms of 
“responsibility before”. The transformation of the preposition “for” into “before” has agential 
implications. As they write: “We are not responsible for the victims but responsible before 
them.”20 To act, create and transform cannot occur through an escapism from that what 
they call “ignoble” in order to look for an outside position of judgement. Such escapism 
only fuels the ignoble. We must “play the part of the animal (to growl, burrow, snigger, 
distort ourselves): though itself is sometimes closer to an animal that dies than to a living, 
even democratic, human being.”21
 The notion of “responsibility before” is triggered by “shame,” which allows for 
embodiment of the multiple relationality that one finds to become-with. As Deleuze and 
Guattari write: “The feeling of shame is one of philosophy’s most powerful motifs.”22 It 
would be the kind of shame one experiences encountering Zaretsky’s work. It is a shame 
that has nothing to do with the pity that puts an immediate power relation into play. It 
is rather a material phenomenon that can be compared to an experience of synaesthesia, 
when sound has the immediate material capacity to produce colour. The sound of the word 
“shame” spoken in your native language, rings not only as a concept, but reverberates in 
your guts, leaving the memory of anxiety and stomach ache. The word that reminds you of a 
non-linguistic world of meaning and, most importantly, of non-subjective forms of agency 
– where you are immersed in the world of multiple others, encountering and residing 
already within you. It is through such a notion of shame that responsibility emerges. Not as 
a moral duty, but as an encounter with agency that can be touched, felt and, as a result of 
the encounter you are mutually transformed.
 What Deleuze and Guattari seem to propose is a sense of responsibility that focuses 
neither on the care for something because of existing inequalities, nor in the name of pursuing 
the resolution of those inequalities. Affect that generates the onto-epistemological practice 
of thought and thinking practice of bodies demands rather the notion of responsibility 
that is beyond moralizing systematization and the pursuit of consensual agreements. The 
ethics of contamination would thus be about keeping the vibration, the tension that is to 
19 “Responsibility, N.,” OED Online (Oxford University Press), http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/
view/Entry/163862, accessed 10 February 2017.




stimulate difference and that is to resist any ressentiments of identity and sameness that 
forces consensus. As Deleuze argues: 
Morality presents us with a set of constraining rules of a special sort, ones that 
judge actions and intentions by considering them in relation to transcendent 
values (this is good, that’s bad…); ethics is a set of optional rules that assess 
what we do, what we say, in relation to the ways of existing involved. We say 
this, do that: what way of existing does it involve?23
Deleuze’s question: “what way of existing does it involve?”24 reveals the onto-epistemo-
ethical entanglements. The next question that would follow would be: how can we act 
ethically? What would such ethics beyond morality be like today, for the multibodies, 
mutants of the present future? 
 I have argued for an understanding of affect that is relational, transformative and which 
can be conditioned through the continuous relations of experimentations as discussed 
in Chapter 2. Such experimentation would follow and generate new material meanings 
(Chapter 3) that work according to the logic of multiplication of increasing encounters, 
intensifying the relations and producing new affects (Chapter 4). As I have written 
elsewhere: “In such a way, ethics is intertwined with aesthetics, as it seeks to invent new 
possibilities of life, new ways of existing in terms of experimenting with new relations, 
in terms of how it is to affect and be affected by.”25 For artists, the onto-epistemo-ethico-
aesthetic practice of bodies is apparently already inherent in their practice. In particular, as 
discussed in this book, bioart’s engagement with living matters imperceptibly yet profoundly 
and vividly practices the multiple dimensionality of an infectious ethics. Implicitly, I have 
already demonstrated the affective way of dealing with bodies in bioart’s practice that urges 
a consequent conceptualization of affect for practicing bodies within affect. Yet, one last 
argument deserves consideration in the context of the new concept of ethics that must be 
created.
 Zylinska writes: “Bioartistic experiments not only undermine the metaphysical 
understanding of life but also challenge the traditional humanist value-based ethics, where 
this nebulous entity called ‘human life’ is posited as a value in advance, something to be 
protected at all cost.”26 It is thus not about bioart being the only party with the capacity of 
a critical approach to life. After all, biotechnological practices are perfectly fine on their 
own for securing bioethical standards and undermining any dogmatic understanding of 
23 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972-1990 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 100.
24 Ibid. 
25 Agnieszka Anna Wołodźko, “Materiality of Affect: How Art Can Reveal the More Subtle Realities of an 
Encounter,” in This Deleuzian Century: Art, Activism, Life, (eds) Rick Dolphijn and Rosi Braidotti (Leiden/Boston, 
MA: Brill, 2015), 179.
26 Joanna Zylinska, “Taking Responsibility for Life: Bioethics and Bioart,” in Ethics and the Arts, ed. Paul Macneill 
(Springer Netherlands, 2014), 194, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8816-8_17.
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actual scientific findings and argumentation. The point she is making lies rather in a non-
pragmatic orientation of bioart’s practices, which she calls “non-goal oriented agendas.”27 
Bioart and science, as Zylinska argues, 
are often developed from within the same labs and are part of the same 
research grants, [yet] bioart’s mission is ostensibly different from the one 
embraced by the biotechnological industry. The primary business of bioart 
is the representation, articulation and open-ended creation of newforms and 
modes of life – not capital-induced production of Life.28 
For this reason, as she further argues, the given norms of bioethics, those that are applied 
to researchers working in the same labs, cannot be applied to artists. Such a statement 
provokes a troubling question, however, about whether there are any limits to art’s playing 
with life. For her, bioart’s practice with life is justifiable “when bioart takes responsibility for 
life, without retreating to any predefined entrenched moralist positions about what this life 
is and how it should be treated.”29
 However, the question remains, what does such responsibility actually mean? What 
might such responsibility-for be like when it does not refer to any given moralistic norms? 
Her use of “responsibility for” already suggests, as we have discussed, the presupposition 
of the relation of power and duty towards a less potent other. While Zylinska refers to “the 
tendency” to describe ethical relations in Spinozian/Deleuzian terms of affective encounter, 
she indicates the necessity of human assessment. She seems thus to criticise the affective 
understanding of ethics, pursuing the inevitability of human judgement regarding which 
relations are good and which are bad. She calls it “cutting”:
The function of this ‘cut’ is to allow, first, for these and not some other 
relations to be recognised as individual relations, and, second, for (at least 
provisional) judgments to be made about those relations. The situation as 
such demands an assessment from the human – who is capable not only of 
recognising in him – or herself this propensity for being affected but also of 
theorising this propensity.30
Zylisnka actualizes affect within the judgement of good and bad relationality. I argue, 
however, that the ethics of contamination practiced by bioart happens in the very moment 
before such actualization takes place, where rather than thinking in terms of responsibility 






before – as the spaces of tension. The ethics of contamination that I propose here, is not 
directed at creating a system of practices, manuals about what can or cannot be done. 
Rather, the ethics of contamination focuses on what we should establish for the tension to 
occur in a way that would not destroy the bodies but make them proliferate.
 The underlying presupposition of this book is that my multiple encounters and processes 
of thinking with affect result from the contaminated thinking-writing-reading process, 
which has not been disciplinarily separated. However, the lack of separation between 
philosophy, art, politics, culture, sciences, biology, technology and many more, does not 
mean a lack of difference between those multiple platforms, multiple ways of practicing 
bodies. As I have showed, through the multiple points of view and their contaminants, 
we encounter temporary agreements and possibilities to think otherwise. These temporary 
agreements do not imply any universal and fixed methods of how to practice affect, but 
rather through dynamism and multiplicity of points of view, the necessity of risks and 
tensions involved in the process of conditioning transformations becomes evident. Through 
speculation and creation of relations as thinking otherwise we can prolong the tension, and 
in this way, condition the ethics of contamination for our multibodies. 
 Thus, the ethics of contamination has emerged from a different kind of logic, one 
that values not the rules that govern and guarantee its smooth fulfilment, but temporary 
conditions that sustain the tension between those rules. The ethics of contamination is 
about creating and producing spaces of encounters where the only telos of this continuous 
production is a necessity of conviction that something more important might emerge. This 
is what bioartists have been doing with bodies, changing radically the understanding of 
what it means to practice the body, to be a body and to mean a body. The question of 
ethics transforms itself into a plea for thinking otherwise, that the thought as such must 
be important. This conviction of importance, the importance of importance, will be the 
driving force of the ethics of affect – it is the plea of the persona that Deleuze named “an 
idiot” and which we, even if for a moment, must become.
5.4 In Search of Resistance 
It is quite risky to end a book, especially one that is to prove your academic abilities, with 
the pursuit of an idiot. I will take the risk, nevertheless, and position an idiot as a conceptual 
persona that facilitates the practice of thinking with affect. Isabelle Stengers has already 
formulated such an experimental approach to thinking otherwise by implementing Virginia 
Woolf ’s plea for “Think we must”31 as a form of resistance in the Deleuzian notion of an 
31 “But you will object, you have no time to think, you have your battles to fight […]. That excuse shall not serve 
you, Madame. As you know from your own experience, and there are facts that prove it, the daughters of educated 
men have always done their thinking hand to mouth; not under green lamps at study tables in the cloisters of 
secluded colleges. They have thought while they stirred the pot, while they rocked the cradle […]. Think we must. 
Let us think in offices, in omnibuses, while we are standing in the crowd, watching Coronations and Lord Mayor’s 
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idiot. In Stenger’s quest to find a method of creating the spaces and situations in which 
we would be able to think otherwise, without the urge for progress, quick solution and 
consensus, she points to the need to prioritize experimentation. She argues for the sheer 
necessity to experiment with thought, situations and problems, yet not any problem, but 
only those that “mobilize us.”32 For Stengers, such methods of experimentation would work 
after adopting Deleuze’s conceptual persona of an idiot. Deleuze mapped the persona of 
an idiot as someone who slows things and others down, but not because something is not 
true or wrong but because there is something more important: “It’s the Idiot’s formula: ‘You 
know, there is a deeper problem. I am not sure what it is. But leave me alone. Let everything 
rot [...] this more urgent problem must be found’.”33
 The idiot slows down, although the exact issue of importance is not yet known, there 
is only a sense of it coming. The persona of an idiot, like affect, is not neutral. Moreover, 
Deleuze distinguishes two kinds of idiot. The first one is Cartesian, “who is the private 
thinker, in contrast to the public teacher.”34 He is obsessed with truth understood as 
undeniability and certainty. He – Descartes’ idiot – is ready to deny, as Deleuze with 
Guattari mock, “that 3+2=5”.35 The other kind of idiot, Deleuze finds in Dostoyevsky, and 
this is the one who is still “a private thinker, but with a different singularity.”36 He is not 
driven by truth, but by a sense of importance: “The old idiot wanted truth, but the new idiot 
wants to turn the absurd into the highest power of thought – in other words, to create.”37 
Significantly, those two idiots are never separate beings, but rather the second is a mutation 
of the first, as they put it: “Descartes goes mad in Russia?”38
 With the mutation of the persona of an idiot, Deleuze and Guattari show how it is 
not a question of a dialectical difference between concepts, but rather how to mutate the 
existing ones. They emphasize the change of focus from what is into what is important. 
The acknowledgment that there is something much more important becomes a critical 
condition of thought. Importantly, “critical” here is not understood in a deconstructive 
Shows, let us think as we pass the Cenotaph; and in White Hall; in the galleries of the House of Commons; in 
the Law Courts; let us think at baptisms and marriages and funerals. Let us never cease from thinking—what is 
this ‘civilization’ in which we find ourselves?” Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas, quote from: Isabelle Stengers and 
Vinciane Despret, Women Who Make a Fuss: The Unfaithful Daughters of Virginia Woolf, trans. April Knutson, 1st 
edition (Minneapolis, MN: Univocal Publishing, 2014), 26.
32 Isabelle Stengers, “The Cosmopolitical Proposal,” in Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy, (eds) 
Bruno Latour, Peter Weibel, and Zentrum für Kunst und Medientechnologie Karlsruhe (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2005), 994.
33 Gilles Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews, 1975-1995, 2nd edition (New York: Semiotexte/
Smart Art, 2008), 317.






sense, but as a creation, as a production of the new, as the urge to create, to make spaces 
enabling to pose questions of importance.
 An idiot becomes understood in this way, as the persona of the ethics of contamination. 
The idiot of affect is the one who, rather than searching for certainty, stability and 
intersubjectivity, will search for the uncomfortable question. Significantly, Dostoyevsky’s 
idiot cannot be taken as the idiot Bartleby in Herman Melville’s novel Bartleby The 
Scrivener, which Deleuze ascribes with the literal sense of the formula “I would prefer not 
to.”39 Resistance of an idiot is not directed at its own nihilation, does not end with death, 
as is the case in Melville’s novella. I argue that an idiot of the ethics of contamination is a 
mutation of not only the Cartesian idiot, but also of Bartleby. Bartleby seems detached from 
any concerns, ignorant of habitual practices and resistant to conform to any given systems 
and norms. Instead of following the logic of expectation, consensus of that which can be 
expected, Bartleby introduces a new logic – “a logic of preference” – which, as Deleuze 
explains, “is enough to undermine the presuppositions of language as a whole.”40 Because 
of that, and because of the resistance to norms by following a different logic, the idiot 
shares a great deal with Bartleby. Yet, Bartleby’s resistance does not lead him to any form 
of creation. The nonsense of Bartleby does not produce, does not generate new logic of 
new processes, unless we consider the nonsense of the others reacting to his detachment. 
If Bartleby produces affects, they would be sad ones, ones that stop further relations, ones 
that destroy bodies. Bartleby’s idiot is a withdrawal from the affect, from relations, and it is 
sustained by pity, not by shame. 
 When referring to an idiot, I indicate the idiot that is driven by importance, that creates 
by sustaining the tension in her belief in importance, in desiring for significance rather 
than remaining in the state of equilibrium that is empty resistance, which is almost close 
to agreement with the status quo. The idiot of the ethics of contamination is driven by 
the sense of creativity, by the feeling that something is more important for the sake of 
creation and production of the new. An idiot resists the status quo by sensing and desiring 
to think otherwise, to create. She takes a flight and continues the ritual of experimentation; 
mutating, in this way, even the significance of her resistance.
39 Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 68.
40 Ibid., 73.
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5.5 Encountering the Witches Flight
Although art for nonhumans is an interesting topic that I am also exploring … essentially art is a 
manifestation of the human trying to understand themselves, so it is about us, of course, and I have 
actually pointed it out that it is ultimately not about plants per se because plants here are just one 
example of how we do or completely do not relate to something that is radically different – this 
other, this vegetal other. But it does not have to be a vegetal one, it can be another race, an alien, 
anything that we cannot use this empathy to understand. We need other tools. So, it is a sort of 
an exploration of this […] the relationship to plants in particular that for me still remains to be 
answered or at least sketched out […]. At the moment, I am still, I would say, in the dark even 
though I was standing in the light for so long. And I appreciate being in this position because I 
believe that life in general is very complex and it is absolutely self-indulgent to think that you have 
the answer.41
Figure 32. Špela Petrič, Skotopoiesis, 2015, performance Galerija Kapelica / Zavod Kersnikova, Ljubljana, 
http://www.spelapetric.org/portfolio/skotopoiesis/, accessed 17 February 2017.
Špela Petrič is an artist, a researcher, a biophilosopher, a biohacker, an educator, a scientist, 
and a bioactivist who practices the mutating ethics of contaminations. Her continuous 
travel and nomadic existence means she is based somewhere between her home city of 
Ljubljana and Amsterdam. I remember my first encounter with her work Naval Gazing 
in 2014 [Figure 33] – a project that won her a Bioart and Design Award in the edition of 
41 Špela Petrič, “Confronting Vegetal Otherness: Skotopoiesis,” audio transcript, http://www.spelapetric.org/
portfolio/skotopoiesis/, accessed 11 February 2017.
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“Matter of Life.”42 Naval Gazing was exhibited in the MU gallery in Eindhoven as a reminder 
of what it was, namely a habitation kinetic machine designed to swim in the North Sea 
and become a platform for all organisms living in these waters. This “travelling biotope,” 
while majestic and mysterious in its habitat as the videos screening testified, was awkward, 
huge and disruptive in the gallery space. Transformed and consumed by the non-human 
organisms in the sea, it raised a strange dissonance between human desire to control, to 
familiarize, and the non-human flow of production, transformation and acceptance. This 
radical encounter, which generates transformations, hesitations and tensions pervades 
Petrič’s work. During many encounters with Špela, I have gradually learned to find her 
practice marking what the contaminating matters of affect may involve.
Figure 33. Špela Petrič, Naval Gazing, 2014, 
http://www.spelapetric.org/portfolio/naval-
gazing/, accessed 17 March 2017. 
A performance that literally tests the encounter of tension between human and non-human 
body, marking what the ethics of contamination are yet to address, is Petrič Skotopoiesis, 
2015 [Figure 32]. It was part of the project “Trust me, I am an artist” – the same platform that 
hosted Willet and O’Reilly’s performance discussed in the Contaminant G. The Skotopoiesis, 
as the artist explains, denotes “meaning shaped by darkness” and was a performance that 
explored the possibility of encountering the non-human forms of meaning generation, and 
an attempt at “plant-human intercognition,”43 or, as I would call it, a ritual for the ethics of 
contamination.
 The design of the encounter was simple. The human (the artist) was standing in the 
dark in front of a bed of cress. The only source of light necessary for the plants to grow was 
42 “Matter of Life,” Bio Art & Design Awards (blog), http://www.badaward.nl/matter-of-life/, accessed 17 February 
2017.
43 Petrič, “Confronting Vegetal Otherness.”
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positioned behind the human, so that her body shed a shadow on some parts of the cress. 
This performance lasted for two days, during which the artist stood for nineteen hours, 
seemingly passive, yet in a constant relation with the plants. In this event of an encounter 
that was neither a meeting, nor an interrelation nor an obstacle alone, the artist and the 
germinating cress faced each other, illuminated by a light projection [Figures 34, 35, 36]. 
Figure 34. Špela Petrič, Skotopoiesis, 2015, 
performance Galerija Kapelica / Zavod Kersnikova, 
Ljubljana, http://www.spelapetric.org/portfolio/
skotopoiesis/, accessed 17 March 2017. 
Even though the performance demanded the immobilization of the artist standing in front 
of the cress, the event of the encounter was not about her being silent. Furthermore, as 
Petrič herself explains, the relation between human and plant did not concern the question 
of who stands where, who is more powerless in this power relation context. During the 
whole performance, as long as she maintained the same shadow thrown on the cress, the 
artist could talk to the audience, engage in conversation while standing. In this way, rather 
than focusing on subjects and identities, the work focused on the relation, tension and 
encounter between multiple agents. That the performance happened in this biosemiotical 
sphere of relations is clear from the triadic scheme of the performance, where Petrič seems 
to refer to Peirce’s sign theory. The tragic characteristic of a sign, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
involves a spatio-temporal action where signs, in order to be understood as an active mode 
of being, must be materially embodied. In this way, Skotopoiesis was about exposition of the 
production of affect, but also affect happening.
 For Petrič, experimenting especially within the art scene with animals and human self 
is immediately and easily positioned within the existing ethical debate. Our relation with 
animals and human bodies function already within well-established moral boundaries and 
laws. Creating with plants, however, poses no such immediate ethical dilemma. As she 
argues, because plants are so different “we have no moral intuition of how we can react to 
this plant life,” even though plants, as she stipulates, are the crucial part of living systems.
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Figure 35. Špela Petrič, Skotopoiesis, 2015, performance Galerija Kapelica / Zavod Kersnikova, Ljubljana, 
http://www.spelapetric.org/portfolio/skotopoiesis/, 17 March 2017. 
As she puts it, plants do not classify as a “moral being with which we can have empathy.” 
Because of their radical otherness, which we cannot quickly assimilate into what is, for 
us, familiar, plants can foster an encounter that she calls “authentic,” and which I would 
call affective because it is transformative. “Some things are just unlike us,” Petrič claims, 
therefore the radical challenge is to create a situation that would allow us to encounter the 
radical other in a transformative, rather than familiar, way. The artist creates thus a condition 
of resistance with regard to anthropomorphization, the condition of encounter that would 
reveal the multiple agencies of the non-human: the agencies of light, plants and a human, 
who, through her kinetic immobility, creates a condition of disruptive communication.
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Figure 36. Špela Petrič, Skotopoiesis, 2015, 
performance Galerija Kapelica / Zavod Kersnikova, 
Ljubljana, http://www.spelapetric.org/portfolio/
skotopoiesis/, accessed 17 March 2017.
The Anthropos that slows down by creating a form of resistance to the quick solution and 
consensus, comes close to enacting the persona of an idiot of the ethics of contamination. 
The resistance to what “ought to be” happens by allowing for the generation of spaces of 
multiple encounters, but also, by allowing “the whole to generate what each one would have 
been unable to produce separately.”44 In her performance, Petrič enacted the persona of an 
idiot, who slows down and resists in order for something different to occur. In her work, 
however, the necessity to think outside the anthropocentric significations is never without 
the acknowledgment of the inevitably asymmetrical relations and anthropocentric privilege 
she, as a human, embodies. 
 Nevertheless, through the tension of this hierarchy of bodies in the encounter, her 
art captures imperceptible biosemiotic movements. This is an experimental approach to 
thought as practice, the biosemiotical urgency of creating material relations that would 
foster new processes of thinking. As she explains: 
The reason why I am doing this is because I have so many questions and I just 
have no idea how to answer them and be smart about it and serve the public, 
you know: ‘this is the way, I have read all the literature, trust me, I am and 
artist, I know what I am doing!’ Well, I don’t. So, I am hoping that through 
these series of experiments some things become clearer. Rather that relaying 
44 Stengers, “The Cosmopolitical Proposal,” 1002.
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on theory, I will just see how this process transforms me and my thoughts 
towards this.45
This collective understanding of Petrič practicing the persona of an idiot has a different, 
more resonant, I would say, persona that is a witch during her witchcraft. Not coincidentally, 
Deleuze and Guattari were writing about demons, sorcery and witchcraft as a possibility 
to think otherwise. Thinking with demons is thinking with relations, with movements, 
processes, encounters and tensions – presupposing that it is always a populated act within 
multiple becomings: “Demons are different from gods, because gods have fixed attributes, 
properties and functions, territories and codes: they have to do with rails, boundaries and 
surveys. What demons do is jump across intervals, and from one interval to another.”46 
 The interval jump from an idiot to a new persona reflects a pursuit of a ritual, the 
repetition of movements through which difference may be produced. Concepts, glossaries, 
ways of thinking otherwise are neither given, nor neutral. They demand practice of habits, 
changing and re-shifting those very habits as none of them is separated from the body, form 
the material and are without material implications. Thus, when Deleuze and Guattari insist 
that “to think is always to follow the witch’s flight,”47 we should not take it as a metaphor, but 
an actual plea for embodying the relational practice of attachments and ritual encounters 
that would resist and betray your masters: 
There is always betrayal in a line of flight. Not trickery like that of an orderly 
man ordering his future, but betrayal like that of a simple man who no longer 
has any past or future. We betray the fixed powers which try to hold us back, 
the established powers of the earth. The movement of betrayal has been 
defined as a double turning-away: man turns his face away from God, who 
also turns his face away from man. It is in this double turning-away, in the 
divergence of faces, that the line of flight – that is, the deterritorialization of 
man – is traced.48
Contaminating matters of affect thus become the contemporary witchcrafts of which 
bioartists are the witches who establish new ways of practicing bodies and their multiple 
relationalities. Bodies of biotechnology demand these witches take flight, resist universal 
capture, create ways to repeat this resistance and sustaining the practice of mutation. Rather 
than a quick fascination with scientific enhancement, or a too prompt rejection on the 
grounds of essentialist judgement, today’s bodies of mutation, leaking, porous and multiple, 
45 Petrič, “Confronting Vegetal Otherness.”
46 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1987) 40.
47 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 41.
48 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 40.
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demand practices of creative resistance and its continuation. We can learn from these artists, 
by searching for new concepts, by changing the logic of thinking about bodies into relational 
and multibiopolitical, or we can remain the idiots of Cartesian consensus. This is not a 
choice between two opposite ways, between artistic fuzziness and academic rationalism. 
Rather than being within the epistemological debate, this is a choice concerning the very 
onto-epistemo-ethical way of life. This is the understanding that, as Zaretsky puts it, you 
“mutate or you die,49 which has never been more literal than now, when encountering the 
very mutants of multibodies that we are.
 As Stengers argues, for an idiot, it is not about creating the sphere of “a good common,” 
but rather it is to “slow down the construction of this common world, to create spaces 
for hesitation regarding what it means to say ‘good’.”50 These spaces of hesitation do not 
regard axiological judgements, the system of moral rules within which we can judge an 
action, intersubjectively and according to the given law. Rather, the spaces of resistance 
and hesitation create a sense of the necessity to stay with the trouble, as Haraway would 
put it. Creating spaces of hesitation means creating spaces of tension, of encounters that are 
not to be resolved in terms of “good will” of agreement. Instead, the contamination must 
occur and be sustained. Performing witchcraft through the witches flight is performing 
the contaminating matters of affect through thinking bodies and bodies of thinking in 
multiplication of an infinitive: to engage, and to be touched, and to relate, and to experiment, 
and to disagree, and to be eaten, and to fight, and to love, and to mutate, and to go back, and 
to think, and to touch, and to eat, and to slow down, and to plant, and to grow, and to act, 
and to listen, and to resist, and to live, and to die, and to laugh, and to matter, and... 
49 Peter Vidani, “‘Mutate or Die’ with Adam Zaretsky,” http://artscienceethics.tumblr.com/MutateOrDie, accessed 
17 February 2017.




We are bodies within affect – within mutating and growing relations of transformations. 
“How to live and practice the contaminating bodies within affect?” thus becomes a futile 
question, since we are already immersed within contaminations. The question of how to 
practice becomes rather a question of how to condition the growth and multiplication of 
that practice, since we tend to enact bodies as if we were autonomous, as if our thoughts 
were clear and certain. We live in the world of shadows, our knowledge is only partial; 
nevertheless, we are prone to quickly implement the belief in given categorizations and 
universalization. And yet, when we breathe, we change, and when we meet we transform 
each other, multiply and contaminate. Transformations happen imperceptibly, involuntarily, 
not only within the secured spaces of the clean lab, but also here, on this very page and 
moment, in a daily life of our many personas and non-personal multiple existence. If we can 
create the human-pig embryos, multispecies creatures, solar mutants and post-atomic food, 
can we also live with them all, as them? 
 When science and technology invent new bodies, new ideas about those bodies, we 
need new stories, new relations and ways of living and practicing those bodies. We need 
new modulating practices of thinking and think practicing where art, philosophy and 
science are not separate, but also do not form a convenient consensus. Rather, the multiple 
disciplines and bodies need space to be able to continue to challenge each other. We need to 
think about not only affect, but within affect – within the contaminations, spaces of risks, 
hesitations and doubt. Creation of spaces of tensions and experimentation becomes a way 
how to think about implications of affect for the way we practice contaminating matters. In 
other words, not only “think we must” as Isabelle Stenger, following Virginia Woolf, called 
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for,1 but we need to think in a particular way. We need to allow ourselves to take thinking 
as contamination to be our continuous practice of bodies’ transformative relationality. 
 The contaminating character of affect fosters new challenges and risks. Bodies within 
affect might be destroyed, changed, multiplied. Contamination as such, rather than 
being opposite to purity, becomes against the status quo, against the fixed identities. We 
become contagions of becoming, transemiotic GMOs that need to learn how to think with 
contagion so that we can further multiply and move, rather than remain fixed, within given 
hierarchies and segregations. Living within affect demands facing the radical risk of an 
encounter and the challenge of sustaining that risk and tension between multiple points of 
view. Sustaining the risk, diffractions and tensions between encountering bodies, species 
and even disciplines, as this book has demonstrated, becomes a new challenge of thinking 
and living within affect. 
 Importantly, the discussed bodies within affect do not suggest a release of tension 
by finding a common ground, but rather they demand securing the spaces and ways of 
contamination so that such a common ground does not become fixed and universal. 
Bodies within affect call for securing difference while differing, so that we are able to 
think otherwise each time, when encountering, relating with other bodies – be it species, 
disciplines, thoughts. Inevitably, bodies of affect generate questions of responsibility before 
the contaminations. The contaminating relationality of affect expresses messiness and 
risk that rather something to be avoided and managed, needs to be confronted and lived 
with, gaining, in this way, a perspective that fosters new material sensitivities, existential 
meanings and importance. But are you ready to touch the navel of our multibody? 
 Affect implies the understanding of meaning that transverses species division, 
making meaning a capacity of multispecies. Through continuous material repetitions of 
contaminations, we can condition encounters between bodies and, in this way, condition 
their creation of new meanings. This material meanings, rather than driven by the given 
logic of identification and signification, would respond to material and embodied sense 
of importance. It is the sense of importance that drives and generates our bodies that we 
need to learn how to sense, organize and sustain in their modulating transformations. It 
is a challenge, since how to know what is important, what might be important without 
prioritizing or excluding others?
 Our multibodies create transformative relationality according to conditions of what 
happen to be impersonal yet vital within a particular relationality. To foster such a notion 
of material meaning would be to create conditions of continuations of such relationality 
where new meanings, new arrangements of what becomes important formulate themselves. 
We need, then, to search for conditions and to experiment with these conditions, but not 
in order to find a universal method for their material application. Experimentation and 
search, in that sense, can never be fulfilled, never finished – it becomes a dark and hungry 
movement of our becoming. We can practice affect so that the relations of contaminations 
1 Stengers and Despret, Women Who Make a Fuss, 27–31.
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can be continued by repeating the search. We are blind in this world of shadows, but our 
disability becomes our capacity for the growing urge for relationality, experimentation with 
what we do not know.
 The crucial challenge is, however, how to repeat the practice of such relational 
experimentations and searching in a way that does not result in us falling into what we 
habitually consider as our prior sense of self, of identity. After all, it is me, not the multiple, 
writing this book, in order to prove my academic abilities. I cannot therefore question the 
very existence of my agency here, can I? Yet, we can find an impersonal multibody that was 
driving the very thinking and living process of the search.
 Thinking with the impersonal is thinking with the collective on the material scale that 
contaminates and transforms bodies within their relationality and encounters. Multibody 
of contaminants in this book, like those of G, P, E, B, S, T, C, M, O, S, A, V, becomes not only 
narrations of affect, little stories of transformation, but your and my new multibody, which 
we have become while reading. This multibody becomes a dynamic and material condition 
of how we can practice and continue to condition the practice of affect. Such a notion of 
agency, which is not one but more, that becomes a multibody of moving and mutating 
relationality while relating, as impersonal, fosters a different organization of relationality 
– a different condition of affect. Contamination becomes our immunity from fixation and 
identity. To live within contamination implies living in constant tension and encounter with 
the fear of losing once identity. 
 Bodies of affect foster an ethics of contamination – a condition of creating spaces and 
encounters so that transformations may occur and be exercised. Through learning and 
continuing the relations of transformations, by sustaining the tensions of contaminations, 
we foster not only thinking with affect, but living with the consequences of affect – the 
contaminating, impersonal, driven by necessity mutating multispecies multibody that 
we are, again and again, anew. The question is, are we ready to practice the multiple – to 
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Onze opvatting van het lichaam als passieve biologische materialiteit staat ter discussie 
sinds de opkomst van genetische-modificatietechnieken, stamcelonderzoek en 
weefselmanipulatie. Biotechnologisch onderzoek vertelt ons nu dat lichamen dood én 
levend kunnen zijn; ze kunnen menselijk en niet-menselijk zijn; meervoudig en toch één; 
of ze kunnen de volledige biologische informatie van een persoon bevatten en toch als 
commercieel object worden beschouwd. De manier waarop wij denken over lichamen, 
en hoe wij praktisch omgaan met lichamen, toont zich radicaal anders dan de manier 
waarop biotechnologische toepassingen met deze lichamen omgaan. In dit boek worden 
de voorwaarden van denken over, en omgaan met lichamen binnen affect onderzocht. Het 
voornaamste uitgangspunt bij dit onderzoek is dat lichamen bestaan uit veranderende en 
groeiende transformaties waarmee we geconfronteerd worden, als gevolg van, met name, 
manipulaties van lichamen door de levenswetenschappen.
 De huidige biotechnologische werkwijzen die het lichaam manipuleren, tonen de 
noodzaak om de wederkerige relatie tussen de theorie en praktijk van levende lichamen 
te accepteren en te implementeren. Om greep te krijgen op de continuïteit van theorie en 
praktijk van lichamen, richt ik mij op het concept van affect zoals dat naar voren komt 
in de filosofie van Gilles Deleuze, met name in zijn interpretatie van Baruch Spinoza en 
Jakob von Uexküll. De notie van affect wordt gebruikt om de relationele, contaminerende 
materialiteiten van onze lichamen te begrijpen, en de term ‘affect’ confronteert ons met 
de feitelijke implicaties van het praktische omgaan met lichamen. Ik stel dat affect, als 
een transformatieve relationaliteit, teweeggebracht wordt door biokunstenaars en bio-
ontwerpers die werken met levende lichamen als artistiek medium. Dat is de reden dat ik, 
door goed te kijken naar hoe kunstenaars de relationele capaciteiten van lichamen in hun 
werk gebruiken, zoek naar de voorwaarden om praktisch om te gaan met lichamen binnen 
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affect. Dit boek stelt dat gebruik maken van affect een andere logica van denken vereist, 
die materiële implicaties adresseert voor de manier waarop we niet alleen vandaag de dag 
het lichaam begrijpen, maar ook, en in het bijzonder, hoe we omgaan met lijfelijke en niet-
lijfelijke lichamen binnen een breed socio-politiek en ethisch gebied. 
 Teneinde onze manier van denken over lichamen te veranderen wordt de notie van 
contaminatie gebruikt als een manier om relaties tussen meervoudige gebieden en 
standpunten te bestuderen en analyseren. Contaminatie staat niet in tegenstelling tot 
puurheid maar wordt gebruikt als de bevestiging van relaties van transformatie. Het boek is 
gestructureerd aan de hand van twee hoofdtrajecten: 1) de studie van de wijze waarop bio-
kunst “conditionerende contaminaties” gebruikt, die ons in staat stelt de manieren van het 
praktisch omgaan met lichamen binnen affect in kaart te brengen; en 2) een incarnatie van dit 
in kaart brengen binnen New Materialism denken en de daaraan gerelateerde onderwerpen, 
die cruciaal zijn in de zoektocht naar de condities van het omgaan met lichamen binnen 
affect; dat wil zeggen, een behoefte aan menselijke en niet-menselijke egalitaire reciprociteit; 
een openheid naar het creëren van non-linguïstische vormen van betekenis; de notie 
van agency en subjectiviteit buiten het menselijke domein; de verantwoordelijkheid die 
voortvloeit uit een “materiële contaminatie” die vormgeeft aan theorie en praktijk. In 
beide trajecten van dit boek worden filosofische analyse, kunstontmoetingen en reflectie 
op de werkwijzen van levenswetenschappen gecombineerd. Tegelijkertijd worden ze ook 
ontwricht en gecomplementeerd door contaminanten. 
 Contaminanten ontwrichten ieder hoofdstuk en constitueren een drijvende kracht 
in termen van wat belangrijk is bij onze ontmoeting met de transformatieve relaties van 
lichamen. Door ontwrichting zijn contaminanten de verhalen van gedurfde transformaties 
die niet alleen lichamen doorkruisen, maar ook disciplines en perspectieven over 
lichamen. Toch komt elk verhaal wankelend naderbij, en wordt urgent en belangrijk voor 
het fantaseren van onze wederzijdse multilichamen, de lezer achterlatend met niet alleen 
een contaminerende manier van denken, maar ook met begrip van de noodzaak van deze 
manier van denken over het praktische omgaan met lichamen binnen affect.
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